In Conjunction with

Touro Institute

Causes and Prevention of War

An F-16 Fighting Falcon dropped two joint direct attack munitions on the bombing range over Chik-Do Island, South Korea, during training July 2. The munitions were dropped by Lt. Col. Eric Schnitzer from the 80th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Alex Lloyd.)

Course Highlights

This course features an extensive reading list addressing topics related to the causes and prevention of war.

Course Instructor

Prof. Stephen Van Evera
Course Description

The causes and prevention of interstate war are the central topics of this course. The course goal is to discover and assess the means to prevent or control war. Hence we focus on manipulable or controllable war-causes. The topics covered include the dilemmas, misperceptions, crimes and blunders that caused wars of the past; the origins of these and other war-causes; the possible causes of wars of the future; and possible means to prevent such wars, including short-term policy steps and more utopian schemes.

The historical cases covered include World War I, World War II, Korea, Indochina, and the Peloponnesian, Crimean and Seven Years wars.

Syllabus

Course Topic

The causes and prevention of interstate war.

Course Goal

Discovering and assessing means to prevent or control war. Hence we focus on manipulable or controllable causes. The topics covered include the dilemmas, misperceptions, crimes and blunders that caused wars of the past; the origins of these and other war-causes; the possible causes of wars of the future; and possible means to prevent such wars, including short-term policy steps and more utopian schemes.

The historical cases covered include the Peloponnesian and Seven Years wars, World War I, World War II, Korea, the Arab-Israel conflict, and the U.S.-Iraq and U.S.-Al Qaeda wars.

Final Exam

A final will be given when all lecture material has been covered and the student feels they are ready.

Readings

Students should buy these books or make sure they are available in a nearby library:


**Calendar**

**Course calendar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lec #</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>The causes of war in perspective. Does international politics follow regular laws of motion? If so, how can we discover them? Can we use methods like those of the physical sciences?</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 Hypotheses on Military Factors as Causes of War Misperception and War; Religion and War</td>
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<td>10 Hypotheses on Misperception and the Causes of War Hypotheses from Psychology; Militarism; Nationalism; Spirals and Deterrence; Religion and War; Defects in Academe and the Press</td>
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### Course calendar

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lec #</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>III. Cases: Wars and Crises</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Seven Years War</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>The Wars of German Unification: 1864, 1866, and 1870; and Segue to World War I</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Interlude: Hypotheses on Escalation and Limitation of War; and Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Strategy, other Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Causes of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<td>20-21</td>
<td>The Cold War, Korea and Indochina</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>The Peloponnesian War</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-24</td>
<td>The Israel-Arab Conflict; the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War</td>
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<td><strong>IV. The Future of War</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>25-26</td>
<td>Testing and Applying Theories of War Causation; the Future of War, Solutions to War</td>
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<td>Final Exam</td>
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### Readings

The readings are also available by session. This course also has an extensive set of further readings.

**Text**


I also recommend--but don't require--that students buy a copy of the following book that will improve your papers:


Turabian has the basic rules for formatting footnotes and other style rules. You will want to follow these rules so your writing looks spiffy and professional.

**Readings by Session**

**Course readings.**

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<td>II. Hypotheses on the Causes of War</td>
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<td>2-3</td>
<td>8 Hypotheses on Military Factors as Causes of War</td>
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Course readings.

Lec # | topics | readings
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A basic discussion of a modest proposal: tossing the weapons in the ocean. A good idea?

The classic statement of "stability theory," which frames the dangers that arise with a first-strike advantage.

False optimism as a cause of war.

Note: these page are 20% of the article; much of the rest (pp. 204-236) is assigned over the next two weeks. Please focus for now on pages 193-203, which discuss the crucial matter of offense, defense, and war.

I include this article partly to clue you to my reflexes on the causes of war. Your skepticism is allowed.

For your optional delectation see also John Mueller's collection of predictions about war, "Various Shapes of Things to Come". Has our understanding of war made progress since the days of Henry Buckle, Randolph Bourne, and David Starr Jordan? And see also, for background, the data on war deaths from:
### Course readings.

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<tr>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>Misperception and War; Religion and War</td>
<td>Van Evera, Stephen. &quot;Primed for Peace.&quot; pp. 204-211.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hypotheses on Misperception and the Causes of War</td>
<td>Hedges, Chris. &quot;In Bosnia's Schools, 3 Ways Never to Learn From History,&quot; <em>New York Times,</em> November 25, 1997, p. A1. It was once said that &quot;war begins in the classroom.&quot; Is that such a silly notion? Do the Balkans' separate realities, and the Balkan wars of the 1990s, stem from separate and divergent</td>
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Course readings.

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<td>teaching of the past?</td>
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Pages 38-55, 62-68, 91-94 describe the Islamist currents of thinking that spawned Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's violence stems from a stream of Islamist thought going back to ibn Taymiyya, a bellicose Islamic thinker from the 13th century; to Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the harsh and rigid shaper of modern Saudi Arabian Islam; to Rashid Rida (1866-1935) and Hassan al-Banna (?-1949); and above all to Sayyid Qutb (?-1966), the shaper of modern Islamism. Taymiyya, al-Wahhab and Qutb are covered here. Covered also (pp. 91-94) is the frightening rise of apocalyptic thinking in the Islamic world. What causes the murderous thinking described here?

Pages 419-446 cover the phenomenon of millenarianism (apocalyptic thinking) in other religions--Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity. This violent, even genocidal (globacidal?) form of religious thought has appeared widely in the last two decades. Why? How can it be tamed before it is used to justify great horrors?


Lampman, Jane. "Mixing Prophecy and Politics,"
Course readings.

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Van Evera. &quot;Primed for Peace.&quot; pp. 211-236. On the democracy and polarity questions, who is more persuasive, Mearsheimer or this guy?</td>
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<td>Eriksson, Mikael, and Peter Wallensteen. &quot;Armed Conflict 1989-2003.&quot; Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 5 (September 2004): 625-631. Nearly all wars today are civil wars. The number of wars has declined sharply since 1990 - back down to the number observed in the mid-1970s, but still more than the number observed during 1946-76. Will these trends continue?</td>
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III. Cases: Wars and Crises
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<td>12-14</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<td>Admiral Müller's notes on the Council.) This book summarizes the views of the &quot;Fischer School,&quot; which argues that German aggression was a prime cause of World War I. Others believe Fisher and Geiss blame Germany unduly. Who’s right?</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Kitchen, Martin. "The Army and the Idea of Preventive War," and "The Army and the Civilians." Chapters 5 and 6 in *The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1968, pp. 96-142. ISBN: 0198214677. In Germany the army also purveyed the concept of preventive war, the notion that war was healthy and beneficial, and other exotic ideas; and within Germany it became a law unto itself - a "state within the state," in Gordon Craig's phrase.

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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Interlude: Hypotheses on Escalation and Limitation of War; and Nuclear</td>
<td>German elementary and high schools were channels of nationalist propaganda.</td>
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<td>Causes of War</td>
<td>A summary of the events of the strange and amazing July crisis.</td>
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<td>For more on World War I origins see the World War I Document Archive.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And for more on the role of German public opinion in causing the war see specifically:</td>
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<td>Iklé, Fred. <em>Every War Must End</em>. pp. 1-105. Can war be rationally conducted and controlled? This superb book makes you wonder.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>A basic rundown of the issues.</td>
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<td>Rees, Martin. *Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future in this</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>The advance of science has a fearsome byproduct: we are discovering ever more powerful means of destruction. These destructive powers are being democratized: the mayhem that only major states can do today may lie within the capacity of millions of individuals in the future unless we somehow change course. Deterrence works against states but will fail against crazed non-state organizations or individuals. How can the spread of destructive powers be controlled?</td>
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<td>For more on controlling the longterm bioweapons danger see &quot;Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System.&quot; (a monograph by John Steinbruner and Elisa Harris.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Kelly, Henry C. &quot;Terrorism and the Biology Lab,&quot; New York Times, July 2, 2003. The biology profession must realize that its research, if left unregulated, could produce discoveries that gravely threaten our safety. Biologists must develop a strategy to keep biology from being used for destructive ends.</td>
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<td>leading up to the war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ienaga. <em>The Pacific War 1931-1945</em>. pp. vii-152, 247-256. Was the Japanese decision for war a rational response to circumstances, or in some sense &quot;irrational&quot;? Ienaga and Sagan disagree - who's right?</td>
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<td>Utley, Jonathan G. <em>Going to War With Japan</em></td>
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<td>Was the crucial American decision to cut off oil exports to Japan taken by a bureaucracy out of control? Utley and Heinrichs disagree. How can this mystery be unravelled?</td>
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<td>A summary of Goldhagen's famous argument that Germany committed the holocaust because most Germans embraced an eliminationist anti-semitism. How could we test Goldhagen's argument?</td>
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<td>Mythmaking about Japan's role in World War II continues, stirring suspicion and anger elsewhere in Asia.</td>
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<td>Stoessinger, John. <em>Nations at Dawn</em>. pp. xi-119. Paterson, et al. is a standard history; Stoessinger...</td>
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Shavit interviews Benny Morris, one of Israel's leading historians, on the realities and ethics of Israel's expulsion of 700,000-750,000 Palestinians during the 1948 war. In the past Morris led in exposing the expulsion; now he is a prominent defender of it, arguing that sometimes ethnic cleansing is necessary.

Bumiller, Elisabeth. "Was a Tyrant Prefigured by Baby Saddam?" New York Times, May 15, 2004. Saddam Hussein was severely abused as a child and as a result suffered narcissism and other personality disorders. Does this help explain the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars? Can the U.S. deter or coerce such people if it better understands their personal demons?


Kaysen, Carl. "Is War Obsolete?" In Cold War and After. Edited by Sean M. Lynn-Jones. pp. 81-103. Kaysen says past causes of war are already gone. But if he's right, why does war continue?

Ziegler, David. "World Government," and "Collective Security." Chapters 8, and 11 in War, Peace and IR. pp. 127-45, 179-203. ISBN: 0316984930. Many people have offered these answers. Do you think they would work? (Why haven't they been implemented yet?)
Course readings.

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<td>Review again Rees, <em>Our Final Hour</em>, pp. 41-60, and 73-88 (assigned above.)</td>
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<td>Bush, George W. &quot;Second Inaugural Address.&quot; Inauguration, Washington, DC, January 20, 2005. President Bush announces a U.S. policy of promoting freedom and liberty, on grounds that &quot;as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny... violence will gather and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat.... The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom.&quot;</td>
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Final Exam
Further Readings

The Causes of War

The causes of war, general and theoretical works:


Arms and War


Misperception


Gender and War


**Militarism**


See also representative writings on war and international affairs by military officers, e.g., Friedrich von Bernhardi, Ferdinand Foch, Giulio Douhet, Nathan Twining, Thomas Powers, and Curtis LeMay.

**Nationalism - General Works**


**Ingroup-Outgroup Dynamics**


**Nationalist Mythmaking**


**Democratic Peace Theory, Dictatorial Peace Theory**


**Human Instinct Theories of War**


**Religion and War**


A survey of the problem of religion and war.


**Civil War, its Control**


**Negotiation and Diplomacy**


Mediation


Limited War


For more references, see Smoke's bibliography.

Arms Races


Historical Sources

General surveys of global international history include:


For more sources see the bibliography in Palmer and Colton. Another excellent bibliographic source is *War and Society Newsletter: A Bibliographical Survey*. Edited by Jürgen Förster, David French, David Stevenson and Russel Van Wyk. Munich: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, annual since 1973; it lists articles and book chapters relevant to international relations and war.

General surveys of European international history:


Also pertinent are the relevant books in four series of general histories:

The "Langer" series, published by Harper Torchbooks, 15-odd volumes covering western history since 1200, under the general editorship of William Langer (e.g. Sontag, Raymond. *A Broken World, 1919-1939*.)

The Longman's "General History of Europe" series, covering western history since Roman times, published by Longman, under the general editorship of Denys Hays (e.g. Roberts, J. M. *Europe 1880-1945*.)

The Fontana "History of Europe" series, published by Fontana/Collins, covering history since the middle ages, under the general editorship of J.H. Plumb (e.g. Grenville, J. A. S. *Europe Reshaped, 1848-78*.)

The "New Cambridge Modern History" and "Cambridge Ancient History" series, covering western history from the beginning.

**The Seven Years War**

An overview:


On the Franco-British conflict in the Seven Years War:


On the Prussian-Austrian-Russian-French war of 1756:


**The Crimean War**


**The Italian Wars of Independence**


**The Wars of German Unification**


**World War I**

Basic histories include:


Surveys of debates about the war's origins are:


Other sources on the origins of the war include:


Contemporary descriptions of the political climate in Germany are:


Other works on themes pertinent to this course include:


(on wartime press coverage.)


Readable accounts of the war itself include:


On Versailles an introduction is:


**World War II in Europe**


The Pacific War


The Origins of the Cold War


The Korean War


**The Indochina War**


A vivid personal account by an American soldier.


The Peloponnesian War


The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War


An excellent, horrifying study.

By a perceptive Iraqi patriot and MIT graduate.

See the 100 pages in here criticizing U.S. policy in the Gulf War.


**The Cuban Missile Crisis**


**The Arab-Israel Conflict**

Surveys include:

An outstanding history by a leading Israeli "new historian."

Also excellent, by another top Israeli "new historian."

Even-handed and judicious.

An excellent history.


Judicious and high-quality.
Even-handed but pretty basic.

Mildly pro-Israel.

(many editions.) Mildly pro-Arab. Legalistic.

Pro-Arab but not blindly so. Has some facts wrong on 1967 war.

**Historiographic Debates**

A rather heated but also excellent assessment of some important historiographical controversies.

Another excellent survey of important historiographical controversies.

**National Histories**

The best single history.

The best single history.

**Movement Histories**


A brilliant classic.

Relevant Ancient History


Peace Negotiations in Recent Years


A survey of recent events. Pressman is a recent Ph.D. graduate from the MIT political science department.


Anti-semitism - The Root of the Evil


See also relevant entries in the Encyclopedia Judaica, from which this book is excerpted. In this dark story lies a key to the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict.


A fine account of western Christian persecution of the Jews. If this account is accepted the party most responsible for the Israel-Arab conflict becomes clear: the anti-semitic Christian west.

Excellent press coverage of current events in the MidEast can be found on line from Israel's *Ha'aretz*, an outstanding newspaper.

On Soviet military policy Western analyses are:


Translated Soviet writings on this subject include:


**The Terror War**


**Other Contemporary Wars**


**Lecture Notes**

Below is a selection of lecture notes that approximate chronologically the topics and themes listed on the calendar.

**Lecture Notes**

Introduction (PDF)

8 Hypotheses on Military Factors and the Causes of War (PDF)

10 Hypotheses on Misperception and the Causes of War (PDF)

More Causes of War and Peace (PDF)
The Seven Years War (PDF)
The Crimean War (PDF)
The Prussian Wars of Unification (PDF)
World War I (PDF)
World War II (PDF)
The Nuclear Revolution (PDF)
The Causes of Intense War (PDF)
The Cold War and Korea (PDF)
The Peloponnesian War (PDF)

**Additional Material**

Spiral and Deterrence Models (PDF)

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**COURSE OVERVIEW**

I. COURSE QUESTIONS
What causes war? Including: wars of the past, present, and future. How can war best be prevented? We focus on interstate war. If there were more to read on civil war we would cover it in more depth, but the civil war literature is very thin.

II. EXISTING LITERATURE: IT LEAVES THE WAR MYSTERY ONLY PARTLY SOLVED

III. IDEAS OF THE COURSE: FAMILIES OF HYPOTHESES
A. Military factors: e.g., arms as war cause and disarmament as solution; "crisis instability" and the "security dilemma" as war causes; disarmament as a solution to war.

B. Misperception: false optimism; nationalist mythmaking; etc.

C. Diplomatic/foreign policy bungles & blunders.

IV. CLASS MISSIONS
A. Explaining historical cases: making/testing theories of war's causes; making prescriptions. How can war be prevented?
B. Sharing thoughts on writing.

V. 7 CASES EXPLORED: World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Seven Years War, Crimea, Peloponnesian War.

VI. GRADES AND REQUIREMENTS
A. Background required: none. Students with zero history background are welcome. We start from the beginning.
B. Requirements.

C. Discussion sections start next week. Debates on responsibility for the two world wars are featured.
VII. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CAUSES OF WAR. Testing social science theories.

1. Observation v. experimentation.

2. Large-n (statistical) method v. case study method.

B. Criticisms of social "science."

1. "Accidents drive history--'butterflies cause hurricanes' in history--hence general theories cannot explain much." Annie Oakley's crucial role in history.

2. "Each historical event is unique; hence generalization is futile, even misleading." Implied: politics has no laws of motion.

3. "Human will defeats our effort to generalize about human conduct. Once we know what people will do, they'll change their minds."

4. "Social data is bad, hence social science has no reliable empirical basis."

5. "Social science methods are gendered/biased."
MILITARY POLICY AND THE CAUSES OF WAR: EIGHT HYPOTHESES

I. FIRST MOVE ADVANTAGE (or "crisis instability"). "The greater the advantage that accrues to the side mobilizing or striking first, the greater the risk of war." See Schelling, Arms and Influence, chapter 6 (in the course notes).

A. When does it pay / not pay / to move (mobilize or strike) first?
   1. The problem is two-sided. Their first-move advantage is also yours.

2. First-strike vs. first-mobilization advantages. Both are dangerous.

B. Dangers Raised by a First-Move Advantage (FMA):

1. Opportunistic war. ("If we strike first we win, so let's strike and capture the benefits of winning?") Not a profound point, but many analysts don't get beyond it.

2. Preemptive war. "We fear they will strike, so we must strike." Examples: Israel's 1967 attack on Egypt; Russia's 1914 mobilization. And two extensions: "Accidental War." Example: 1890 Battle of Wounded Knee. "The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack"--Schelling. ("We fear they fear we fear they will strike; so they may strike; so we must.") This is the common formulation of the problem--but the least realistic. History shows that reciprocal fear almost never happens--perhaps because states seldom see themselves as threats to others so they seldom expect others to fear them.

3. The "Dangers of Candor"--the most serious of these 3 risks. States conceal their grievances and their capabilities ("we must lull them into believing we are weak and benign; otherwise we can't gain surprise.") This makes inadvertent war and wars of false optimism more likely.


c. States conceal their misperceptions, leaving others unable to correct these misperceptions: China 1950.

d. States conceal their military and diplomatic miscalculations: Britain and France 1956, Prussia 1740, North Korea 1950, Japan 1941.

C. Types of war caused by FMA: first mobilization vs. first strike; preemption of opponents vs. preemption of neutral states.

D. How can a First Move Advantage Be Prevented? The ingredients and antidotes to an FMA.

1. Is a secret military move possible? This is a function of two factors: (a) the concealment of the attack; (b) the speed of the attack. If so, peace is bolstered by transparency and slow-traveling weapons.

2. Can a successful secret move change force ratios in the attacker's favor?

3. Is the offense powerful relative to the defensive in warfare? If the offense is very weak there is little first-move advantage even if states can change force ratios by stealthy first moves.
E. How common are first-move advantages? (Very rare.) How often have they been perceived? (Often!) Actual first-move advantages, being scarce, cause little trouble. The illusion of first-move advantage, being common, causes lots of trouble.

F. How could the first-move advantage hypothesis be tested?

II. "WINDOWS" OF OPPORTUNITY & VULNERABILITY (causing "preventive war"): "The greater the fluctuations in the relative power of states, the greater the risk of war." A. Varieties of preventive war:
1. Internally-caused windows: Germany 1914 vs. Russia, Hitler vs. Britain & France 1940, Germany & Japan vs. USA 1941, Israel vs. Egypt 1956, Sparta vs. Athens 440 BCE, US vs. Iraq 1991 CE.
2. Externally (diplomatically)-caused windows: Germany 1914, Japan 1941, USA 1812, indeed all wide wars...
3. Tactical vs. Strategic windows.

B. Dangers raised by Windows:
1. Attack pays for the declining state ("war is better now than later, and since war later is likely let's start a war now!"); and belligerent diplomacy makes more sense for the decliner ("a war now would not be such a bad thing, let's risk it!") (USA 1950s.)
2. The rising state has less credibility, hence others won't settle disputes with it. ("They will break promises made in weakness after they gain strength, so agreements with them are worthless!") Arabs & Israelis 1930s.
3. Haste, truncated diplomacy ("we must resolve any disputes before our power wanes."):  
   b. No time to warn ---> one side underestimates another's will. Examples: Germany misread Britain, 1914; Finland misread the USSR, 1939; Egypt misread American intentions, 1967.

C. How common are windows? (Common in perception, rare in reality. As German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck said, preventive war is usually to "commit suicide from fear of death." Why are illusory windows so often imagined?)

D. Applications to today: would nuclear disarmament create dangerous windows? Would nuclear proliferation?

III. FALSE OPTIMISM: "If losers could foresee their defeat they would not fight; hence false optimism on the outcome of war raises the risk of war." (See Blainey, Causes of War, in course notes.) A. Three types of false optimism:
2. Optimism about relative will: Japan 1941, Confederacy 1861, USA 1965.
3. Optimism about relative access to allies: Germany 1939, North Korea 1950, Germany 1914.

IV. CUMULATIVE RESOURCES: "The greater the cumulativity of resources (i.e. the more that control of one resource enables control of another) the greater the risk of war." Buffer Room: "we need to control our lifelines/backyard etc." Convertible resources, e.g., industry Credibility (How does the nuclear revolution change things?)

V. CHEAP WAR: "War is least common when its costs are greatest."

VI. EASY CONQUEST/OFFENSE-DOMINANCE: "The easier conquest becomes, the greater the risk of war." See Hugh Gibson 1932, Robert Jervis 1978; and see assigned reading by SVE, "Primed for Peace." A related idea: the "security dilemma." A. What is the "Security Dilemma"? It arises when states' efforts to secure themselves leave other states insecure. B. Are offensive forces and force postures distinguishable from defensive forces and force postures? (Sometimes.) Does the offense-defense balance vary across time and space? (Yes; cf. the battles of France, 1914 and 1940.)

C. Ten (10) Dangers that Arise When Conquest Is Easy:

1. Opportunistic aggression. When conquest is easy cheap gains can be had by war, so states go to war.

2. Defensive aggression. States are less secure because their borders are harder to defend and their neighbors are more aggressive. Hence they want to expand to make their borders more defensible; and they want to cut their neighbors down to size.

3. Fierce resistance to others' expansion. Small gains by an enemy can snowball, so every gain must be strongly opposed. This intensifies the collision between expansionist states and others.

4. First-move advantages are larger because states can make greater territorial gains with any military advantages gained by mobilizing first or striking first.

5. Windows are larger for the same reason. Small force-ratio advantages can be converted into large territorial gains, small force-ratio disadvantages may translate into large losses, so states are anxious to strike while they have the upper hand, if they see themselves in decline.

6. *Fait Accompli* tactics:

   a. Are more tempting to adopt ("we must gain our aims, since our safety is threatened if we fail; hence we should adopt even reckless diplomatic tactics if they will work.")

   b. Have more dangerous effects if adopted.

7. Alliances are tighter, hence wars have a greater propensity to spread (e.g., 1914). ("We can't let our allies go under or we'll be next; so we must join every war they get into, even wars they start.")

8. Secrecy is tighter, hence miscalculation and misperception are more common; and errors flowing therefrom have more catastrophic and less reversible consequences. ("If they knew our plans and forces our enemies could conquer us; hence we must observe dark
9. Arms racing is more intense, giving rise to windows of opportunity and vulnerability, and to false optimism.

10. Offense-dominance is self-feeding: offense breeds offense. ("Offense is the stronger form of war; we should buy what works so let's buy offensive forces.")

D. How can these hypotheses be tested? What are their observable implications? How much history can they explain? Tests and what they show:
1. In the past states were often driven to war by the search for security. In a world of very strong defenses this search would not be necessary, and the wars caused by this search could be avoided.

2. War has been more common when & where security was believed scarce.

E. Causes of Offensive and Defensive Advantage:
1. Military factors:
   i. Arms.
   ii. Geography.
   iii. Nationalism.
   iv. Urban vs. Rural setting.

2. Diplomatic factors:
   i. Are alliances defensive or defensive/offensive?
   ii. Do "balancers" exist and do they balance?
   iii. Can "collective security" be made to work?

3. The conflict between arms and diplomacy: can defending your allies require offensive forces?

F. Are Offensive Military Strategies Always Bad? Despite the dangers listed under "A", is offense sometimes the best strategy anyway?
1. When the offense already dominates?

2. For "extended deterrence" (i.e. protecting allies)?

3. For scaring aggressor-states into better behavior?

4. For scaring small or weak states into better behavior?

5. For limiting one's own damage in wars, & ending wars?

6. For reforming otherwise-unreformable aggressor states?

G. How Easy Is Conquest in the Real World? Does the Nuclear Revolution Make Conquest Easier or Harder?

VII. ARMS RACING AND WARA. Causes of Arms Racing:
1. Secrecy.

2. Offense-dominance, offensive doctrines and force postures.
a. Direct effects (offensive forces spur more counter-building by the other side.)

b. Indirect effects: secrecy, less arms control.

B. Does Arms Racing Cause War? (Is it more a cause or a symptom of international conflict?)

1. It causes windows.

2. It causes false optimism.

3. Why the importance of arms racing is exaggerated: war and arms racing are correlated, but is the correlation spurious? (Does mutual hostility cause them both, creating an illusion of causation?)

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NATIONAL MISPERCEPTION AND THE CAUSES OF WAR

I. HOW COMMON IS MISPERCEPTION? HOW DANGEROUS? IS IT ALWAYS DANGEROUS WHEN IT APPEARS? Sometimes misperceptions prevent war, e.g., if states are insecure but don't know it they may refrain from wars they might start if they knew the truth. However, it's often true that misperceptions on either side of the reality baseline raise the risk of war, e.g.: Exaggeration or underestimating others' hostility can cause war. False optimism or false pessimism can cause war.

II. THREE PARADIGMS OF NATIONAL MISPERCEPTION: PSYCHOLOGY, OPACITY, COZENOLOGY

III. HYPOTHESES FROM PSYCHOLOGY (from Jervis 1968, Jervis 1976, in course notes)

A. "Attribution theory"—states tend to attribute their own aggressive behavior to their situation, while attributing others' aggressive behavior to their innate disposition. States therefore see their own nasty conduct as excused by necessity, while others' nasty conduct is unprovoked and unjustified.

B. A related syndrome: states tend to ascribe others' good behavior to their own efforts to make the other behave well, and to blame others' bad conduct on the other's innate disposition. (Jervis 1968, hypo #11.)

C. Belief perseverance—states are slow to absorb new facts & realities that clash with their elite's existing beliefs. (Jervis 1968, hypo #1, #2.)

D. States tend to exaggerate the shared character of information, hence to exaggerate the effectiveness of communication. Hence they are unaware of their own and others' misperceptions. (Jervis 1968, hypo #5, #6, #12.)

E. States tend to infer too much from isolated or unique events, and to mis-apply domestic analogies to international politics. F. States tend to exaggerate the centralized/disciplined/coordinated character of others' behavior. (Jervis 1968, hypo #9.)

Question: can you think of competing non-psychological explanations for any of these misperceptions (e.g., misperceptions B or C?)

IV. HYPOTHESES FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY #1: GOVT. BUREAUCRACIES AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS AS THE SOURCES OF ELITE AND PUBLIC MISPERCEPTION. "Militarism."

1. Two militarism theories:

a. "Militaries live by war so they cause war." Joseph Schumpeter, Alexis de Tocqueville, and others. Historical facts give this version little support.

b. "Militaries infuse civilian society with organizationally self-serving ideas that leads civilians to start wars. Militaries do this to preserve/protect their organizational interests." The professional military and

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MORE CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE: Culture, Gender, Language, Democracy, Social equality and social justice, Minority rights and human rights, Prosperity, Economic interdependence, Revolution, Capitalism, Imperial decline and collapse, Cultural learning, Religion, Emotional factors (revenge, contempt, honor), Polarity of the international system; Causes of civil war.

I. CULTURAL CAUSES OF WAR

"Some national cultures incline toward war. For example, harsh German child-rearing practices makes Germans belligerent." See, e.g., Leopold Bellak's op-ed in the coursenotes.

Is this explanation satisfying? What causes culture?
Is this cause of war manipulable?

II. GENDER AND WAR

"Men cause war. War would diminish with the greater empowerment of women." See the reading in the coursenotes on this subject by Joshua Goldstein.

Is this explanation valid? What evidence would test it?
Are observed correlations between gender and attitudes on war causal or spurious?
That is, are women more dovish because they depend more on government services, etc.?
Does the greater dovishness of women mean they would better avoid war if they were more powerful? Perhaps they would appease their way into war.
Is this cause of war manipulable?

III. PERSONALITY DISORDER CAUSES WAR

Such disorders include narcissism, megalomania, and sociopathology. In this view these disorders are overrepresented among governing elites in many states.

Studies of this hypothesis are few--more are needed.

IV. DEMOCRACY CAUSES PEACE

"Democratic states are more peaceful, especially in their relations with each other. This is because publics are more anti-war than elites, making states ruled by the public more peaceful; and because democratic publics are infused with democratic values that clash with the notion of conquering and ruling others against their will." An argument by Imanuel Kant, Michael Doyle and others.

Is this hypothesis valid? What evidence would test it? (Strong evidence supports it.)
Is this cause of war/peace manipulable? Can democracy by conjured up and sustained in non-democratic societies?
Does democratization promote peace in multiethnic authoritarian states? Civil conflict in Sri Lanka, Congo Brazzaville and Indonesia warns that democratization can cause war in such settings.
V. SOCIAL EQUALITY, SOCIAL JUSTICE
"Social inequity causes war by creating social conflict that elites defuse by pursuing conflict with other states. Social inequity also spurs elites to sow war-causing nationalist myths in order to defuse demands from below."

Is this cause of war manipulable? Not easily!

VI. MINORITY RIGHTS; OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS
"Minorities that are treated fairly are less likely to pursue secession by force. This dampens the risk of civil war."
The U.S. government has acted to protect minority rights in Eastern Europe under this hypothesis. But minority rights are often hard to nurture.

VII. PROSPERITY
"Prosperity gives people more to lose in war, so they avoid war more carefully. Prosperity also promotes democracy, which independently promotes peace."

Prosperity may cause peace indirectly, by promoting democracy, which in turn causes less nationalism and more equality. But it seems to have little direct effect on the risk of war.
Also, prosperity is hard to foster from abroad.

VIII. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
"Economic interdependence raises the cost of cutting economic ties between states. This dampens the risk of war by raising its costs." An argument by Imanuel Kant among others.

The opposite may also occur. States that depend on foreign materials or imports may fear being strangled by embargo or blockade and therefore use force to establish direct control over these resources, as Germany and Japan did in World War II.

IX. MASS REVOLUTION
"Regimes that seize power by mass revolution are more warlike because they are infused with myths of their own enormous goodness, leading to a messianic expansionism. They also exaggerate the ease of overthrowing regimes, since their own experience of revolutionary success makes overthrows seem easier than they are. This leads them to recklessly attempt to overthrow neighboring regimes, and also to be unreasonably fearful of being overthrown by counterrevolution-leading to foreign campaigns against counterrevolutionary regimes." An argument made by Stephen Walt in a book and an article on the subject.

This theory seems well-supported by evidence. But the world's mass revolutions seem largely behind us; and mass revolution is hard to influence.

X. COMMUNISM
"Communist regimes are infused with a revolutionary messianism that leads them into foreign wars."
This is basically a variant of the previous proposition, "Mass Revolution."

XI. CAPITALISM
"Capitalist states must conquer the markets that their economies require to avoid recessions and depressions. This leads to wars over colonies and wars against colonies." A favorite Marxist argument.

This hypotheses fits some wars during 1890-1918, but not more recent wars. And it points to a cause that is not manipulable.

XII. IMPERIAL DECLINE AND COLLAPSE
"The collapse of empires leaves the zone of imperial retraction without settled borders and leaves nearby powers unsure of their rights and responsibilities in this zone. Conflict is the result."

Evidence supports this hypothesis but it points to a largely defunct and non-manipulable cause of war.

XIII. CULTURAL LEARNING
"War is being delegitimated as a human practice, just as slavery and duelling were earlier delegitimated." An hypothesis from John Mueller.
Is this hypothesis valid? What about World War II, Korea and Vietnam? The civil wars in Angola and Sudan?

XIV. RELIGION
"Religion is a cause of war. Religious believers are led by their belief to kill one another in the name of God."
"Religion is a cause of peace. Most of the world's great religions proscribe killing and emphasize the value of human life; this inhibits war." These important hypotheses are under-studied. Can the content of religions be manipulated in peaceful directions?

XV. EMOTIONS
"Emotions like honor, desire for vengeance, pride, and displays of contempt can trigger war; apology and displays of contrition can bolster peace."

XVI. POLARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
"A bipolar international order is more peaceful and a multipolar order, because false optimism is less likely. States can't have illusions about how many allies will join their side in the next war because there are no major nonaligned states in the system." An idea from Kenneth Waltz.

Is this hypothesis valid? Does it point to a manipulable cause?

XVII. CAUSES OF CIVIL WARS
See Michael Brown reading in coursnotes.
THE ANGLO-FRENCH SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-1763

I. BACKGROUND TO WARA. Mercantilism. The European powers scrambled for specie (gold) to pay mercenaries, hence for trade surpluses, hence for empire.

B. A worldwide Anglo-French contest for empire. This contest saw Anglo-French clashes in the Caribbean, South Asia, West Africa, and North America.

C. The incomplete partition of the world. Who owned the Ohio valley region in North America? This hadn't been decided.

D. Military facts: The British navy was twice the strength of the French navy, but France had far the stronger army.

E. Chronology:

1. During 1752-53 France destroyed a British fort in the Ohio Valley, and built two forts of its own there.

2. During 1753-54 Britain sent three expeditions to the Ohio Valley to eject the French. All three failed.

3. In early 1755 Britain sent two battalions under Braddock to America to eject the French from the Ohio Valley. The British claimed Braddock's instructions were purely defensive.

4. In May 1755 France countered by sending six battalions to America.

5. In June 1755 Britain's Admiral Boscawen tried to intercept these six French battalions off Newfoundland.

6. Britain and France halted negotiations and war erupted, May 18, 1756.

F. This was a war of illusions. Three types of misperceptions to look for:

1. Of one's own and the other's conduct and intentions.

2. Of the other's likely response to one's own acts. Compliance with threats and submission to punishment was expected, but defiance was elicited.

3. Of the value of the stakes in dispute. This value was greatly exaggerated by British and French leaders.

II. CAUSES OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR. Misperceptions (do these constitute a Jervisian spiral?)

1. Britain misperceived:

a. The nature of the status quo --"Ohio belongs to us!"
Virginia Governor Dinwiddie described the Ohio Valley as "British property" in communiques to London (making the French "invaders of British property" in one of his communiques). But Ohio wasn't British--its ownership was undetermined.

b. French conduct--Britain exaggerated the aggressiveness of French behavior. Dinwiddie told London "the French have invaded East of the Alleghanies!" (but they hadn't). Massachusetts Governor Shirley told London "the French have invaded Massachusetts!" (but they hadn't). Dinwiddie told London "the French are planning a general invasion of British North America!" (but they weren't). Dinwiddie wrote London that the French were attacking "the forces of this Dominion" in the Ohio Valley (but these forces were Ohio Company mercenaries, not British government troops). In his dispatches the Ohio Company fort-builders became "our people" and the fort was "our fort," wrongly implying that they were British government personnel and property.

c. British conduct--Britain underestimated the aggressiveness of its own behavior. Dinwiddie failed to report his own fort-building in the Ohio Valley. Dinwiddie failed to report his collaboration with Indians fighting against the French in the Ohio Valley.
2. France suffered similar misperceptions, though we know fewer details.

3. Additional beliefs and misperceptions (which ones grew from those above):

   a. Both sides saw the other as very expansionist.

   b. Both sides thought a tough policy would persuade the other side to back down. In fact the other counter-escalated in response.

      i. Britain thought France would not counter Braddock's 2-battalion deployment. But France did, with 6 battalions.

      ii. France thought Britain would not counter its 6-battalion deployment. But Britain did, with Boscawen's naval attack on that deployment.

   c. Both sides were reluctant to negotiate, because:

      i. They thought the other would take their willingness to talk as a sign of weakness.

      ii. They thought concessions would injure their credibility.

      iii. They thought negotiations were pointless, wouldn't succeed. However, without talks misperceptions on both sides went undiscovered.

   d. Britain exaggerated the value of the stakes at issue. Britain thought that by beating France it could consolidate control over North America. In fact Britain's victory cost it North America. With the French threat to the English North American colonies removed, the English colonists felt less reliant on London's protection, hence less willing to tolerate rule from London. Hence they rebelled in 1775-1776. Washington et al. stick it to the Redcoats.

B. Non-settlement of disputes: the gaps in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).

C. Four windows of opportunity or vulnerability:

   a. Britain saw a waning British worldwide military advantage over France. British leaders thought Britain was better prepared for war than France but also saw France building up its fleet.

   b. France saw British power growing. The French saw Britain making alliances on the European continent (e.g., with Spain) and expanding into the Ohio Valley.

   c. The British deployment of Braddock's 2 battalions to North America in winter 1755 caused France to perceive a tactical window: "we must deploy offsetting forces to North America before a war starts and Britain closes the seas; we can't do it later."

   d. The subsequent French 6-battalion deployment to North America on disarmed French warships created dual British windows of opportunity and vulnerability: "we have a fleeting opportunity to destroy a third of the French fleet," and "if we don't strike the French will gain military superiority in North America!"

Note: windows 'c' and 'd' were unwitting products of government decisions.

E. Competition for control of cumulative resources; also, competition for security.

F. Expectation of a cheap, limited war.

III. OUTCOME: BRITAIN WINS WAR ---> BRITAIN LOSES ITS AMERICAN COLONIES (HMMMM ... DON'T YOU HATE IT WHEN THAT HAPPENS?)

IV. ESCALATION OF THE SEVEN YEARS WARBritish leaders tried hard to limit the war to North America, but failed.
THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1853-1856

I. BACKGROUND TO WAR: Misperceptions in Russia, Britain & France

A. "The Russians Are Coming!" The British and French hold ill-founded fears of Russia.

1. The Illusion of Russian Power: "Russia is the strongest state in Europe!"

2. The Illusion of Russian Expansionism: "Russia plans to carve up Turkey!"

B. "The French are coming!" Russia has ill-founded fears of a "revolutionary" France, and false faith that Britain and Austria share these fears.

C. "The Turks Are Collapsing." Russia falsely expects Turkey's imminent demise.D. Strategic background: Turkey's role as Russia's southern strategic buffer.

II. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF WAR: 13 EVENTS

A. "The Quarrel of the Monks," 1690-1852: Catholics and Orthodox Christians struggle for control of Palestine's Holy Places. France favors Catholics, Russia backs Orthodox.

B. Napoleon III plays demagogue: France intimidates Turkey into favoring the Catholics in the Holy Places dispute, 1850-52. Turkey concedes to France over Russian opposition.

C. Russia counter-intimidates, Feb. 1853--Menshikov demands that Turkey grant Russia wide rights to protect Orthodox believers in Turkey. (He demands more than the restoration of the Holy Places status quo.) His demands arise from these facts and concerns:

1. Turkey controls naval access to Russian Black Sea region, hence is a key buffer.

2. Russia infers from French action that France has wide imperial designs on Turkey.

3. Russia fears "revolutionary" France; and also falsely assumes that the rest of Europe also sees "revolutionary" France as the main danger to the European order.

4. Russia thinks Turkey generally bandwagons when threatened.

5. Russia exaggerates its rights under the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, hence it falsely believes Menshikov's demands are legitimate under existing treaty rights.

D. Britain & Russia bungle their negotiations of Feb. 1853, and Britain misperceives the Russian-Austrian talks of Sept. 1853; hence Britain falsely infers that Russia seeks a wider empire in Turkey; and Russia is oblivious of this British misperception.

E. Britain and France send fleets to Besika Bay, June 1853, to scare Russia into withdrawing Menshikov demands (a result they confidently expect).

F. Russia doesn't fold--isn't even scared--and instead invades Moldavia & Wallachia (now Rumania), July 1853, to scare Russia into withdrawing Menshikov demands (a result they confidently expect).

G. The Anglo-French "blank check" to Turkey. An offensive Franco-British-Turkish alliance develops, fall 1853. Symbolizing this blank check, the Anglo-French fleet is sent forward from Besika Bay to Constantinople, Sept./Oct. 1853 (in violation of existing treaties); it arrives in Constantinople Oct. 22, 1853. Why the deployment? Partly because the Turkish Sultan (dishonestly) tells GB & Fr: "my government might fall unless you back me with a show of force!"

H. The Turks, blank check in hand, attack both Moldavia & Wallachia and the Caucasus, Oct. 23, 1853.

I. The "Sinope massacre," Nov. 1853 ---> anti-Russian uproar in GB, France; they commit more deeply to Turkey (why?); they declare war on Russia, March 1854.

J. Russia withdraws from Moldavia & Wallachia, August 1854, under Austrian pressure. This satisfies the British & French war aims, but:
K. Britain and France nevertheless open a ground war against Russia in the Crimea, Sept. 1854 (!!!)

L. The rise of the hawks (Palmerston) in Britain; the growth of hawkish public opinion; and the growth of British war aims--"We must destroy Russian power in the Black Sea region" ("and we'll win in a jiffy!")

M. The harsh peace: Russian power in the Crimea is destroyed. But not for long...

III. PERSISTING MYSTERIES ABOUT THESE EVENTS
A. Why didn't Russia assure Britain and France that only limited aims underlay the Menshikov demands?
B. Why did France and Britain decide to:
   1. Resort to war to free Moldavia and Wallachia from Russian control? Why was their defense so important?
   2. Back later Turkish aggression against Russia in the Caucasus?
   3. Launch the ground war against Russia in 1854, even after Russia withdrew from Moldavia/Wallachia?
C. Why did the Sinope massacre, which apparently helped move Britain and France to launch the ground war, cause such outrage in Britain?

IV. CAUSES OF THE WAR
A. Ten (10) Misperceptions & Diplomatic Blunders:
   1. French leaders were unaware that by humiliating Turkey over the Holy Places issue they would injure an interest that Russia held dear--i.e., Turkey's attitude of fearing Russia more than other states.
   2. France failed to tell Russia: "our objectives in Turkey are limited"; hence Russia feared that France had wide ambitions.
   3. Russia failed to tell Britain, France, and Turkey: "our objectives in Turkey are limited"; hence Britain and France feared that Russia had wide ambitions.
   4. Britain and Russia differed on the odds that the Ottoman empire would soon collapse, but didn't realize that they differed, hence they talked past each other; hence British wrongly inferred that Russia sought Turkey's partition.
   5. The Russian Czar exaggerated Russian rights under the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji.
   6. Britain and France expected their Besika Bay deployment would induce Russia to back down; instead Russia got tougher, occupying Moldavia & Wallachia.
   7. Russian leaders wrongly assumed the Franco-British Besika Bay deployment arose from British bureaucratic politics, and did not reflect real British opposition to Russian demands on Turkey.
   8. Russia occupied Moldavia and Wallachia without realizing that Austria would threaten to counter-intervene.
   9. Russia failed to realize that the Menshikov demands and the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia appeared aggressive to others, because Russian leaders focused on false analogies--similar moves in the past by Russia (in M&W) and Austria (in Montenegro) that had evoked no alarmed reaction.
   10. Britain and France failed to bound their commitment to Turkey, instead giving Turkey a blank check to attack Russia.
B. Spiral Dynamics?
   1. Spiral ingredients:
      a. Russia:
i. misperceives the status quo, by exaggerating Russian rights under 1774 Kutchuck Kainardji Treaty.

ii. underestimates British & French interests, hence inadvertently damages them. Specifically, Russia was unaware of British & French security-related fears of Russian power & intentions, hence Russia was slow to see the need to assuage their fears by curbing its demands on Turkey.

b. France: underestimates Russia's interests, hence inadvertently damages them. Specifically, France was unaware of the injury Russia thought it would suffer if it allowed France to intimidate Turkey successfully.

c. Britain: exaggerates Russian aggressiveness, because Britain misconstrues Feb. 1853 Anglo-Russian discussions & later Austro-Russian talks; and Russia is unaware of this British misperception.

d. GB, France, Russia all exaggerate the shared character of information, & underestimate the others' misperceptions: hence they do too little to explain their actions & intentions; hence misperceptions persist that otherwise might be detected & cured.

2. Later stages of the Spiral:

a. As a result of #1a and #1b, France and Russia injure each others' interests without knowing they did so.

b. France therefore overestimates Russian hostility, since it misconstrues the Russian hostility that it provokes to be unprovoked.

c. Russia, at first unaware of the hostility its behavior has provoked, underestimates British and French hostility (re: ignoring the warning conveyed by the Besika Bay deployment); hence it fails to heed their warnings, and continues to do them injury, unaware that they mean business.

d. As a result Britain and France exaggerate Russian hostility, leading them to adopt more aggressive aims themselves.

e. Russia, finally aware of Franco-British hostility, is now unaware that it provoked this hostility, and hence overestimates it. Note: the 7 Years War spiral arose largely from misperceptions about others' actions. The Crimean spiral arose largely from misperceptions of others' ideas, intentions, and interests.

C. Unsettled Disputes (but did Russia try to settle something too early?) D. Preventive War (by Turkey). E. False Optimism: Britain and France expect easy victory at Sebastopol. F. Offense/defense & Security Aspects.

1. Security is a goal of all major parties: Britain, France, Russia, & Turkey.

2. Offensive opportunity tempts Turkey. G. Crisis Mismanagement:

1. The Sinope Massacre--a loss of command control by the Czar.

2. The Besika Bay deployment--a move whose self-entrapping effects were not foreseen, hence an instance of crisis mismanagement. H. War ---> War. See British war aims grow like topsy!

V. OUTCOME A. Russia, seeking to secure Black Sea region, loses control of Black sea until 1871.
B. Britain and France prevent a Russian expansion into Turkey that Russia never planned anyway.

C. Russian power, which Britain fought to destroy, is restored in only 14 years.
THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866

I. BISMARCK'S PLAN TO UNIFY GERMANY: "LET'S BAIT AUSTRIA INTO STARTING A WAR!" Bismarck sought to unify Germany by force. He had two requirements: (1) France, Britain and Russia must remain neutral as Prussia beat Austria; and (2) the Prussian king must be induced to declare war on his brother-German Austrians. Solution: Prussia must sweet-talk the other European powers into not fearing Prussia, and must get Austria to start the war. Then Austria will stand alone, hence will be easy pickings; and the Prussian king will be outraged at Austria, hence will declare war on it.

II. BACKGROUND TO WAR: EVENTS & CONDITIONS
A. Bismarck's deceptions:
   1. Regarding Prussian capability ("we're weak!")
   2. Regarding Prussian intentions ("we're benign!") Bismarck sent the Schweinitz mission to Russia to proclaim Prussia's limited aims.
B. British, French, and Russian indifference to containing Prussia.
   1. Britain: feared France more than Prussia, and was generally isolationist.
   2. France: saw advantage in what it thought would be a long Prussian-Austrian war. "We can demand the Rhineland as our fee for breaking the stalemate for the victor."
   3. Russia felt solidarity with Prussia against the Poles, whom they both cruelly oppressed and who hated them both. Russia also was distracted from central European affairs by its focus on revising the convention that demilitarized the Black Sea in 1856.
C. The Prussian-Italian offensive alliance, April 8, 1866.
D. Austria mobilizes its army, April 21, 1866--a fateful step. Why did Austria take it?
   1. Austria received false reports that Italy was mobilizing. Where did these false reports come from? (Maybe the Austrian military deceived its civilians; perhaps Bismarck deceived Austria.)
   2. Why did Austria mobilize against Prussia as well as Italy?
      a. Austrian leaders assumed Prussia had already decided for war. They didn't realize that Prussia couldn't start a war if Austria didn't move first.
      b. Austria had only one mobilization plan--positing a 2-front mobilization.

III. WARTIME EVENTS:
A. Bitter civil-military conflict in Prussia over war aims. (The Prussian army: "Let's smash Austria completely! And perhaps France!" Bismarck: "Why not go all the way to Constantinople?") The military doesn't get its way--fortunately for Prussia.
B. Prussian war aims nevertheless do modestly widen: Prussia excludes Austria from Germany instead of dividing it with her at the Main.

IV. CAUSES OF THE WAR? PERHAPS AMONG THEM:
A. Austria's false optimism.
B. Prussia's search for security; and Prussia's offensive opportunity.
C. Bismarck's baiting, and Austria's blunderous decision to take the bait.

V. CAUSES OF THE PEACE? AN EMERGING DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AGAINST PRUSSIA.

VI. WAS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS POSSIBLE? (PROBABLY NO--SCARY THOUGHT.)
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870

I. BACKGROUND
A. Bismarck's continuing deceptions: "We're weak and we're benign!"
B. Bismarck's provocations to France: he authored the Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne & the Ems telegram. They provoked France to mobilize, triggering war.

II. THE WAR: EVENTS
A. The wartime widening of German aims to include Alsace-Lorraine.
B. Bitter civil-military conflict in Prussia over war aims and military operations.

III. RELEVANT HYPOTHESES
A. The Prussian and French militaries both (!) saw windows of opportunity.
B. Prussia saw an offensive opportunity arising from Britain, Russia and Austria's unusual failure to counterbalance Prussia.
C. France was falsely optimistic about the military outcome of the war.

IV. THE FALSE LESSONS GERMANS LEARNED FROM THE WAR OF 1870: "BISMARCK USED BLOOD AND IRON TO MAKE FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE. YOU CAN TOO!" QUESTION: WHY WAS THIS FALSE LESSON LEARNED?

V. THE CHANGE IN GERMAN POLICY AFTER 1890
A. Germany moves from sated to expansionist.
B. Germany pursues expansion by belligerence rather than stealth and deception.

VI. LESSONS OF BOTH WARS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
These wars suggest that when offshore balancers don't balance against Europe's continental aggressors, they get frisky and start wars. Does this lesson still apply?
THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

I. WORLD WAR I IN PERSPECTIVE

A. In 1890 Europe was a nice, quiet place. Things were cool. Question:

how could such a great war emerge from such an untroubled world?

B. WWI unleashed an avalanche of violence that pervaded the 20th century.

II. FOUR COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR WWI

"Germany caused the war." Three main variants are offered:

1. The minimalist Germany-blaming view: Germany consciously risked a great war in July 1914 in order to make gains for the German/Austrian alliance. Germany preferred the prewar status quo to a general war, but did knowingly risk a general war.

2. The intermediate Germany-blaming view: Germany preferred a continental war to the prewar status quo, but preferred the prewar status quo to a world war (a war against Britain, France, and Russia). This is the view of "Fischer School" moderates, exemplified by Imanuel Geiss.

3. The maximalist Germany-blaming view: Germany preferred even a world war to the prewar status quo. The First World War as deliberate plot. This is the extreme "Fischer School" view.

B. "Russia, or Serbia, or Britain, or France, or Austria caused the war."

1. During 1919-1945 many Germans alleged that Britain organized the encirclement of Germany and conspired to cause the war. Germany, they said, was wholly innocent.

2. Sidney Fay and other scholars have put prime responsibility on Austria and Russia; some heavily blame Serbia; some blame France and Britain for not restraining Russia more firmly; some suspect that France egged Russia on.

C. "Crisis bungling caused the war." In this view no European power willfully risked war. European leaders simply mismanaged the July crisis.

1. "Russia began pre-mobilization without realizing that mobilization meant war, or that partial mobilization against Austria was impossible."

2. "Austria failed to give Russia its evidence showing that Serbia was responsible for the death of the Archduke. Had Russia known Serbia's guilt it would have sympathized more with Austria's position."

3. "British leaders (Grey) did not realize that mobilization meant war; hence they unwisely failed to restrain Russian mobilization."

4. "German leaders (Jagow) falsely assured Russia that Germany would tolerate Russian partial mobilization against Austria, leading Russia to mobilize."

D. "The explosive military situation caused the war." In this view the widespread belief in the power of the offense and the general embrace of offensive plans primed the world for war. This explosive military backdrop magnified the dangers posed by a minor crisis and the usual crisis blunders that it produced.

III. BACKGROUND TO WAR: EUROPE 1890-1914

A. The Powers' relative strength: they ranked as follows: (1) Germany; (2) Britain; (3) Russia; (4) France; (5) Austria-Hungary; (6) Serbia. (See Paul Kennedy tables, attached to these notes, especially Tables 7 and 9.)

B. Social Structure and Domestic Politics in Europe, 1890-1914.

1. Oligarchy and fears of upheaval in Europe, e.g., in Austria-Hungary and Germany.
2. Militarism (see assigned Martin Kitchen readings).
   a. The military's influence was large, especially in Germany.
   b. The military's ideas were dangerous. These included:
      i. Offense is easy // windows are common & large // surprise is essential.
      ii. Waving big sticks makes others nice.
      iii. Others are hostile.
      iv. Empires are valuable.
   v. War is short, glorious, even fun.
3. Self-glorifying nationalist myths in the schools--history as fiction (see assigned Langsam reading).
4. Lack of independent scholarship. Professors were propagandists for the state who repeated fatuous ideas instead of evaluating them, especially in Germany (see L.L. Snyder, German Nationalism, in "further readings," chapter on scholars).
C. The Changing Nature of War
1. The rise of mass armies and the mobilization system:
   a. Preliminary mobilization vs. full mobilization.
   b. Why did mobilization mean war? Because Germany’s Schlieffen plan mandated a surprise attack on Belgium as soon as mobilization began.
   c. Was secret mobilization possible? No, but some thought so.
2. The rise of the power of the defensive on the battlefield: machine guns, barbed wire, railroads, and mass armies.
3. The growth of the "cult of the offensive": Germany's Schlieffen Plan, France's Plan XVII, Russia's Plan 20, Austria's offensive war plans; the cult of the offensive at sea.
   Question: What war plans would have made the most sense for each power? Once at war, what was the best way for each side to fight?
D. Perceptions in Europe (see assigned Geiss reading).
1. The rise of international Social Darwinism and the cult of the offensive.
2. Big stick ideas in Germany: Admiral Tirpitz's Risk Theory and Kurt Riezler's theory of "bluff diplomacy."
3. The self-encirclement of Germany, and the German myth that others had conspired to bring it about.
4. The need for empire--Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism; expansionism in Germany, Russia, Serbia (!), and France.
5. "War is good for you"--a remarkable idea.
E. German expansion and the Fischer Controversy (see Geiss reading).
1. How expansionist was Germany? The "War Council" of December 8, 1912: how to interpret it?
2. How expansionist were the other European powers? F. The decline of British power and the Anglo-German Detente of 1912-1914. G. The appearance of a tight (offensive) network of alliances in Europe (the transformation of alliances from "epimachies" to "symmachies.") H. The crises of 1905, 1908, 1911. Were these causes of trouble or mere symptoms of other causes? I. The naval and land arms races. Were these causes of trouble or mere symptoms of other causes? J. The rise of economic interdependence (it was high in 1914!) and international cooperation (e.g., international agencies regulated railways, postal service and telegraph).

K. The alleged appearance of dumb national leaders in Russia, Germany, Britain, and Austria-Hungary.
L. The rise of (incompetent?) peace movements: "let's arbitrate disputes!"; "lets have arms control!"

IV. THE "JULY CRISIS": JUNE 28-AUGUST 4, 1914 Ask three questions of these events: (1) What caused the war? i.e. what conditions, events, or actions made the war inevitable? (2) Who caused the war? What states, or political groups or persons within states? (3) Why did these actors cause the war? What expectations and intentions animated their actions? Were they trying to cause war? Expecting to cause war?
A. The Sarajevo Assassination of Austria's Archduke Ferdinand, June 28. Was the Serbian government responsible? I think yes, although some say no.
B. The German "Blank Check" to Austria, July 5-6. Germany does more than approve an Austrian war against Serbia: it pushes Austria toward war. 1. German expectations: what were they?
>Did the German government think that such a war would provoke Russia to intervene? Most evidence (see Geiss) suggests that most Germans thought Russia would sit quietly, from monarchical solidarity, and for window reasons: Germany's good window was the Russian-French bad window. However, some straws in the wind suggest that some Germans foresaw where the crisis would lead.

>Was British intervention in such a war expected? Again, this is debated, but most evidence suggests that most Germans thought not.
2. German desires: what were they?
>Did Germany want a war? The elite was split. The Army actively wanted a continental war, the Kaiser and Bethmann didn't. In my view the preferred center-of-gravity outcome of the elite was a crisis victory; the next preferred outcome was a continental war; the next was status quo ante; and the least-desired result was world war. Bethmann and the Kaiser preferred the status quo ante to continental war, but the Army didn't, and prevailed--ultimately in an unrecorded confrontation on July 30.
C. The Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, July 23. This had a 2-day deadline, and was designed to be impossible to accept. Austria's plan was then to smash the Serbian army and vassalize Serbia, but not to annex it, because Austria-Hungary's Hungarian politicians wouldn't accept more Slavs in the empire.
D. Serbian reply, 6:00 p.m., July 25. The Serbs considered accepting all Austria's demands but in the end rejected Austria's demand to allow Austrian officials to participate in the Serbian enquiry into the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. On receiving this reply the Austrian government promptly ordered mobilization of its army against Serbia. This order reached the army command at 9:23 p.m. July 25; it posited July 27 as "alarm day," and July 28 as the first day of mobilization.
E. Russian Preliminary Mobilization, July 25, with orders issued at 4:00 p.m.--even before the Serbian time limit expired at 6:00. Russian leaders also decide in principle to mobilize later against Austria (but not Germany). The French also began pre-mobilization on July 25, although this had less effect on the crisis, perhaps because these measures were still substantially undetected by July 28. Why did the Russians pre-mobilize? With what expectation? Answer: we don't know. This grave decision, a key to the crisis, has never been fully explained. These points are pertinent:
1. Evidence suggests that Russian leaders thought Germany meant to push matters to war and felt compelled to move first to prepare for the coming conflict. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said on July 24 "C'est la guerre Européenne!" when he heard the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. It seems the Russians already expected war at this point: they felt the Austro-German move showed that Austria and Germany planned to smash Serbia, and that Russia would have to allow this or fight; and since Russia wouldn't allow this, it would have to fight. Perhaps they also felt that Germany would merely find another excuse for war if Russia conceded on Serbia, making concessions fruitless.

If so, it seems likely that the Russians pre-mobilized to gain the first strike (really first-mobilization) advantage in the war that Germany and Austria seemed to be forcing upon them. Since war seemed inevitable, and the Russians thought that whoever mobilized first would have the upper hand, quick mobilization made sense. Note: the July crisis occurred against the backdrop of manifest signs of war fever in Germany (e.g., the Jubilees of 1913) that Russia had detected.

Note: during July 24-25 Russian civilians also made a decision in principle to fully mobilize against Austria but not Germany. This suggests a civil-military split on preempting Germany: the civilians were not yet sold on it. Did the Russian military manipulate unwitting civilian consent to Russian military measures?

2. Russian civilians (Sazonov and the Czar) were apparently unaware that mobilization meant war until later in the crisis. We can surmise that their soldiers talked them into these preliminary measures before they realized that mobilization meant war.

3. Russian civilians (Sazonov and the Czar) were apparently unaware that Russia had an "all or nothing" mobilization plan; Russia had to mobilize against Germany if it mobilized against Austria. The Russian chief of staff failed to explain this to the civilians at the key meetings on July 24-25. This misconception eased the Russian decision in principle to mobilize against Austria.

4. Russian leaders did not receive Austria's dossier showing Serb responsibility for the Sarajevo murder of Archduke Ferdinand until after Russia had pre-mobilized on July 25 and mobilized on July 30.

F. Germany hangs tough, July 25-30. The British proposed mediation of the crisis under British auspices. But the Germans kept pushing Austria forward, seeking to get the fait accompli finished. The German problem: Austria wouldn't be ready to attack Serbia until August 12. Hence, to foreclose diplomacy, the Germans urged Austria to declare war on Serbia, which Austria did on July 28. This in turn helped spur Russia to declare partial mobilization on July 29, and then full mobilization on July 30. What went on? Some details:

1. Bethmann sabotages the Kaiser's peace effort. The Kaiser wasn't told of the Serbian reply for several days. When he saw it, he wrote (July 28) that "every cause of war falls to the ground." He then asked Bethmann to ask Austria to offer the "Halt in Belgrade" peace plan to Russia.

But Bethmann didn't do it! He waited half a day, and then late on July 28 he told the Austrian's something much milder! He never told them how strongly the Kaiser wanted the crisis ended!

2. Moltke sabotages Bethmann's peace effort. Then late on July 29 Bethmann reversed course and tried to pull the Austrians back from the brink, in messages sent overnight, asking Austria to accept the Halt in Belgrade. These messages were sent at 2:55 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. July 30.

Too much can be made of this change. Even on July 30 Bethmann never made a clear threat to Austria, or clearly stated that the crisis should be called off. Still, it was a change.

a. What caused it? Some say it was the latest warning from Britain, received at 9:12 p.m. July 29. Some say it was Russian partial mobilization, which convinced him that Russia wouldn't cave. I also wonder if it wasn't Belgian mobilization too; Germany learned of significant Belgian mobilization measures on July 29 at 4:00 p.m.
b. Moltke sabotaged Bethmann's effort at 2:00 p.m. July 30 with a telegram to Austria urging immediate Austrian mobilization against Russia and promising that Germany would follow suit. It's possible that Moltke also made more direct efforts to persuade Bethmann to halt his peace effort. Bethmann was inactive during the morning of July 30. If he really meant to avoid war, he should have been telling Russia that he was now willing to pressure Austria, and asking it not to mobilize in the meantime; and he should have been telling Britain the same thing, and asking it to restrain Russia. He didn't. Could coercion or persuasion by Moltke be the reason?

However, assuming that this happened, we still don't know why. Two very different interpretations are possible.

i. Moltke had hoped to preserve peace, but was finally persuaded that Germany had to mobilize in order to keep pace with the Russian, French, and Belgian mobilizations. He explained this necessity to Bethmann with sadness in his heart.

ii. Moltke, having desired an opportunity for preventive war against Russia for months, and seeing in the July crisis a fine opportunity for such a war, was delighted that Russia, France and Belgium gave Germany a pretext to mobilize; was enraged that Bethmann might take this pretext as an opportunity to make peace; and either persuaded or coerced Bethmann to cease his efforts.

Interpretation #i suggests World War I was an accidental war caused by military factors that made the July crisis exceptionally dangerous. Interpretation #ii suggests that World War I was a deliberate war of aggression by Germany, which plotted to provoke, and then exploited, the excuse that Russian mobilization presented in order to wage a war of continental conquest.

Note: the Germans learned of the Russian pre-mobilization measures on July 27, two days after they began. If Germany really sought to prevent a continental war, shouldn't this news have shocked Germany into backtracking--i.e. forcing the "Halt in Belgrade" compromise on Austria? But Bethmann kept going until late on July 29. This supports the inference that the Germans viewed a continental war with equanimity, and feared only a world war.

G. British dithering. The British never warned Germany in a crystal-clear manner that they would intervene if Germany launched a continental war, chiefly because the British themselves did not decide what they would do until August 3.

H. Russian mobilization

1. Partial mobilization, July 29. Russia did this partly to deter Austria from invading Serbia, partly to offset Austrian mobilization against Serbia, partly to forestall Austrian mobilization in Galicia, and perhaps partly because on July 27 German Secretary of State Jagow lullingly assured the Allies that Germany would accept a partial Russian mobilization that was aimed only at Austria-Hungary.

2. Full mobilization, 5:00, July 30. Reasons: the conviction that war was inevitable, spurred by:

a. Reports that the Germans were upset by Russian preliminary mobilization, and that the Austrians still resisted any compromise; and Russian military warnings that mobilization was an all-or-nothing matter--a partial, South-only mobilization would make more difficult a full mobilization later if that became necessary.

b. False reports that German mobilization had begun.

I. German mobilization. Late on July 30 (but before learning of Russian full mobilization) the German government made a commitment to decide at noon July 31 whether to mobilize. This was, in essence, a provisional decision to mobilize the next day unless something favorable (e.g., a Russian/French cave-in) happened in the interim to defuse the crisis. Germany was probably responding to continuing Russian pre-mobilization, to Belgian pre-mobilization, to the Russian partial mobilization of July 29, and/or to the Kaiser's misinterpretation of Czar's remark that Russian mobilization had begun 5 days earlier, which emerged from the Willy-Nicky correspondence. This decision meant that the war would have broken out absent Russian
full mobilization, with German mobilization on July 31. (Thus the outbreak of the war was "overdetermined.")

J. An interpretation of the crisis to consider. Note that German military leaders rightly knew that Germany could not mobilize in secret for any length of time; but Russian and French military leaders thought Germany could mobilize secretly, with the French believing secret mobilization was possible for a week (See Joffre's memoirs). Why was this? Perhaps German officers, hoping to bait Russia or France into early mobilizations that would then justify German mobilization and the preventive war that many German officers sought, primed French and Russian intelligence with false information that would scare them into a premature mobilization. Joffre does indicate that his 7-days-of-secret mobilization estimate came from secret intelligence on Germany. Had I been a German general, and had I desired a preventive war, this is exactly what I would have wanted the French to believe, and I would have polluted French intelligence with exactly this sort of information. (This is a speculative interpretation, but I know no evidence against it.)

V. WORLD WAR I AS A CASE STUDY: HOW TO USE CASES TO TEST THEORIES, & HOW TO USE THEORIES TO EXPLAIN CASES

VI. MILITARY-RELATED CAUSES OF WWI?
A. Preemption
B. 3 Windows
C. False Optimism
D. Cult of the Offensive
E. Cheap War (What if all sides had possessed nuclear second-strike capabilities in 1914?)

VII. MISPERCEPTIONS AS CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I?
A. Spiral or deterrence failure?
B. Non-evaluation
C. Nationalist mythmaking
D. Non-strategy
E. Militarism?
I. WORLD WAR II IN CONTEXT

World War II was the greatest war in world history. Some 35-60 million people died in this enormous global conflagration. This vast war closely followed the most elaborate and hopeful effort ever made to design a peaceful world--the 1919 Versailles peace. Never before had world leaders sought so consciously to use their power to shape a peaceful world as they did in 1919. And never has the world seen such violence as it did in Versailles' aftermath. In contrast, the peace that emerged in 1945 was undesigned yet proved far more durable. What does this say of our capacity to engineer a more peaceful world?

II. WAR & REMEMBRANCE: HOW ILLUSIONS REPLACED REALITY IN EUROPE'S MEMORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (See Holger Herwig, "Clio Deceived...")

Sometimes losers write history. They did here, and sold this history to the winners. The world paid dearly for the German-authored Great Social Science Experiment of 1898-1918. (The experiment destroyed the laboratory!) But then someone falsified the lab notes.

III. NATIONAL POLICIES AND IDEAS

A. Germany:
1. Germans practiced creative history. Weimar-era (1920's) German schools & scholars told and believed lies about:
   a. The origins of WWI--"The Entente powers encircled Germany and instigated the war!"
   b. The causes and responsibility for Germany's defeat--"the Jews and the socialists did it!", not Ludendorff and the superhawks. Germany's blunders were not evaluated. Those few scholars who did evaluate were persecuted.
   c. The harshness of the peace--"Versailles was Draconian!" Moral drawn by Germany: "We need a bigger empire to be safe from our rapacious neighbors!" Instead of learning that a reach for lebensraum was dangerous, indeed suicidal, Germans learned that gaining lebensraum was essential!
2. Germans first embraced Nazi-like ideas (1920s), then the Nazis themselves (1930s). (Was World War II really just a 1-man show--"Hitler did it!"?? He had many willing helping hands!)
   a. German neoconservative publishers, 1890-1930.
   b. German war-cult literature, 1920s. Who purveyed these Nazi-like ideas? For what reason? We don't have a satisfactory answer; responsibility for this crime remains hidden in the mists of history.
3. Nazi beliefs about international affairs.
   a. "Germany is insecure," especially "Germany can be strangled by cutting off food imports."
   b. "An empire is the answer. Germany needs more territory because it needs an independent economy. It especially needs new food-producing lands."
   c. "Offense is easy."
      i. Bandwagoning--Hitler's "avalanche" theory.
      ii. Contempt for the Soviet Union--"Germans built the USSR, but mere Jews run it now" so "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."
A professional political scientist (Woodrow Wilson) was the chief architect of Versailles. Hmmm.

iii. The invention of Blitzkrieg and Manstein’s war plan (this occurred late-during 1939-1940—but Hitler seemed to foresee them or their equivalent).

4. The German military buildup. During the late 1930s Germany spent a far larger share of its GNP on the military than did Britain and France (see attached Tables 30-32 from Paul Kennedy). This gave Germany a large but temporary military advantage during 1938-1940.

B. Japan:
1. Militarism appears in Japan. The military comes to dominate Japanese national ideas about foreign affairs, 1900-1941.

2. Ideas the Japanese military believed and/or purveyed:
   a. "Japan is insecure, and an empire is the answer."
   i. "Others are hostile." Japan embraced the myth of "ABCD [American, British, Chinese, Dutch] encirclement." It spiralled with neighbors, unaware that it provoked the hostility it faced.
   ii. "These hostile powers could strangle Japan." Specifically, "World War I shows that states can strangle each other by blockading their maritime trade—as the Entente strangled Germany. We could be next."
   iii. "Japan can and must address this threat by seizing an empire." Japanese believed that:
      a. Due to factors i and ii Japan needed an independent economy that could function without external trade.
      b. A wide empire could provide economic independence.
   iv. "Japan can conquer an empire." Seizing an empire is a feasible proposition.
      a. Bandwagon dynamics allow it: "With the Axis Alliance we can scare the US into accepting our expansion."
      b. The U.S. won't resist: "If we hit America hard it will not fight all-out."
      b. A sugar-coated self-image—"our empire is good for our fellow-Asians" and "we Japanese are not aggressive." After 1937 the Japanese press was forbidden to print "articles that may give the impression that our foreign policy is aggressive."
   c. Note the disintegrated character of Japanese ideas:
      i. "The US is so aggressive that they will destroy us unless we act; and so nice they will let us conquer Asia, and will not respond fully if we attack them."
      ii. "Control of economic/industrial resources is so decisive in war that we must gain such control"—in a war against a state with 10 times Japan's net economic resources!
      iii. "In World War I blockades strangled states, hence we need an economically independent empire"—even a seaborne empire. But WWI also showed that a seaborne empire could be strangled by an enemy with a superior navy (like the USA).
      iv. "Our economy requires empire to expand"—even though Japan's economy grew by leaps and bounds during 1871-1929 without one.

3. Did Japan have alternatives? What if Japan had accepted its island borders and sought security through alliances, trusting the operation of the balance-of-power/balance-of-threat to produce help from others if it were ever threatened?
C. Italy--the land of blue smoke & mirrors. Mussolini’s government:

1. Badly misperceived the realities of the late 1930s:
   a. It believed gross overestimates of Italian military strength.
   b. It believed gross overestimates of the value of empire.

2. Believed false images of the past: "We, the Italians, won WWI for the Entente! Then we were cheated of our fair share of the spoils!"

D. Britain:

1. Was generally isolationist.

2. Was further weakened by WWI.

3. Was late to rearm in the 1930s.

4. Embraced an aerial cult of the offensive--"the bomber will always get through."

5. Adopted a strategy of appeasement toward Germany. Why? Three explanations are common:
   a. Craven cowardice. The British public and government were snivelling wimps who cowered before German belligerence. But if this is true, why did Britain declare war on Germany in 1939 and bravely fight on alone against Germany in 1940?
   b. Dilemmas of multiple contingencies. Some argue that Britain felt overextended and had to appease one of its adversaries--Japan, Italy, or Germany. Germany got the nod, purely for reasons of resource limitation.
   c. British belief that Germany was appeasable, due to false historical understanding. Too many Britons read and believed German propaganda, concluding that "We encircled and provoked the Germans; let's not do it again!" and "We were too mean at Versailles--German demands to revise it are legitimate."

E. The United States:

1. Embraced isolationism. Most important, Congress passed a series of neutrality laws during 1935-1939 that tied the president to a policy of strict neutrality in event of war elsewhere--an open message to the Nazis and Japanese saying "we won't oppose your aggression!"

2. Adopted a mobilization military strategy that included no large standing forces.

3. Had no clear national grand strategy; hence the United States could not predict its own behavior; hence others (Germany, Japan) couldn't predict it either.

F. France: absorbed in domestic left-right conflicts and unready for war.

G. The Soviet Union: is indifferent to--even helpful toward--the rise of Nazis in Germany in the early 1930s. Later it is confident that a war among western states would be a long stalemate, so it dismissed the danger that France would lose quickly leaving the Soviets to fight a larger, stronger Germany alone.
H. Everywhere except Germany: a military "cult of the defensive" gained currency. National elites assumed that offense would be as difficult in the next war as it was during 1914-1918.

IV. HOW THE STORM GATHERED: EVENTS IN EUROPE
A. Withdrawal of the USA, Britain, and USSR from central European affairs.
B. German rearmament--giving Germany an offensive capability and a fleeting superiority. (Why didn't the allies prevent German rearmament?)
C. Hitler wins without a war: appeasement and peaceful German expansion.

1. Hitler's recoveries & conquests:
   - German remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936
   - Austria 1938
   - Czech sudetenland 1938
   - The Czech rump, 1939
   - Memel, 1939

   a. This is quite a nice empire! Why didn't it sate Germany? (Should Britain and France have launched a preventive war while it was being assembled?)

   b. International effects of these German conquests:
      - Growth of German power.
      - Destruction of allied and German credibility.

2. The failure of a strong anti-German defensive alliance to emerge.

D. Hitler attacks Poland, Sept. 1 1939, launching World War II.

Questions about the outbreak of war:

1. Why did deterrence fail, Sept. 1, 1939? 6 explanations:
   a. Appeasement destroyed British & French credibility.
   b. Hitler's bandwagon beliefs destroyed British & French credibility: Hitler assumed that Britain and France would shrink from war if the USSR agreed to stay neutral, as it did on August 24, 1939 (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact).
   c. Growth of German power, 1932-39. When aggressors are stronger than status quo powers, we get war. This is particularly true when the aggressor advantage is fleeting--this spurs preventive war by the aggressor.
   d. British non-strategy.
   e. Britain made the wrong threat to Germany? Some say Britain should have written off Poland, and only warned Germany not to invade the USSR--a threat that Britain had more capacity to carry out, and which therefore would have been more credible.
   f. Lack of allied (Franco-British) offensive capability against Germany?

2. Could Hitler's policy of peaceful expansion have worked in a Europe of nuclear-armed powers?

E. Hitler declares war on the United States, December 1941. Why?

V. HOW THE STORM GATHERED: EVENTS IN ASIA
A. The Japanese reach for empire, 1931, 1937 ff.: Japan's China advance ultimately requires the southern advance.
B. The Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis alliance, Sept. 1940 (also called the Tripartite Pact).
C. The progressive hardening of U.S. policy, 1931-1941.

--Why did the US goals expand? Specifically, why did the U.S. begin demanding Japanese withdrawal from China as the price of peace in July 1941? Ideas that helped motivate the U.S. hard line position include:

1. The China Market beckons. "Sell every Chinaman a shirt and we'll all get rich."

2. The strategic importance of British colonies in Asia to the British war effort in Europe--a myth the British helped promote.
3. The illusion of the Axis monolith: "Japan is Germany's loyal and obedient ally; hence Japan's gains accrue to Germany."

4. "An Asian war can be a back door to a European war." (But might it not also be a trap door to an Asian morass that diverts the U.S. from Europe?) Note: the China Lobby and the British government promoted some of these ideas.--Why did the US embargo Japanese oil, July 1941? Utley v. Heinrichs interpretations.

D. Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Was this smart? Why not just bypass the Philippines, and then let Roosevelt try to start a war if it wanted one? E. Lessons of Pearl Harbor: Munich in reverse? Japan wasn't appeased--and it still went to war!

VI. WHAT CAUSED WWII?

A. German Expansionism--but what caused that? Dubious explanations:

1. German national character? (But look at today's peaceful Germans...)

2. Versailles--a "harsh peace"? (But it wasn't harsh--and 1945 was far harsher, but produced peace!)

3. Hitler? (The "great man" theory?) (But wasn't German society primed to accept Hitler?)

4. Militarism? (But the Weimar German military, while hardly benign, wasn't the main purveyor of Nazi ideas.) Problematic explanations:

1. The Great Depression, 1929-39--it brought the Nazis to power. (But the depression was worldwide. Why did it make only Germany crazy?)

2. War ---> War: Was 1914-1945 one great, single war? Germans were steeped in the propaganda of WWI, and its effects lived on later. (But why didn't WWI propaganda have the same effects in Britain, France, and the USA? And why didn't WWII later have the same effects as WWI?)

Other explanations:

1. "Continuity" from before 1914: was Naziism an after-echo of the militarism & hyper-nationalism of 1890-1914? Was German national thought transformed by this earlier militarist/nationalist incultation? (Hitler himself was steeped in the crazed pre-1914 writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Gobineau, and Haushofer. See Carr, Hitler).

2. Nationalist mythmaking? We saw plenty after 1918. (A disease of a young democracy?)

3. Non-evaluation: of the German policies of 1890-1918 during 1919-32; and of Hitler's ideas, 1932-1941. (Another disease of a young democracy?)

B. Allied diplomacy. Could the allies have deterred Germany?

C. Japanese Expansionism.

D. Military factors: the security dilemma and its offspring.

VII. ESCALATION OF WWII

VIII. HITLER'S OTHER WARS: THE HOLOCAUST AND HITLER'S OTHER MASS MURDERS

IX. AFTERMATH OF WWII: A STABLE PEACE (WHY?) November 16, 1999 / Stephen Van Evera / 17.423
CAUSES OF THE HOLOCAUST

I. THE COMMON EXPLANATION: VIRULENT GERMAN ANTISEMITISM

Anti-semitic lunatics—Hitler and the Nazis—took over in Germany, murdered the Jews. The key mystery is: why did they get away with it? What allowed it? Daniel Goldhagen variant (Hitler's Willing Executioners): an "eliminationist anti-semitism" was widespread among Germans and predisposed them to favor Hitler and help him with his Holocaust project.

Criticisms:
1. Anti-semitism was no more virulent in Germany than in Rumania, Poland, Russia, and Hungary during the 1930s. Why was there no holocaust by these other governments?
2. Hitler murdered millions of non-Jews as well as Jews—a fact that neither variant of the "virulent anti-semitism" theory predicts.
3. Had the German public been infused with the eliminationist anti-semitism that Goldhagen sees, German Jews would have seen the holocaust coming, in the eyes and words of their German non-Jewish neighbors. But clearly they didn't see it coming--this is why many did not flee, or fled only late in the game.
4. Spontaneous acts of anti-Jewish violence should have been common in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s--e.g., like the lynching of blacks in the American south during 1880s-1930s--but were not.
5. Hitler should not have hidden the holocaust from the German people if Goldhagen is correct. Instead he should have been proud to tell Germans about it. But in fact he hid it carefully. (Counterargument: Hitler may have concealed the holocaust from Germans to hide it from the wider world, whose reaction he feared.)
6. The "anti-semitic lunatics" explanation is unsatisfying. What or who made the Nazis into lunatics? What brought them to power? Likewise the "eliminationist anti-semitism" theory. If eliminationist anti-semitism was the cause, where did it come from?

II. THE SVE EXPLANATION:

Organized Christianity -----> Anti-semitism in Germany -----------> holocaust
x  Anti-semitism throughout Europe--hence Ukrainians, Lithuanians, etc. helped Germans do the holocaust; and Americans, British didn't offer haven.
  x  Highly effective German state
  x  German militarism, international social -----> of mass expulsions and murder as an appropriate wayDarwinism, general talk of empire and the need to seize it, especially by pan-Germans and the Army,during 1900-1918

This theory explains where Germany's lunatics came from, and predicts what we actually see: (1) mass murder of both Jews and non-Jews (although focused on the Jews); and (2) mass killing by Germany but not by other anti-semitic states.Hitler's murder victims, and Deaths from World War II in Europe

Compiled by John Mearsheimer
Total murdered: 17.9 million plus.
5.6 million Jews.6 million non-Jewish Soviet civilians.3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war (out of 5.7 million total Soviet POWs). From Mosaic of Victims, chapter by Christian Streit.3 million Polish Christians. (But note: Sebastian Haffner, Meaning of Hitler, p. * , says only somewhat more than a million were murdered. The rest died less directly.)<1 million other (gypsies gays, Serbs, mentally ill, anti-Nazi political dissidents).
Total dead in WWII European Theater (compiled by John Mearsheimer): 40 million total fatalities37 million in East3 million in West
By country:22 million USSR8 million Germany6 million Polish1 million Rumania/Hungary (Jews)
Background questions: Would the world be better off if nuclear weapons had never been invented? Would it be better off if nuclear weapons were now abolished?

I. THE TECHNICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION

Technologies rarely have decisive effects on war or politics; more often technology is bent to serve politics or military doctrine. Nuclear weapons are an exception. They overwhelm politics and doctrine.

Five cascading technical effects flow from the nuclear revolution. These cascade further into political effects listed below in Section IV. The technical effects are:

A. Effect #1: hydrogen bombs offer an increase of six (6, count them six) orders of magnitude over the power of the TNT explosives used in World War II. The atomic bomb = x 1,000 increase on TNT; the hydrogen bomb = x 1,000 increase on atomic bombs.

B. Effect #2: due to 'A' (the destructiveness of nuclear weapons), the "cost exchange ratio" vastly favors defenders (better termed "retaliators") over attackers seeking to disarm them. Nuclear weapons pack tremendous explosive power in devices that are cheap, light, easily hidden, protected, and delivered. Hence destroying nuclear weapons is very hard, protecting and delivering them very easy.

C. Effect #3: due to 'B' (the cost-exchange ratio), a relationship of MAD ("Mutual Assured Destruction") develops between major powers. Both can destroy the other's society even after absorbing an all-out counterforce attack by the other. In short, both have a "second strike countervalue capability."

In the Cold War, both the US and USSR sought to avert MAD, preferring instead to deny the other a second-strike countervalue capability, but they could not escape it. Technology overrode their desires.

D. Effect #4: "flat of the curve" dynamics. One of MAD's special characteristics is the "flat of the curve": beyond a certain point, the capacity to inflict damage on the other society, or to prevent damage to one's own, is inelastic to the size and capability of one's own force or one's opponent's force. Capabilities are absolute.

E. Effect #5: the "multiplier effect." The efficiency with which one side must strike the other's forces in order to leave the other unable to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation increases sharply as the arsenals on both sides grow. Even an inefficient strike (a substantial percentage of the attacked weapons survive) can reduce the retaliation to acceptable levels if both arsenals are very small; even a very efficient strike (e.g., 99 percent effective) can fail to reduce retaliation to acceptable levels if both arsenals are very large. Hence first strikes are least thinkable when arsenals are large, suggesting the argument that "the more weapons both sides have, the less the risk of their use."

II. ALTERNATE NUCLEAR DOCTRINES: COUNTERVALUE vs. COUNTERFORCE STRATEGIES

Nuclear weapons present states with two basic nuclear doctrines: counterforce and countervalue.

>> **Countervalue**: the enemy society is targeted. Political aims are achieved by threatening to punish the adversary by destroying its population and industry.

>> **Counterforce**: the enemy nuclear forces are targeted. Political aims are achieved by threatening to disarm the adversary--that is, to remove its capacity to inflict punishment on oneself.

Since forces can be used first or second, we have a crude universe of four possible nuclear capabilities:

A. First-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to launch a first strike that inflicts unacceptable damage on the adversary's society. This capability is very easy to build, for reasons noted above in Section I, but is quite useless.

B. Second-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to absorb an all-out counterforce first strike and inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary's society in retaliation. This capability is easy to build, for reasons noted above in Section I.

C. First-strike counterforce: the capacity to launch a first strike that removes the adversary's capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on oneself in retaliation.
This capability is very hard or impossible to build, for reasons noted above in Section I.

D. **Second-strike counterforce capability**: the capacity to absorb an all-out counterforce first strike and mount a counterforce counterattack that leaves the attacker's forces unable to inflict unacceptable further damage on one's own society. This capability is even harder to build than a first-strike counterforce capability.

These four capabilities can be displayed in a 2x2 table:

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Associated agencies and industries as causes of misperception. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire.

i. Germany before 1914 and Japan in the 1930s and 1940s seem to be clear examples.

ii. This theory clearly does not cover many, even most, militaries. Can it still be useful?


3. Why some militaries are willful and powerful actors--why they want to shape national perceptions, and why they can.

a. Professional militaries are willful because: military officers have only one potential employer, hence they are especially concerned about its welfare. Militaries demand a lot from society--lots of money, plus draftees' time--and must constantly justify these demands.

Militaries have natural political enemies, e.g., peace groups, pacific religious organizations, etc., who dislike the military's task, and must be countered.

b. Professional militaries have persuasive power because they possess:
a monopoly of information and expertise.a monolithic internal character, a hierarchic internal structure, and high esprit de corps.a vast workforce.great prestige.

See S.E. Finer, Man on Horseback, for more discussion of this.

3. What perceptions do militaries sometimes purvey? The web of military misperceptions. (Debating this: Samuel Huntington and Richard Betts vs. Bernard Brodie, Martin Kitchen.)

a. "Others are hostile"--others' hostility is exaggerated. See for example the German and Russian militaries before 1914, the Soviet Cold War military, today's Chinese military.

b. "Bandwagoning is common, threats make others more compliant." Cf. Germany's Admiral Tirpitz's risk theory, Gen. LeMay, Ariel Sharon.

c. "Conquest is Easy." Cf. European armies, 1914; European air forces, 1930s; US Strategic Air Command & the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, 1950-1980s. Two arguments are made:

a. "Conquest is easy."

b. "Offensive force postures and doctrines are better than defensive postures and doctrines."


e. "Windows are common and large." Cf. German and Austrian armies, 1914; British Navy 1898; French & Prussian armies, 1867; U.S. Generals Power and Twining, 1950s.

f. "Empires are valuable, resources are cumulative." Cf. U.S. Admiral A.T. Mahan; Prussian army, 1871.


h. Optimism in wartime--cf. U.S. military in Indochina;
Japanese military in WWII--but not peacetime.
i. "Escalation is the answer" in wartime. Cf. German military 1917; US military in
Korea, Vietnam.

4. What states are prone to "militarism?" (Big states; isolated states; insecure
states; states whose militaries form a separate society.)

5. How could the militarism hypothesis be tested? What predictions does it make?
Does history seem to confirm or infirm them?
B. Other domestic organizations: the foreign policy bureaucracy; foreign lobbies
(the China Lobby, the Egestaens); businesses (United Fruit Company, Gov.
Dinwiddie); etc.

V. HYPOTHESES FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY #2: STATES & SOCIETIES AS ORGANIZATIONS
A. National Mythmaking: self-glorifying, self-whitewashing & other-maligning
myths.

1. Nationalism and nationalist mythmaking in education--"value infusion" and the
"non-guilt complex"--Philip Selznick, Carleton Hayes. "Elites' desire to persuade
publics to support the regime, pay taxes & join the army causes them to purvey
myths that glorify state & national institutions."

a. Three types of myth:

i. Self-glorifying myths--"we're brilliant, ingenious, chosen by god. We invented
all the world's better mousetraps!" The Soviet government claimed that Soviets
invented the lightbulb, airplane, and railroad.

ii. Self-whitewashing myths--"we've started no wars, committed no crimes!" E.g.,
Germans in 1920s ("we didn't start WWI--Britain did"); Turkish denial of Turkish
murder of Armenians; Soviet denial of responsibility for Cuban Missile Crisis
(they called it "The Caribbean Crisis"); Croatian denial of Croat mass murders
during WWII; Arab & Israeli mutual myths of innocence.

iii. Other-maligning myths--"our neighbors are culturally
inferior/aggressive/dangerous." Israelis and Arabs both blame the other for a
conflict caused by the West.

b. Why are myths purveyed? They make citizens contribute more to the nation--pay
taxes, join the army, etc. They also bolster the political power of illegitimate
elites.

c. A short history of mythmaking. Chauvinist mythmaking peaked in Europe during
1870-1945; it then diminished. Why?

2. "Orwellian" myths, "social imperial" myths, & "diversionary war"myths--"our
neighbors are out to get us, so you better back the government!"

3. Can nationalist myths be cured? If so, how? (Start "Amnesia International"):)
B. "Non-self-evaluation" by states and societies: "the wish of the powerful to
stifle criticism leads societies to punish those who evaluate dominant policies
and ideas; hence evaluation is scarce and inferior." ("National Auto-
lobotomization"? :)) Relevant works: Irving Janis, Groupthink; Aaron Wildavsky,

"The Self-Evaluating Organization."
1. Non-evaluation in government bureaucracy
a. Punishment of "whistle blowers"—Robert Fitzgerald and the C5A, Billy Mitchell, the U.S. "China hands" were fired in the U.S. in the late 1940s and early 1950s for speaking truths about China’s Chiang Kai Shek regime, Saddam Hussein murdered anyone who brought him bad news, etc.

b. Motives for expunging evaluators; the clash between requirements of sound policy formulation and sound policy implementation. Dissenters make policy implementation difficult, so they are purged in advance—which injures policy formulation.

2. Non-evaluation in the press and academe. See, e.g., Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? German scholars were "fleet professors" before 1914; honest historians (Hermann Kantorowicz and Eckert Kehr) were hounded out of Germany after 1918; Fritz Fischer was attacked in 1960s for truth-telling about World War I; Results: consider the many follies and folly-makers lionized by their peoples: Napoleon, Ludendorff, the Schlieffen plan (not even assessed until 1956).

C. "Non-strategy": "States tend to leave national grand strategy & basic foreign policy vague, or fail to frame it at all." Results: Less learning. E.g., U.S. policy in Asia didn't learn & adjust following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.Less storing of knowledge. E.g., by 1965 the U.S. forgot what it learned about Vietnam in 1954.

Explaining is more difficult. E.g., Britain failed to explain its policy to Germany before 1939, hence Hitler miscalculated.

VI. THE "SPIRAL MODEL" VERSUS "DETERRENCE" (OR THE "DETERRENCE MODEL," OR THE "MUNICH MODEL"): CHOOSING BETWEEN HARD-LINE POLICIES AND APPEASEMENT, AND THE DANGERS THAT FOLLOW FROM WRONG CHOICESA. Defining the spiral model and the deterrence model. What are they?B. Explaining spirals:

1. Can psychological dynamics explain spirals? (See IIIA, IIIB above).

2. Can nationalist mythmaking explain spirals?

C. What conditions determine whether carrots or sticks work better?

1. Is the other an aggressor state or a status quo power? (And: does it see itself as the aggressor or not?)

2. Are the other’s claims legitimate or illegitimate? (And: does it see its claims as legitimate or not?)

3. Is the other weak or strong?

4. Will the concessions demanded by the other strengthen its ability to commit further aggression?

MORE CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE: Culture, Gender, Language, Democracy, Social equality and social justice, Minority rights and human rights, Prosperity, Economic interdependence, Revolution, Capitalism, Imperial decline and collapse, Cultural learning, Religion, Emotional factors (revenge, contempt, honor), Polarity of the international system; Causes of civil war.

I. CULTURAL CAUSES OF WAR
"Some national cultures incline toward war. For example, harsh German child-rearing practices makes Germans belligerent." See, e.g., Leopold Bellak's op-ed in the coursnotes.
Is this explanation satisfying? What causes culture?
Is this cause of war manipulable?

II. GENDER AND WAR
"Men cause war. War would diminish with the greater empowerment of women." See the reading in the coursenotes on this subject by Joshua Goldstein.

Is this explanation valid? What evidence would test it?
Are observed correlations between gender and attitudes on war causal or spurious?
That is, are women more dovish because they depend more on government services, etc.?
Does the greater dovishness of women mean they would better avoid war if they were more powerful? Perhaps they would appease their way into war.
Is this cause of war manipulable?

III. PERSONALITY DISORDER CAUSES WAR
Such disorders include narcissism, megalomania, and sociopathology. In this view these disorders are overrepresented among governing elites in many states.

Studies of this hypothesis are few--more are needed.

IV. DEMOCRACY CAUSES PEACE
"Democratic states are more peaceful, especially in their relations with each other. This is because publics are more anti-war than elites, making states ruled by the public more peaceful; and because democratic publics are infused with democratic values that clash with the notion of conquering and ruling others against their will." An argument by Imanuel Kant, Michael Doyle and others.

Is this hypothesis valid? What evidence would test it? (Strong evidence supports it.)
Is this cause of war/peace manipulable? Can democracy by conjured up and sustained in non-democratic societies?
Does democratization promote peace in multiethnic authoritarian states? Civil conflict in Sri Lanka, Congo Brazzaville and Indonesia warns that democratization can cause war in such settings.

V. SOCIAL EQUALITY, SOCIAL JUSTICE
"Social inequity causes war by creating social conflict that elites defuse by pursuing conflict with other states. Social inequity also spurs elites to sow war- causing nationalist myths in order to defuse demands from below."

Is this cause of war manipulable? Not easily!

VI. MINORITY RIGHTS; OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS
"Minorities that are treated fairly are less likely to pursue secession by force. This dampens the risk of civil war."
The U.S. government has acted to protect minority rights in Eastern Europe under this hypothesis. But minority rights are often hard to nurture.

VII. PROSPERITY
"Prosperity gives people more to lose in war, so they avoid war more carefully. Prosperity also promotes democracy, which independently promotes peace."

Prosperity may cause peace indirectly, by promoting democracy, which in turn causes less nationalism and more equality. But it seems to have little direct effect on the risk of war.
Also, prosperity is hard to foster from abroad.

VIII. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
"Economic interdependence raises the cost of cutting economic ties between states. This dampens the risk of war by raising its costs." An argument by Imanuel Kant among others.

The opposite may also occur. States that depend on foreign materials or imports may fear being strangled by embargo or blockade and therefore use force to establish direct control over these resources, as Germany and Japan did in World War II.

IX. MASS REVOLUTION
"Regimes that seize power by mass revolution are more warlike because they are infused with myths of their own enormous goodness, leading to a messianic expansionism. They also exaggerate the ease of overthrowing regimes, since their own experience of revolutionary success makes overthrows seem easier than they are. This leads them to recklessly attempt to overthrow neighboring regimes, and also to be unreasonably fearful of being overthrown by counterrevolution--leading to foreign campaigns against counterrevolutionary regimes." An argument made by Stephen Walt in a book and an article on the subject.

This theory seems well-supported by evidence. But the world's mass revolutions seem largely behind us; and mass revolution is hard to influence.

X. COMMUNISM
"Communist regimes are infused with a revolutionary messianism that leads them into foreign wars." This is basically a variant of the previous proposition, "Mass Revolution."

XI. CAPITALISM
"Capitalist states must conquer the markets that their economies require to avoid recessions and depressions. This leads to wars over colonies and wars against colonies." A favorite Marxist argument.

This hypotheses fits some wars during 1890-1918, but not more recent wars. And it points to a cause that is not manipulable.

XII. IMPERIAL DECLINE AND COLLAPSE
"The collapse of empires leaves the zone of imperial retraction without settled borders and leaves nearby powers unsure of their rights and responsibilities in this zone. Conflict is the result."

Evidence supports this hypothesis but it points to a largely defunct and non-manipulable cause of war.

XIII. CULTURAL LEARNING
"War is being delegitimated as a human practice, just as slavery and duelling were earlier delegitimated." An hypothesis from John Mueller. Is this hypothesis valid? What about World War II, Korea and Vietnam? The civil wars in Angola and Sudan?

XIV. RELIGION
"Religion is a cause of war. Religious believers are led by their belief to kill one another in the name of God."
"Religion is a cause of peace. Most of the world's great religions proscribe killing and emphasize the value of human life; this inhibits war." These important hypotheses are under-studied. Can the content of religions be manipulated in peaceful directions?

XV. EMOTIONS
"Emotions like honor, desire for vengeance, pride, and displays of contempt can trigger war; apology and displays of contrition can bolster peace."
XVI. POLARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
"A bipolar international order is more peaceful and a multipolar order, because false optimism is less likely. States can't have illusions about how many allies will join their side in the next war because there are no major nonaligned states in the system." An idea from Kenneth Waltz.

Is this hypothesis valid? Does it point to a manipulable cause?

XVII. CAUSES OF CIVIL WARS Michael Brown reading in coursenotes.

VIII. WHAT ABOUT DISARMAMENT? IS IT POSSIBLE? WOULD IT CAUSE OR PREVENT WAR?
A. Is it possible?
Could the human race ever really be disarmed? (Consider the slaughter of ancient wars, waged with swords & shields; e.g., 76,000 of the 126,000 participants in the battle of Cannae [216 BCE] perished in an afternoon.)

What quality of verification would be required before states would disarm? What arrangements to equalize both side's possible rate of "breakout" from the arms control regime would be required?
B. Is it desirable? The problem of preventive war.
C. If it's possible, is it necessary? (If states already get along so well that they can agree to disarm, why is it needed?)

Note: These eight hypotheses represent the universe of major hypotheses on arms and war. If you can think of more you've found something new.
Background questions: Would the world be better off if nuclear weapons had never been invented? Would it be better off if nuclear weapons were now abolished?

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B. Second-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to absorb an all-out counterforce first strike and inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary's society in retaliation. This capability is easy to build, for reasons noted above in Section I.

C. First-strike counterforce: the capacity to launch a first strike that removes the adversary's capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on oneself in retaliation.
This capability is very hard or impossible to build, for reasons noted above in Section I.

D. **Second-strike counterforce capability:** the capacity to absorb an all-out counterforce first strike and mount a counterforce counterattack that leaves the attacker's forces unable to inflict unacceptable further damage on one's own society. This capability is even harder to build than a first-strike counterforce capability. These four capabilities can be displayed in a 2x2 table:

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Past debates over US nuclear doctrine have focused on whether the US should be content with capability #2 (second strike countervalue capability) or should also strive for #3 (first strike counterforce capability).

III. FIVE NUCLEAR ORDERS: MAD AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

MAD may be a technical inevitability. However, hypothetical alternates to MAD include: BAD ("both are defended", a world of symmetrical city defenses); WORSE ("winning only requires striking early," a world of mutual first strike capabilities); MARNE ("mankind absolutely rejects nuclear explosives," a non-nuclear world); and USA ("Unilateral Superiority--American"), a world where the U.S. is top dog--it has second-strike countervalue and first-strike counterforce capabilities against all other nuclear powers.

IV. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION

If states are casualty-sensitive, clear-perceiving, not hyper-aggressive, cannot transfer nuclear weapons anonymously, can build secure arsenals.

Assume states have five attributes: (1) they are casualty-sensitive; (2) they do not value conquest unduly, e.g., they do not value it more than others value freedom; (3) their perceptions of their surroundings are fairly accurate--they have some capacity to assess their neighbors' capabilities, and to correctly anticipate how these neighbors will respond to their conduct; (4) they are unable to use or transfer nuclear weapons anonymously; (5) they have the industrial capacity to build large, secure arsenals. If so, the nuclear revolution has seven positive consequences:

A. First-strike advantages disappear, hence "crisis instability" and preemptive war also disappear. Flat-of-the-curve dynamics (see 'I D') erase first-strike payoffs. Even if a country can shift the force ratio in its favor by striking first, it merely moves itself and its enemy laterally on the flat of the curve. The relative ability to bounce rubble changes, but nothing else.

B. "Windows" of opportunity and vulnerability disappear, hence temptation to preventive war also disappears. See 'IV A': windows disappear for similar flat-of-the-curve reasons.

C. Resources are less cumulative. Flat-of-the-curve dynamics diminish the additivity of resources; even large shifts in the control of industrial resources, or in control of advantageous geographic positions, won't move either power off the flat of the curve. Also, nuclear forces can be delivered over great distances, hence don't require proximity to function (so bases matter little.) (Though this was less true earlier, e.g., in 1962.)
D. Less false optimism. Nuclear weapons create very certain physical results, eliminating miscalculations of relative capability. They still leave room for miscalculations of relative will, however.

E. Defense-dominance, hence fewer wars for security and wars of opportunity. The nuclear revolution strengthens defender-states and weakens aggressor-states, since conflicts in a MAD world become to contests of will, and defenders nearly always win contests of will. Under MAD each side can harm the other without limit. Disputes are then settled in favor of the side that cares more about the issue, and hence is willing to run a greater risk or pay a higher price to prevail. Contests of will are nearly always won by defenders, since defenders value freedom more than aggressors value conquests. If so, conquest among great powers is impossible unless one power acquires a first-strike counterforce capability against the other. A first-strike counterforce capability is essentially unreachable between powers of remotely comparable resources, hence conquest is also impossible among them.

F. Limited war. Logic suggests that causes of war and intense war are similar; and if so, logic suggests that the nuclear revolution can (counter-intuitively) promote limited war, as well as less war.

G. Slower arms racing.

V. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION ON THE INTENSITY OF WAR IF STATES ARE NOT CASUALTY-SENSITIVE OR CLEAR-PERCEIVING, ARE HYPER-AGGRESSIVE, CAN TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANONYMOUSLY, & CANNOT BUILD SECURE ARSENALS

If we relax the five assumptions outlined at the front of in Section IV then the benefits of MAD evaporate and the dark face of MAD appears.

A. If the first four assumptions are relaxed, the benefits of the nuclear revolution are lost, even reversed. Defenders no longer have the clear upper hand. Moreover a new danger appears: states now must face the possibility of being physically destroyed (by a crazed, non-deterrable adversary) even if they cannot be conquered. This may impel them to take drastic steps if a nuclear-armed neighbor seems to be taking leave of its senses. If the crazed neighbor seems certain to attack eventually, killing hundreds of millions, a preemptive strike against it becomes sensible, even though the neighbor's retaliation will kill tens of millions. (In short, a "survival dilemma" arises, parallel to the "security dilemma." "The measures each state must take to ensure its physical survival threaten the physical survival of other states." ) States also face the risk of anonymous use by rogue states or movements. Such rogues are less deterred because they can hope that their responsibility will not be discovered.

B. If the fifth assumption is relaxed, MAD itself may be frail, or may never develop. A first strike may be feasible by one or both sides. Hence MAD between superpowers can be good, but nuclear proliferation to small states can be bad.

Bottom line: nuclear weapons are Janus-faced. They cause peace or war, security or insecurity, depending on ... us! They pacify a world of states that are casualty-sensitive, fairly clear-perceiving, not hyper-aggressive, unable to use or transfer nuclear weapons anonymously, and able to build secure arsenals. If these conditions are relaxed the benefits of the nuclear revolution evaporate and a dark side appears; nuclear weapons themselves become a cause of war.

VI. NUCLEAR TRANSITIONS

MAD may be pacifying, but the road to MAD is dangerous. The transition to MAD opens windows; other states are tempted to strike emerging nuclear powers before they develop their forces, and newly-emerged nuclear powers are tempted to strike neighbors who are lagging in the race. (See, e.g., Israel’s attack on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor, 1981.)

Note: this suggests that nuclear disarmament would raise the danger of preventive war if that disarmament proved impermanent, and the disarmed states began a race back to nuclear capabilities.

VII. THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Many who like the nuclear revolution, believing it has pacified relations among great powers, also fear the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states. Two reasons are given: A. New nuclear states may not meet the five conditions outlined above. Hence relations among them, and between them and the established nuclear powers, will be worsened by their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Examples offered: Saddam Hussein’s crazed Iraqi regime; Iran under the Ayatollah and the Shia mullahs; North Korea under the Great Leader and Dear Leader. B.
As the number of nuclear states grows, so does the feasibility of anonymous use or transfer. Nuclear users can lose themselves in the crowd, erasing their victims’ capacity to hold them accountable.

VIII. COMPARE FIVE WORLDS: WHICH IS BEST?
1. Few (5-10) nuclear powers.
2. Many (80-100) nuclear powers.
3. No nuclear powers, in a world of nuclear knowledge. (We would achieve this if today's nuclear powers disarmed.)
4. No nuclear powers, nuclear weapons are never invented and remain unknown. A now-impossible world still worth evaluating.
5. USA: The United States has a secure deterrent and a first-strike counterforce capability against the rest of the world.
THE CAUSES OF INTENSE WAR

I. THE MYSTERY OF LIMITED/INTENSE WAR

Some wars are total from the outset, like World War I. Some start quietly but end with a bang, like World War II in Europe, which opened the 1939-40 "Sitzkrieg" but became total. Some remain limited, like Korea and Vietnam. Why?

II. SEVEN COMMON HYPOTHESES ON LIMITED WAR

A. "Destructive Weapons Cause Destructive War"—and its less-popular opposite: "Mutual Deterrence Prevents Destructive War."

Consider four hypotheses on arms and the intensity of war:
1. States destroy what they can. The violence of war corresponds to the destructive power of states.
2. States destroy what they cannot avoid destroying. The violence of war depends on whether weapons are discriminating, e.g., accurate or not.
3. States destroy what they must to accomplish their war goals. The violence of war corresponds to the scope of those goals, and hence to the scope of political conflict between the belligerents.
4. States destroy least when they fear large punishment in return. The violence of war corresponds inversely to the ability of both belligerents to punish the other.

Note: Propositions #A1 and #A4 are mirror opposites. What to make of this?

Solutions implied by Proposition #A1:
> Disarmament.
> Deploy forces that can disarm the other side—e.g., strategic nuclear counterforce forces (accurate silo-busting ICBMs and strategic defenses for cities).
Solutions implied by Proposition #A2:
> Deploy discriminating weapons that can be used without collateral damage—e.g., laser-guided bombs. Ban land mines, especially hard-to-clear anti-personnel mines.
Solution implied by Proposition #A3:
> All states should adopt defensive force postures, so that their neighbors will not be insecure, hence will not feel the need to adopt desperate measures in a search for security.
Solution implied by Proposition #A4:
> States should arm themselves abundantly with well-protected weapons of mass destruction. "Nuclear weapons are your friend!"

B. "Total War Doctrine Causes Total War, Limited War Doctrines Allow Limited War."

C. "Defining and Observing Thresholds Helps Keep War Limited"—e.g., "I won't use gas if you won't."

D. "Don't destroy your opponent's command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)—otherwise they can't observe your restraint or make peace with you.

III. CAUSES OF WAR AS CAUSES OF ESCALATION

A. First-strike advantages. When these exist, wars
2. Are fought intensely as each attacks before it is attacked.
3. Widen as belligerents preempt neutrals. Cf. the German invasion of Norway 1940.
4. Are harder to stop due to the treachery displayed by a surprise attack—why should the attacker now be trusted to keep peace?

B. Large windows—i.e., fluctuations in relative power. When these exist, wars
1. Start at an intense level. Cf. World War I, 1941 Pacific War.
2. Escalate as states "jump through" windows of opportunity in wartime. Cf. Hitler's 1940 attack on France, Germany's 1918 offensive.

3. Widen as neutrals jump in to exploit war-caused windows. Note: windows also make war more barbaric. Belligerents often massacre POWs and populations for "preventive" reasons, i.e., otherwise they will escape and rejoin the fight. See e.g., the 1976 massacre of Tal Zataar in Lebanon. Moreover, such horrors make losers fight to the end.

C. False optimism. This makes war

1. Persist--see e.g., World War I, World War II, Vietnam.

2. Escalate--see e.g., German 1917 submarine campaign, the Athenians' Syracusan expedition.

3. Widen.

D. Cumulative resources. When resources are cumulative states struggle to control them for themselves, and to destroy them, in order to deny them to their opponent. These two motives drive much wartime destruction.

D. Offense vs. Defense: Does a strong offense make war more or less intense? 1914-1918 vs. 1792, 1939.

IV. WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AND ESCALATION
A. Do offensive operations cause or dampen escalation? The Altmark incident; the rush to the Yalu, 1950; the Posen-Navy debate over Murmansk.

B. Also: remember Admiral Boscawen and the danger of self-opened windows.

V. DOES WAR BEGET WAR? IF SO, WHY?
A. War aims may expand in wartime as each side adopts a darker image of the other's intentions.

B. The blackmail problem.

C. False wartime optimism.

D. Wartime hyper-nationalism and chauvinist mythmaking.

E. Wartime non-evaluation:

1. Critical assessment of official policy becomes "aid and comfort to the enemy"--and in fact it is!

2. Wartime breakdown of communication between adversaries ---> no external evaluation of each side's domestic debate ---> lopsided debates on war aims. Hawks can lie unanswered about the enemy.

F. Sunk-cost dynamics and ego-investment by elites who can't admit they were wrong.

G. The popular desire for vengeance. An emotional factor.

H. Do "Cleon's" (the military, other hawks) wield more political power in wartime? A missing concept in wartime: The "Treason of the Hawks." Collaborating with enemies is reviled, but ruining one's country in avoidable warfare is a crime with no name and no punishment.

VI. WHAT WILL WORLD WAR III BE LIKE? THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND THE INTENSITY OF WAR
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA

I. HOW THE COLD WAR ERUPTED: EVENTS

A. Poland and Eastern Europe:

1. Warsaw uprising, 1944. Stalin induces the Polish non-communists into a futile rebellion against Hitler, then watches inertly while Hitler slaughters them. Americans wonder what else Stalin intends.

2. Stalin makes a vague promise at Yalta (Feb. 1945) to allow democracy in Poland; then he imposes communism instead.

B. Iran 1946: Stalin won't leave northern Iran until he is pressured.

C. Turkey 1946: Stalin says he wants some Turkish territory; instead Truman sends the Missouri to the Mediterranean, a threatening show of force.

D. Greece 1947: the West thought Stalin was instigating the Communist revolution in Greece. (He wasn't. Yugoslavia's communist Tito government was aiding the Greek communists, but not Stalin.)

E. Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949--an outgrowth of the struggle for Germany.

F. Military aspects:
   1. The illusion of Soviet military superiority. American intelligence and the Western press depicted a vast Soviet conventional superiority in Europe and downplayed the implications of the American atomic monopoly. Hence a Soviet threat that was largely political--the Soviets had some capacity to disrupt or subvert Western Europe--was also perceived as military.
   2. The Soviet atomic bomb explodes, September 1949. Now the West is really scared. What if Stalin isn't deterrable? Western responses: the Marshall Plan (1947); the Berlin airlift (1948-49); the formation of NATO (1949); and a vast American military buildup (1950-53). This triggered a large Soviet counter-buildup.

II. WHAT CAUSED THE COLD WAR? WHO CAUSED THE COLD WAR? SIX EXPLANATIONS

A. Communist totalitarian expansionism? "The totalitarian Soviets were the aggressor, the democratic West the defender. Soviet aggression sprang from the aggressiveness of Communist political systems. Communist governments are aggressive either because they are (a) inherently messianic--Communist ideology preaches the necessity for global conquest; and/or because they are (b) frail, hence aggressive for Orwellian reasons--they needed enemies to legitimate their totalitarian rule."

Variant #1: Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, driven by these motives, threatened West European and American security, causing the Cold War. Variant #2: Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe aroused Western opposition less for security reasons than for cultural reasons. The Soviets had seized the homelands of powerful American ethnic groups, especially the Poles; they demanded American action. Variant #3: Western softness early in the Cold War made things worse--the West led the Soviets forward by appeasement. In this view the problem wasn't Western aggression, but insufficient Western toughness. What if the U.S. had given Stalin an ultimatum in 1946: "Get out of Eastern Europe or we'll throw you out! By atomic war if necessary!"? He would have folded! (For this view see Adam Ulam, The Rivals.)

B. Communist totalitarian cruelty and barbarism? "The West opposed the USSR less because the USSR was aggressive than because it was tyrannical--i.e. the Cold War was a Western human rights crusade." But if true, why didn't the Cold War blossom fully in 1919?

C. Capitalist expansionism? "The U.S.-led capitalist west was the aggressor, the socialist Soviet Union was the defender. The U.S. feared a new depression. It hoped to avoid such a depression by finding market outlets for surplus goods. It sought to control Eastern Europe to compel it to be such a market. U.S. imperialism in Eastern Europe collided with a legitimate Soviet desire to maintain a neutral buffer to its west." This is the now-largely-discredited left-revisionist view. See e.g., the writings of Gabriel Kolko and Lloyd Gardner.

D. Revolutionary vs. Oligarchic states? "Both sides were aggressors, for reasons Stephen Walt describes; revolutionary states are messianic and frightened; their neighbors are defensively aggressive, and polluted by emigres." (But if true why didn't the Cold War blossom fully in 1919?)
E. The Unshaped Postwar European Order/Collapse of German Empire? "The lack of a clear Soviet-American wartime agreement on the postwar partition of the German empire caused a collision of the two major allied powers in a zone of uncertainty. Had each side's sphere of influence been more clearly delineated earlier, the Cold War might have been milder."

F. International System: Bipolarity and the Security Dilemma? "The world's two strongest states never get along well, as each is the main threat to the other. They will always compete for security. The Cold War was an inevitable result of the rise of the U.S. and USSR to the pinnacle of world power."

Variant #1 (realism variant): The two superpowers were in fact insecure, and contested for resources of real value: buffer room in Eastern Europe.

Variant #2 (realism + misperception variant): The superpowers were secure, due to the nuclear revolution, their vast size, and their distance from each other. But didn't know it; and they contended for assets--Eastern Europe--of no real value. Controlling Eastern Europe made USSR less, not more, secure, by scaring the rest of the world; and the Soviets could secure themselves with nuclear weapons alone.

Variant #3 (spiral model variant): The two superpowers felt insecure, and contended for security, but both thought the other pursued unprovoked aggression for non-security reasons, and overreacted accordingly.

Question: what does this systemic explanation predict for the future of U.S.-China relations?

III. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950: WHAT HAPPENED

A. The partition of Korea, 1945. This event was key. Had Korea instead been united and neutralized, as was done with Austria, this would have avoided the Korean war.


C. Communist victory in China triggers a bitter "who lost China?" debate in the USA.

D. Dean Acheson gives a speech at the United Press Club in January 1950 delineating the "American defense perimeter in Asia." He omitted South Korea! Another U.S. blunder.

E. North Korea attacks South Korea, June 25, 1950. Why? Kim Il Sung and Stalin expect the U.S. will not intervene, or that the North can crush the South before the U.S. can intervene effectively. A huge miscalculation.

F. Truman decides to intervene. Reasons:

1. To preserve American credibility. But was it engaged in Korea?

2. Domestic politics--1950 was a bad year to lose another Asian country to Communism.

G. The U.S. lands at Inchon, Sept. 15, 1950, and shortly routs the North Korean army from South Korea. Truman then decides to cross 38th parallel and conquer North Korea in late September. Part of the U.S. reasoning: "We must punish the aggressors to deter them from other aggression elsewhere." An American mega-blunder.

H. Oct. 3, 1950: China warns the Truman administration: "Don't cross 38th parallel or it's war with us!" Truman and Acheson don't listen; UN troops cross the 38th parallel Oct. 7. Why?

1. The warning came via an Indian diplomat not trusted by Truman.

2. China didn't explain the reasoning behind its warning or include Congressional Republicans among those who received it.

3. The Administration had already decided to cross the parallel in late September; backtracking is painful.

4. Truman feared attacks from Republican hawks if he stayed South.

I. U.S. forces encounter small Chinese forces in Korea, 26 Oct. 1950. MacArthur thinks: "If this is all they can do, they'll be a pushover," and orders an advance to the Yalu. Another mega-blunder.

J. A massive Chinese surprise attack on U.S. forces in North Korea, Nov. 26, 1950, routs the U.S. army and drives it from North Korea. The worst ground defeat in U.S. military history!
K. A long and bloody war ensues, Dec. 1950-summer 1953, ending in a tie. China tries and fails to drive the U.S. from Korea. Note: this war included a long-hidden Soviet-American air war! See the course notes on this air war.

IV. KOREAN WAR, U.S.-CHINA WAR: WHAT CAUSED THEM?

A. Background misperceptions:
   1. American self-sugar-coating: "We've always been nice to China--so China has nothing to fear from us!"

B. Non-strategy: By the USA? No--the problem was that Acheson did state US strategy, but misstated it. A misstated strategy is worse than none. By China? Yes. China told the US in late September that it wouldn't intervene, then changed its mind, but too late.
C. Absence of Sino-American diplomatic relations. A mega-blunder by both sides.
D. McCarthyism in the U.S.? A powerful force--what caused it?
E. First-strike advantage. This is the likely reason why China never issued an ultimatum and sought to convince the U.S. of China's weakness.
G. False optimism--by everyone.
H. Security Dilemma: security was the basic goal pursued by both the U.S. and China.
I. War ----> War

1. U.S. aims widen due to the war itself:
   a. "We must conquer the North to punish the aggressor."
   b. "We should hold POWs to scare future communist aggressors into thinking we'll do it again."

2. Chinese aims also widen. Mao inferred malign U.S. intent from the interposition of the U.S. fleet off Taiwan, and the U.S. invasion of North Korea; he responded by expanding China's aims to include expelling the U.S. from South Korea.
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 460-404 BCE

NOTE: Contents of brackets [] suggest cases of déjà vu all over again.

I. THUCYDIDES: WHAT A GUY! Many later readers, across many centuries, felt that Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* evoked their own times and tragedies. Are they right? Does this book identify general laws of motion in warfare that govern events across time and circumstance?

Yet everyone sees a different central meaning in this book. Some see an anti-democratic Thucydides warning that publics are folly-prone and popular rule is misrule. Some see a ruthless celebration of the inexorable cruelties of international politics. Some see an anti-war book, warning that force is hard to use and its results are uncertain; hence force is the worst and least reliable way to accomplish any goal.


Round #1

C. 431-421 BCE: "" Round #2 (the "Archidamean War") D. 415-404 BCE: "" Round #3

III. MILITARY POWER: ITS CHARACTER AND DISTRIBUTION A. Athens and Sparta were the two strongest powers in Greece, each leading a large alliance/empire. B. Athenian power was growing relative to Spartan power.

C. Athens had a MAD-like military strategy. It would send its navy to torch Spartan coastal cities if Sparta attacked over land.

IV. THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN ANCIENT GREECE

A. The Spartan empire was an oppressive "human volcano," hence easily conquered--its slaves would help an invader. [Like Austria 1914 and like Hitler's 1941 view of the USSR.]

B. The Athenian empire was dependent on its fleet, which required tribute from allies. [Like the world imagined by mercantilists in 1755--empire was a highly cumulative resource.]

V. CHRONOLOGY. The Greco-Persian War: Athens acquires an empire. [Like the rise of USSR 1945...]

B. Round #1: the Sparta-Athens war of 460-445--of which we know little. (Thucydides has a sketchy account on pp. 87-103.)

C. Round #2 beginnings:

1. The dispute at Epidamnus, 433 BCE. Epidamnus was a tiny colony of Corcyra, a neutral state in the Athens-Sparta conflict. Corcyra was a colony of Corinth, a major Spartan ally, but was now hostile to Corinth. A civil war erupts in Epidamnus. The losers appeal for aid first to Corcyra, then to Corinth after Corcyra refuses aid. Corinth offers aid and sends settlers to seize Epidamnus, which Corinth sees as a lost possession. Corcyra asks Athens for help against Corinth. Athens agrees because it fears that Corinth, a major naval power, may conquer Corcyra's substantial fleet, and may thereby tip the naval balance-of-power against Athens. Athens therefore offers Corcyra a defensive alliance. However, offensive and defensive behavior are hard to distinguish at sea; this allows Corinth to later claim (to Sparta) that Athens has broken the 30-year truce (which ended the war of 460-445 BCE) by acting offensively. Thus this local dispute is the first trigger to a vast war. [Sarajevo?]

2. The dispute at Potidaea, 432 BCE. Athens, fearing war with Corinth & Sparta, tightens control over its colony, Potidaea, by ordering Potidaea
to tear down its city walls and hand over hostages. Potidaea revolts. Corinth—fearing the longterm growth of Athenian power, and anxious to contain it—sends help to Potidaea (thereby violating the 30-year truce of 445). [Athens toward Potidaea = J.F. Dulles toward Third World: "the U.S. won't tolerate neutralism..."
]

D. Sparta's decision for war, 431 BCE.
1. Sparta noted the rise of Athenian power [Germany fears rising Russia, 1914?]; and feared that a stronger Athens could destroy Sparta.

2. Corinth lies to Sparta: "Athens is breaking the 30 years truce! They are starting a war!"—and Athens fails to reply to these lies. [Dinwiddie, Shirley, & Duquesne, 1754...]

3. Sparta's pretexts for war—priests, goddesses, curses. Every reason for war is trotted out except the real one: Sparta's fear of Athens' rising power. [Gulf of Tonkin 1964...]

E. The death of Pericles and the rise of the hawkish Cleon and Alcibiades in Athens; the death of Archidamus and the rise of Brasidas in Sparta. [The rise of the Ludendorff/Hindenburg "silent dictatorship" in Germany, 1914-1918...]

F. The growth and later contraction of Athenian war aims.
1. Athens wins a big victory at Sphacteria, but then refuses to settle on its original peace terms [Sebastopol 1855...] until it is sobered up by --->

2. The Athenian defeats at Delium and Amphipolis; these finally convince Athens to make a truce—the Peace of Nicias, 421-415 BCE.

G. Mytilene, an Athenian colony, sees Athens' harsh treatment of other colonies and decides to revolt before the same fate befalls it. But Athens believes the revolt has "no reason" and is unprovoked; hence it sees need to further scare its colonies with even harsher treatment. Athens considers killing all Mytilenians, but relents.

H. Round #3 beginnings: the truce breaks down.
1. Athens destroys Melos, a rebellious Athenian colony. Athens kills all military-age Melian men; Melian women and children are enslaved. Note: compare the Mytilene Debate and the Melian Dialogue... the latter was nastier. Ethical concerns disappear from the discussion. Regarding justice, the Athenians simply declare that "the strong do what the have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." (Thuc. p. 402)

J. The Athenian expedition to Syracuse [German unrestricted submarine campaign, 1917...]
1. Athenians did little research before launching the Expedition. They were largely ignorant of basic facts, such as Sicily's size and population.

2. Athens' aims were vast, Syracuse's aims soon became vast [GB & Fr in 1755, US in 1941, US & China 1950.]

3. Athens expected easy victory, believing the expedition was "an absolutely safe thing." This grew from:
   a. Athenian ignorance of Syracuse's power.
   b. False expectation that others—Sparta and Sicilian states—would bandwagon with Athens, wouldn't balance against it. [Hitler & the Axis Alliance...]
   c. False expectations of help from Egesta (see below).

4. Athens expected a fun, cheap war. [1914...] Alcibiades told Athenians:
   a. The Expedition was an opportunity for "gaining new experience" and to avert the "ruin" that comes with being "idle."
   b. If things went poorly the Athenian forces could simply "come back again."
5. Athenian strategy was disintegrated. Athenians said Syracuse was so strong it was a serious threat, and so weak it could be easily conquered.

6. Egestaean blue smoke & mirrors--Egesta manipulates Athenian perceptions. Egesta tells Athens:
   a. "Beware the transnational Dorian conspiracy against Athens! Syracuse, being Dorian, is part of it!"
   b. "If you fight Syracuse, others in Sicily will join your side!"
   c. "We Egesteans have huge financial resources and can help a lot!"

7. When the Expedition later faces disaster, Nicias (the commander) fears making a necessary and prudent peace because he fears being pilloried for it by Athens' hawkish public.

K. Catastrophe for Athens. The Syracusan expedition is destroyed (413 BCE). But Athens survives anyway for nine more years (413-404 BCE)! [Germany 1914-1918.]

VI. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE WAR, ITS ESCALATION & CONTINUATION

A. Windows:

B. Offense & Defense:
   1. Security is a major goal on all sides:
      a. Athens' goal: to maintain the political division of maritime Greece, since a unity of non-Athenian maritime Greece could threaten Athens.
      b. Sparta's goal: to ease the vulnerability to invaders that arose from its oppressive social structure.
      c. Sparta & Corinth's goal: to avert the threat posed by rising Athenian power.
   2. "Chain gang" dynamics in the Spartan and Athenian alliances:
      a. Corinth can drag Sparta to war because Sparta fears that otherwise Corinth might defect; causing Megara to defect; causing Sparta's downfall.
      b. Athens is dragged into war by Corcyra for similar reasons. [Serbia & Austria drag Europe to war in 1914...]
   3. Offensive and defensive conduct prove to be indistinguishable. [1914]
   4. Offense is believed easy militarily; campaign after campaign--by Thebes, Corinth, Sparta, and Athens--is launched amid assurances that "it's a sure thing."
   5. Bandwagon beliefs prevail on both sides.

C. Both sides fight to control resources believed cumulative, and to maintain credibility.
   1. False optimism about war outcomes.
   2. Cheap war, fun war expectations.
   3. Conflict spirals:
      a. Sparta opts for war in 431 partly because it falsely thought Athens had broken the 30 year truce. A clear case of "exaggerate the hostility of others' conduct."
      b. Athens v. Potidaea: Potidaea revolts in response to Athens' efforts to tighten control. These trigger more rebellion, not less.
      c. Athens v. Mytilene: Athens provokes the Mytilene revolt but fails to see this, instead thinking the revolt is unprovoked; hence it infers that even harsher policies toward its colonies are called for.
4. Athens v. Syracuse: Athens exaggerates Syracusan hostility (by imagining a false Dorian hostile conspiracy), then makes Syracuse hostile by attacking it.

G. Lack of clear strategy ---> Forgetting of original aims & purposes in Athens. For example, Athens continues the Syracusan expedition even after the important premises that underlay it (e.g., that Sparta wouldn't enter the fray on Syracuse's side) are disproven.

H. Chauvinist mythmaking.

I. Poor evaluation of policy ideas, especially in wartime.

J. Pericles' hubris: "I can handle everything--I needn't train successors." [Like Bismarck?]

K. Manipulation by Allies (Corinth manipulates Sparta; Egesta manipulates Athens).

L. War ----> War

1. Reciprocal growth of war aims.

2. Rise of the superhawks in wartime.

3. The tyranny of sunk costs. Alcibiades: "After having sailed out in such forces (the Athenians) ought not to disgrace themselves by going home with nothing to show for it." (Thuc. p. 440.)

4. Fear that negotiation will be taken as a sign of weakness. Pericles warns: "Do not send embassies to Sparta: do not give the impression that you are bowed down under your present sufferings!" (Thuc. pp. 162-163.)

5. McCarthyism: evaluators are shouted down or worse. See Thucydides, pp. 242-243: during the war Greeks came to believe that "anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone who objected to them became suspect." And "fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man." And "to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's unmanly character; ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action." Not a climate conducive to calm evaluation of options.

6. Growing barbarism on both sides as the war proceeds.

VII. MORAL OF THE STORY: NEVER USE FORCE? Consider first history's many successful uses of force: the Spanish/French/British/U.S. "Indian Wars" against native Americans; the U.S. war against Mexico, 1846-1848, a most profitable escapade; the U.S. Persian Gulf war, 1991; Israel's 1967 war against the Arabs; the Arabs' 1973 war against Israel; the U.S. invasion of Haiti, 1994; the British war to recover the Falklands from Argentina, 1982; etc. All wars are not quagmires. The question is: how can you tell which is which?
THE "SPIRAL MODEL" v. THE "DETERRENCE MODEL"

When are threats of punishment ("sticks") the best way to gain other states' compliance, and when do positive inducements (promise of rewards, appeasement, "carrots") work best? Both policies sometimes succeed, but both can also make things worse: "sticks" can provoke a hostile response, while "carrots" can lead the target to sense weakness, make more demands, and dismiss final warnings not to move further. Sometimes either sticks or carrots will work, and sometimes neither will work. However, it often happens that one will work while the other will make things worse. In these situations the choice between carrots and sticks is crucial, since that choice determines if policy will succeed or prove counter-productive.

1 Prescription: Appeasement works better than threat of punishment. Carrots are safer than sticks. Peace is best preserved by conciliation.

I. DEFINING THE SPIRAL MODEL & DETERRENCE MODEL

The spiral model and deterrence model are similar in kind and opposite in substance. Both models attempt to explain the outbreak of war. Both assign a central role to national misperception: specifically, both posit that states adopt war-causing policies in the false expectation that these policies will elicit compliance. However, they posit opposite misperceptions.

A. The Spiral Model posits that conflicts arise from punishment applied in the false expectation that it will elicit better behavior from the other side, when in fact it elicits worse behavior. Angered or frightened by the punishment, the other becomes more aggressive-adopting wider aims, and/or becoming more willing to use force to defend them. The first side responds with more punishment, assuming that its first punishment was too mild, the other grows still more belligerent, etc. In this way two sides divided by only minor differences can spiral into intense confrontation or war.

1 These models are outlined in Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 3 ("Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,"), pp. 58-113.

Jervis spoke only of "deterrence," not of a "deterrence model," but the set of concepts he defines as "deterrence" comprise a model, so I refer here to a "deterrence model."

2 Thus four situations are possible; (1) either carrots or sticks will work (i.e. either strategy will elicit better behavior from the other side); (2) neither carrots nor sticks will work (i.e. both strategies will elicit worse behavior); (3) carrots will work, while sticks will make things worse; and (4) sticks will work, while carrots will make things worse.

2 Prescription: Appeasement works better than threat of punishment. Carrots are safer than sticks. Peace is best preserved by conciliation.

B. The Deterrence Model posits that conflicts arise from acts of appeasement made in the false expectation that appeasement will elicit better behavior from the other side, when in fact it elicits worse behavior. The other, believing that it coerced or frightened the appeaser to offer its concessions, assumes that more threats will elicit more concessions. Hence it makes additional demands, backed by threats. It also may dismiss the appeaser's threats after the appeaser changes course and adopts deterrence; as a result it may move too far and trigger war.

Prescription: Threat of punishment works better than appeasement. Sticks are safer than carrots. Peace is best preserved by unyielding policies.

Note: the spiral model incorporates one misperception (the punishing state falsely expects that punishment will elicit better behavior from the other, when it elicits worse behavior). The deterrence model incorporates two misperceptions (the
appeasing state falsely expects that appeasement will elicit better behavior, when in fact it elicits worse behavior; and the appeased state then falsely expects the appeaser won't carry out its later threats when in fact it will.)

II. CAUSES OF SPIRALS

Two major explanations for spirals have been offered:
A. A psychological explanation: policymakers suffer the syndromes that cognitive psychology suggests individuals suffer, hence the states they govern exhibit these same syndromes. Specifically, states underestimate their own role in causing others' hostility, because (1) they engage in some wishful thinking about themselves, causing them to underestimate the aggressiveness of their own conduct; (2) they believe (following attribution theory) that their own aggressiveness was compelled by circumstances--specifically, by the other side's behavior; and (3) they further assume that the other side knows this. As a result they see the other's provoked hostility as unprovoked malice; the other side is in the wrong, knows it, is just testing to see if its bluff will be called, and will back down if its bluff is called.

B. A nationalism explanation: states and societies paint rose-colored self-images in their schoolbooks and public discourse, largely to build patriotism and a spirit of civic self-sacrifice in the population. As a result they are unaware that they injured other societies in the past; hence they are unaware that others might have legitimate grievances against them, or might have legitimate fears of their future conduct based on their past behavior. Hence they view others complaints against them as unprovoked malice; the other side is in the wrong, knows it, is just testing to see if its bluff will be called, and will back down if its bluff is called.

III. WHEN DOES EACH MODEL APPLY?

When do carrots work better, and when do sticks work better? These conditions can be important:
A. Is the other state an aggressor or a status quo power? In other words, does the other have large aims beyond those it now declares? If the other is an aggressor, it will usually know this, will assume you know it, and will infer weakness from any concessions.

But note: some aggressors don't know they are aggressors—neurotic Wilhelmine states, who forget each past act of aggression as soon as they are done committing it. With these states appeasement may be safer.

So there are two issues:
1. Is the other an aggressor or not?

2. Does the other see itself as an aggressor or not?

It is safest to apply sticks when the other is an aggressor and knows it; then it is really just probing to find out if you have divined its nefarious aims.

B. Are the other state's claims legitimate or illegitimate? The other will infer a wider weakness on your part if you concede to illegitimate than to legitimate claims, because concessions to illegitimate claims set a wider precedent.

Note: some states making illegitimate claims don't think their claims are illegitimate. With these states appeasement may be safer, and standing firm more dangerous.

So there are two issues:
1. Are the other's demands legitimate or not?

2. Does the other see its demands as legitimate or not?
C. How strong is the other state? It is more dangerous to appease strong states, because they are more likely to infer that you conceded to their threats, not to the legitimacy of their claims. Weak states are less likely to make such an inference.

D. Are the resources demanded cumulative, that is, additive? If so, you may be giving away assets that will change the other side's perspective--allowing it to redefine its aims, since it now could take what it could not take formerly. Its appetite will grow with the eating because its ability to eat will grow with the eating.

Related Resources

World War I

- World War I Document Archive
- The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century (Interactive)
- The Versailles Treaty
- Trenches on The Web: An Internet History of the Great War
- World War I Biographical Dictionary

World War II

- World War II Timeline
- Library of Congress Soviet Archives Exhibit: World War II

The Cold War and Korea

- Library of Congress Soviet Archives Exhibit: Soviet Perspectives on the Cold War

The Indochina War, 1945-1975

- The Wars for Viet Nam: 1945-1975
- Vietnam Online (Interactive)

FINAL EXAM STUDY QUESTIONS

Please bring this list to the exam. You may outline your answers on these study-question sheets, but will not be permitted to consult other materials.
You will be asked to answer two from a choice of three questions, drawn for the list below, plus some short identifications. Total exam time: 2.5 hours (1 hour each for the essays, .5 hour for the short IDs).

You are encouraged to study together as you prepare your answers.

1. If you were designing a peaceful world of states best able to co-exist without war, what would your states be like? You may comment on the nature of their political systems, their economic systems, their administrative and educational institutions, their foreign and defense policies, or any other national attributes you believe are relevant. However, confine your remarks to 3-5 attributes, and explain why you think they matter most. Also, please indicate how much you think war would diminish if all the world's states followed your design.

Use historical examples and evidence drawn from course readings and lectures.

2. Which previous wars covered in this course should the leaders of the powers engaged in the Korean War have studied most closely to avoid the mistakes they made? Why?

3. Could World War I have been prevented, localized or limited? If so, when and how? By whom? ("Whom" = any individual, group, or institution, including governments, institutions or individuals within governments, and private institutions or individuals.)

4. Some scholars believe that war results largely from the environment states face. There is no superior authority to protect states, so they must protect themselves; but the measures that each takes to secure itself injures others' security, causing conflict and war. Others argue that real-world conditions give states little reason to fight, that most wars arise from misperception of the real world, and that warfare is best explained by theories of national misperception. What do you think?

   a. How common are wars arising from the security dilemma? How much warfare could be prevented if states could somehow achieve absolute security from conquest?

   b. How common are wars arising from national misperception? How much warfare could be prevented if national perceptions were always accurate?

Base your answer on historical cases covered in this course. Discuss exceptions to any generalizations you offer. If you argue that misperceptions are important, specify what types of misperceptions matter most: (a) those arising from human cognitive shortcomings (that is, psychological causes); (b) those deliberately purveyed by mendacious individuals or institutions; (c) those arising from the opacity of the international environment (that is, from the inherent difficulty of perceiving international politics correctly).

5. In Perception and Misperception in International Politics (chapter 3) Robert Jervis notes that sometimes unyielding policies cause war by provoking a conflict-spiral, while sometimes concessions cause war by encouraging aggressors to make more demands, and to falsely expect that others will grant these demands.

   a. Which problem occurs more often in international history? Comment on the cases covered in this course.

   b. What policy prescriptions follow from your answer? How could past policy makers have avoided the spirals or deterrence failures that you discuss?

6. What has been the single most potent and preventable cause of war in the 20th century? Explain why your war-cause is both potent and preventable; also identify the second and third most potent and preventable war-causes, and explain why they are less potent and/or less preventable than the prime cause you identify.

7. What foreign policy should the United States adopt to keep itself and the world at peace? Some people argue an activist U.S. foreign policy only leads to U.S. entanglement in wars like World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Others argue that an isolationist policy permits wars among other states; then the U.S. is eventually drawn in, as in 1917, 1941, and 1950. They suggest a paradox: "To preserve peace, we must threaten war."
Still others argue that both an active or isolationist policy can cause war or peace, depending on specific policies and circumstances. Discuss these views with reference to relevant history. This history could include past American policies or the policies of other powers covered in this course.

8. You are an adviser to the President of the United States. Write a memo to the President on the future of U.S.-China relations. Address specifically these questions: (1) How great is the danger of military conflict between China and the United States in the next 20 years? (2) What would be the causes of any conflict that occurs? (3) What policies do you recommend to avoid conflict while also protecting American interests? Feel free to mention specific attributes of China and/or the United States, or aspects of the military, technological, and economic environment of today and the future. Support your argument with reference to relevant theories and evidence, including historical evidence.

9. Many later observers have seen their own times reflected in the work of Thucydides and drawn similarities between the Peloponnesian War and conflicts they observed first hand. Of the wars studied in this course, which one in your view is most similar to the Peloponnesian War in its causes and conduct? What were the most important common features of the outbreak and conduct of the Peloponnesian War and the one you have chosen? What are the common lessons that can be drawn from them for the conduct of policy? Feel free to note differences as well as similarities between the wars you discuss.

10. What is the future of war? Will warfare be more or less common in the future than it was before 1945? Will it be more or less violent than pre-1945 warfare? In developing your answer, clearly state your factual and theoretical assumptions. (Note: you may wish to offer different answers for different regions of the globe.)

Assignments

WORLD WAR I: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

It is January 1919. The last echoes of history's greatest war have ended--but the debate over responsibility for the war has just begun! That debate will soon occur at the Cambridge Peace Conference, convened right here at MIT with the purpose of divining the causes of the war and offering recommendations to prevent future wars. You are the official representative of your country at this Peace Conference. In a five-minute speech to the Conference, please:

1. Assign responsibility for the war. What country and/or what factor (e.g., what aspect of the general situation) was most responsible?

2. Explain and defend your own country's actions leading up to the war.

3. You can also offer suggestions on preventing future wars if you are so moved.

After your speech the representatives of other states will have some time to rebut your arguments. After these comments the next five-minute presentation will be heard. In your speech you may wish to refer to:

> The international situation (e.g., to the balance of power, to alliances, to military strategies and plans, to widespread perceptions about war, etc.)
> The domestic situation in your country or other countries (e.g., to nationalism, to civil-military relations, to the abilities or shortcomings of national leaders, to democracy or autocracy, etc.)
> The events of the 1914 July crisis, and the role your country played in these events.

Your job is to advocate a point of view in your speech, not to present the matter from all sides. Your presentation therefore need not be entirely judicious or even-handed.
WORLD WAR II: JUDGMENT DAY--THE EUROPEAN WAR

Political leaders often say that history should be the judge of their actions-confident that history will never rule. But this time History has indeed assembled a Final Court of Judgment to assess their responsibility. It is now in session and there will be no appeal. In the dock are those charged with contributing to the outbreak of the Second World War, a conflagration that killed as many as sixty million people. The trial of those most proximately guilty has already adjourned after condemning Hitler and his Nazi minions. But what others helped set the stage for the grim spectacle? Who else is responsible for the carnage unleashed by the Nazis?

You are the defense counsel and advocate for the accused ghosts of World War II. Your mission: in a five-minute speech, to present a compelling defense of your client and to indict another among the defendants who now tremble before the Final Court.

In your speech you may wish to refer to:
> The international situation (e.g., the balance of power, alliances, military strategies and plans, windows of opportunity and vulnerability, etc.)
> Domestic situations (e.g., national perceptions or misperceptions, the abilities or shortcomings of national leaders, democracy or autocracy, etc.)
> Accidents, misunderstandings, and the perceptions, misperceptions, and honest mistakes of individuals.

Those called to judgment are as follows:

THE ACCUSED
THE CHARGE
British interwar pacifists Their ideas led Britain to a policy of weakness that let Hitler run wild.
British leaders They failed to stop Hitler when he began rearmament in 1933, when he remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, and when he seized Austria in 1938; and they appeased him at Munich in 1938.
U.S. isolationists They hindered Franklin Roosevelt's ability to deter German aggression, leading Germans to believe they could aggress with impunity.

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Soviet leaders
American Wilsonians
German Weimar-era scholars
The interwar German public French policy makers
They cooperated with Hitler in 1939 (in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) instead of deterring his aggression.
They devised a flawed Versailles system that left Germany both strong and bitter, surrounded with small weak states that could not contain it.
They failed to refute, and sometimes echoed, toxic historical lies that German nationalists purveyed to the German people. These lies laid the basis for Hitler's rise.
It chose to believe these toxic lies and willingly voted Hitler into power.
They embraced a defensive military doctrine when deterring Hitler called for offensive capabilities, and they participated in appeasing him.
Your job is to advocate a point of view in your speech, not to present the matter from all sides. Your presentation therefore need not be entirely judicious or even-handed.
Please provide an outline of your speech to your audience. This outline could be written on a blackboard but a 1-page handout often works better.
A good format for your speech is: sum up your argument quickly at the outset so your audience knows where you are going; then proceed through the body of the argument.
Please come prepared to hold your remarks to five minutes. The Chief Justice of the Final Court of Judgment may cut you off if you run over.
We recommend that you practice your speech a couple of times--to the mirror or, better still, to a friend--before giving it.
THE MOMENT OF JUDGMENT SWIFT APPROACHES HOW THEN DO YOU PLEAD?
Western powers

THE CHARGE

They hindered Franklin Roosevelt’s ability to deter Japanese aggression, leading Japan's leaders to believe they could aggress with impunity. Dean Acheson and others pushed provocative policies that triggered Japan's attack on the United States, while failing to devise adequate deterrence. It sought to seize a vast and unneeded Asian empire by violence. They failed to stop Japan's wild military, instead going along with its imperial adventures. They colonized much of Asia before 1900, thereby provoking Japan to a campaign of aggression in self-defense.--
Your job is to advocate a point of view in your speech, not to present the matter from all sides. Your presentation therefore need not be entirely judicious or even-handed. Please provide an outline of your speech to your audience. This outline could be written on a blackboard but a 1-page handout often works better. A good format for your speech is: sum up your argument quickly at the outset so your audience knows where you are going; then proceed through the body of the argument. Please come prepared to hold your remarks to five minutes. The Chief Justice of the Final Court of Judgment may cut you off if you run over. We recommend that you practice your speech a couple of times—-to the mirror or, better still, to a friend—-before giving it.

THE MOMENT OF JUDGMENT SWIFT APPROACHES HOW THEN DO YOU PLEAD?