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In Conjunction with



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Conflict Analysis

Produced by the
Professional Training Program

1: Introduction

About the Course

This self-study course in conflict analysis is the first in a series that will eventually include courses in negotiation, mediation and other activities related to conflict management.

Conflict analysis is the first in the series because of the primary role that good analysis plays in successful conflict management. Effective action is invariably the product of insightful analysis.

Throughout the course, you will be prompted to test your understanding of terms and concepts.

1.1: Challenges in Contemporary Conflict

The End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War brought relief and optimism to people throughout the world. Former adversaries made major reductions in their conventional and nuclear arms. New leaders found ways to cooperate on a range of international issues.

As the specter of nuclear confrontation began to fade, many held hope that this spirit of cooperation might set a precedent, that absent the context of superpower rivalry, nations of the world might find a new willingness to work together, as an international community, to resolve conflicts through peaceful negotiations and diplomacy. Yet events over the next decade proved this optimism premature.

Related Resources from USIP

Europe Undivided The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations

James E. Goodby

In this book, distinguished diplomat James Goodby argues that during the Cold War a network of norms, rules, and structures kept the peace between the superpowers.

Today, a new "logic of peace" must be established, one that builds on such mutual concerns as reducing nuclear weaponry and combating nuclear terrorism.

The Genocide in Rwanda

For example, in 1994, just three years after American and Russian leaders signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the international community failed to provide a coherent response to the genocide in Rwanda.

The nature and scale of this genocide have prompted substantial study and analysis, along with deep soul-searching among policy-makers and observers.

In an attempt to eliminate Rwanda's Tutsi minority, the Hutu majority systematically slaughtered 800,000 individuals, most of them civilians, in just 100 days, a rate of killing that rivals the worst in human history.

Armed with machetes, the killers were both vicious and organized, torturing their victims, murdering them in cold blood, and dumping their bodies in mass graves. In numerous cases, such killing took place while international peacekeepers stood by helplessly.

The Rwandan genocide exposed glaring weaknesses in the capacity of international and multilateral institutions to prevent or respond to such violence, while raising troubling questions about international willingness to do so.

The Conflict in Kosovo

In a number of former communist countries, the end of the Cold War acted to trigger conflict, as long-standing internal divisions boiled to the surface in the sudden absence of single-party rule.

For the most part, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe managed their transitions without violence.

The one exception was Yugoslavia, which disintegrated in a series of violent conflicts, including conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In contrast to its response in Rwanda, the international community acted decisively in Kosovo; nevertheless, the effort was delayed and often lacked coordination, and the conflict took a devastating human toll.

Ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Kosovo resulted in an estimated 10,000 civilian deaths, over 1.5 million internally displaced persons and refugees, burning of homes, use of human shields in combat, rape as an instrument of war, and summary executions.¹

¹ U.S. State Department. *Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting*. http://www.state.gov/www/global/humn_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html

Intensity of Conflict after the Cold War

In the intensity of violence, to what extent have the conflict in Kosovo and the genocide in Rwanda been representative of other conflicts after the Cold War?

Ethnic Violence

The genocide in Rwanda was one of the worst cases of ethnic violence in world history. On a smaller but still substantial scale, ethnic violence cost lives in countries such as Burundi, Yemen and Ethiopia. The collapse of authoritarian communism unleashed latent ethnic violence in many societies besides Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Other conflicts include Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan and Chechnya.

Civil Violence

Since the end of the Cold War, civil violence has cost lives in nations across the globe, including East Timor, Guatemala, Colombia and Somalia. Civil war continued in Cambodia, Sudan and Angola, and broke out in Liberia, enmeshed in broader international conflicts. Many more examples could be cited.

Interstate War

Throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, the possibility of major interstate war has continued to loom in such diverse places as Korea and Kashmir. Two large interstate wars have taken place in Iraq.

Whether in the diplomatic community, the military, international civilian police, or nongovernmental organizations, those who work in areas of conflict have had to ask themselves a fundamental and potentially disturbing question: has the intensity of conflict actually increased since the end of Cold War?

In the early 1990s, the statistics were not encouraging. With 93 wars in 70 countries, the period from 1990 to 1995 was twice as lethal as any decade since World War II. In fact, of the estimated 22 million people who have died in conflicts since 1945, one-quarter of those deaths occurred in the early 1990s.

The late 1990s saw a decline in violence. The end of apartheid in South Africa, some progress towards peace in the Middle East, and a general worldwide trend toward democratic governance raised hopes once again that conflicts might be easier to manage in the new century. However, these hopes were tempered by several events, including the crisis in the peace process in the Middle East and the terrorist threat that brutally made itself manifest on September 11, 2001.

Perspectives

I think that during the Cold War certain kinds of conflicts were made worse and some were mitigated to the extent that there was superpower interest or perceived superpower interest in the area. A superpower could be seen as part of the cause, but a superpower -- or the superpowers -- could also be seen as wanting to dampen down the conflict because neither one of them wanted that one to deal with. But you couldn't fully understand most of those conflicts without understanding what the superpower interests were in them. This is a different world now after the Cold War, and I think that in most cases conflicts have to be understood in somewhat different terms.

-Ray Caldwell

Shifting Trends after the Cold War

While tracking the intensity of violence, practitioners in conflict management have also noted shifts in the types of conflict prevalent since the end of the Cold War. While interstate conflict continues, intrastate conflict has grown in prominence. In their efforts to develop effective interventions, many have wondered if a further set of questions might help them respond to the dynamics of post-Cold-War conflict.

Interstate — Intrastate

For example, in the era of superpower rivalry, conflict-management practitioners often focused on conflicts between states. In the aftermath of the Cold War, must they focus more intently on conflicts within states, as well as hybrid situations such as Liberia?

Professional Armies — Militias

Next to professional armies, are militias growing in importance? How about private military organizations?

Territorial Aims — Ethnicity/Identity

Are there shifts in the balance of the motives for conflict? Are territorial aims growing less prominent, compared to motives more related to ethnicity and identity? To what extent are ethnicity and identity used as a cover for more traditional war aims?

Military Casualties — Civilian Casualties

Are we seeing more civilian casualties in comparison with military casualties?

Sophisticated Weapons Systems — Simple, Lethal Weapons

While advanced states — the U.S. above all — continue to develop ever more sophisticated weapons systems, many combatants are relying on simple weapons that can be every bit as lethal. What is the status of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological)?

Perspectives

It's important to realize that there wasn't a sea change from one moment to the next in terms of the sorts of conflicts we were seeing. After all, ethnic-based conflict is as old as humanity. But if one looks at the conflicts that have occurred after the Cold War and compares them with the conflict situation during the era of the Cold War, there are some important differences. The most important, probably, is that most of the conflicts, the overwhelming majority of conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, have been intrastate conflicts rather than interstate conflicts. They have very often involved questions of identity, ethnicity, religion, language... In a very large part, these have been the drivers of conflicts as opposed to more traditional causes of conflict, such as territorial questions and the like.

-George Ward

1.2: Tools of Conflict Analysis

Questions such as these—and, more generally, questions concerning the nature of conflict—are the principal focus of the field of conflict analysis.

This course will view conflict analysis from the perspective of practitioners, who include professionals in diplomacy, the military, law enforcement, and the legal profession, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).

The practitioner's perspective is an especially focused one, for practitioners are those involved directly in specific conflict management efforts, whether in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement or post-conflict reconstruction. Drawing substantially on academic scholarship, a practitioner's work in conflict is driven by specific, real-time goals, either to help prevent a given conflict, to help resolve it, or to contribute to rebuilding efforts in its aftermath.

This course will focus on two tools used by practitioners in their work in conflict analysis:

The Curve of Conflict

The curve of conflict is a visual tool that helps illustrate how conflicts tend to evolve over time. The curve helps in conceptualizing how different phases of conflict relate to one another, as well as to associated kinds of third-party intervention. Practitioners use this knowledge in the determination of effective strategies for intervention, along with the timing of those strategies.

Analytical Framework

Where the curve of conflict helps in analyzing the evolution of a conflict, the analytical framework helps provide insights into the various forces driving a conflict at a particular moment.² With resources that are often limited, practitioners use the framework to help determine where they can apply their influence most productively.

The Genocide in Rwanda and the Conflict in Kosovo

After presenting the curve of conflict and the analytical framework, this course will apply them to two recent conflicts, the genocide in Rwanda and the conflict in Kosovo. Separated by thousands of miles and differing cultures, these conflicts exhibit numerous contrasts; nevertheless, the curve and the framework show how conflicts can share important characteristics even when they occur in very different contexts. Awareness of common characteristics is a first step in attempting to apply lessons learned from one conflict to another, as part of broader efforts to prevent violent conflicts, or if that is not possible, to mitigate and resolve them in ways that are both expeditious and lasting.

Related Resource

Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators
Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, Eds. Copyright © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) 1998
<http://www.idea.int/>

The analytical framework presented here draws from International IDEA's groundbreaking handbook *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*, which provides practical advice on how to broker peace in countries emerging from deep-rooted conflict and outlines options negotiators can draw upon when trying to build or rebuild democracy. The handbook provides a

² Harris, Peter and Reilly, Ben, Eds. *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*. Stockholm. Copyright © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 1998.
<http://www.idea.int/>

thorough overview of democratic levers—such as power-sharing formulas, questions of federalism and autonomy, options for minority rights, constitutional safeguards and many others. It analyzes actual negotiated settlements from places like Bosnia, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea and South Africa. Written by international experts and experienced negotiators, the handbook is designed as a quick reference tool containing numerous case studies, fact sheets and practical examples.

2: The Curve of Conflict

Terms and Concepts

As in any rigorous field of inquiry, the systematic study of conflict requires learning a challenging array of complex terms and concepts.

Terms such as "durable peace," "stable peace" and "unstable peace" are used to describe the state of a relationship between nations or groups within nations. As a potential conflict develops, these terms are used to describe different phases in a changing relationship.

"Preventive diplomacy," "crisis diplomacy" and related terms describe general categories of action appropriate for various phases of conflict.

In a further complication, different terms are sometimes used to describe the same concept. For example, while "preventive diplomacy" is an expression that might be used in discussions at the United Nations, "conflict prevention" might be used as an equivalent expression in academic literature.

In his insightful book *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, Michael Lund introduces the Curve of Conflict, a conceptual model that illustrates how conflict can be both violent and nonviolent, and how the use of force in violent conflict tends to rise and fall over time. The curve also helps organize terms and concepts used by conflict management professionals, showing how a conflict's different phases relate to one another and to various kinds of third-party intervention.


Related Resources from USIP

Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy
Michael S. Lund

In this insightful analysis, Michael Lund introduces the curve of conflict, a conceptual tool for understanding the nature of conflict. Lund further defines early warning and preventive diplomacy; assesses who does it, what methods work, and why; and suggests how multilateral and national entities (especially the U.S. government) can overcome operational challenges to effective preventive action.

The Curve of Conflict

In his book, Lund explains how the curve is derived: "*The course of disputes that become violent conflicts is traced in relation to two dimensions: the intensity of conflict (the vertical axis) and the duration of conflict (the horizontal axis).*"



Lund continues,

The line that forms an arc from left to right across the diagram portrays the course of a conflict as it rises and falls in intensity over time. Its smoothly curving bell shape is oversimplified to characterize an 'ideal type' life history. As suggested by the arrows that deviate from the line, the course of actual conflicts can exhibit many different long and short life history trajectories, thresholds, reversals, and durations. Even conflicts that have abated can re-escalate. Nevertheless, the model has heuristic value in allowing us to make certain useful distinctions among the conflict management interventions that relate to different levels of intensity.

The column on the left describes relations between parties to the dispute and is divided into various phases of peace or conflict, Durable Peace, Stable Peace, Unstable Peace, Crisis, and War—with lower intensity phases characterized by what Lund calls interactive, mutually accommodative behavior, such as debates and negotiations and higher intensity phases characterized by unilateral, coercive behavior, such as ultimatums, sanctions and physical force. The best way to understand the model is to take a close look at each of these phases.

2.1: Durable Peace

Durable Peace is the first phase on the curve. As its name implies, durable peace is a lasting peace. Plotted over time, it is represented as a relatively long, flat line.

Lund explains,

Durable (or Warm) Peace involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defense measures among parties, although it may include their military alliance against a common threat. A 'positive peace' prevails based on shared values, goals, and institutions (e.g. democratic political systems and rule of law), economic interdependence, and a sense of international community.

These terms apply to both interstate and intrastate contexts. Lund points to relations between the United States and Canada in the 20th Century as an example of durable peace, as well as to relations among countries of the European Union. He cites constitutional democracy as a domestic manifestation of durable peace. Even in a state of durable peace, disagreements will arise on any number of issues, but these disputes will be resolved through Peacetime Diplomacy or Politics, whose objectives include maintaining and strengthening stable relations and institutions.

Perspectives

I see durable peace as the relationship between states such as the United States and Canada. There's a lot of communication, reciprocity. Conflicts are resolved in a political way. There's no hint of violence that's involved. All problems, and there are problems in every relationship, usually are resolved -- or not resolved -- but don't complicate the basic relationship.

-Ted Feifer

Durable peace is cooperation among nations that's based on deeply shared values and profoundly compatible interests. So durable peace is a very stable

foundation for peaceful relations between countries, because the countries share certain underlying powerful core values and they often at the same time, share very, very strong economic, military and strategic interests.

-Anne Henderson

2.2: Stable Peace

The term Stable Peace describes a state of relations that is higher in its degree of tension than that of durable peace.

As Lund explains,

Stable (or Cold) Peace is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g. trade) within an overall context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in nonviolent, more or less predictable ways. The prospect for war is low.

Lund gives several examples of stable peace, including US-Soviet detente in the late 1960s, current US-Russian relations, Israel-PLO accommodation in 1994, and US – Chinese relations in 1995. As these examples suggest, the stability should not be taken for granted. Domestic equivalents of stable peace involve "national political compacts among competing, sometimes hostile political factions," as in South Africa from 1994-1995.

As in durable peace, the mechanism for resolving disputes is still termed Peacetime Diplomacy or Politics.

Perspectives

To some extent, I think, it's rather hard to distinguish between stable peace and durable peace. These are constructs that Lund has created to begin to give a sense of the dynamism that you have to come to grips with when trying to analyze conflict. Stable peace in Lund's vocabulary obviously is a peace that's working fine but doesn't have the deep roots for whatever reason that a durable peace would have, and where analysis might reveal some potential trouble spots that would have to be watched to understand if that stable peace is beginning to move into a stage of instability.

What they are? Are there questions about the economical growth of the country that may have political ramifications? Are there questions about social relationships in the country that contain the potential for creating internal conflict, whether it's class conflict, or ethnic conflict, or religious conflict?

The situation is still stable; it's just one that's a little bit ... it's going to be a little more on your watch list.

-Ray Caldwell

I would say durable peace differs from stable peace in sort of the profundity and intensity of the relationship. I think stable peace could be Russia and China, now. The two countries have agreed that they want to get along, and they are getting along, but sometimes that's as far as it goes. So it is not an area that anybody would worry about in terms of potential conflict, and one would hope over time that the relationships would intensify so that stable peace, which is certainly good, could become durable peace, which is even better.

-Mike Lekson

2.3: Unstable Peace

If disputes remain unresolved and tensions continue to rise, the conflict may over time enter a phase known as Unstable Peace.

Lund states,

Unstable Peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A 'negative peace' prevails because although armed force is not deployed [or employed], the parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities... A balance of power may discourage aggression, but crisis and war are still possible.

According to Lund, the relationship between the US and Iran in 1995 provides a good example of unstable peace. Domestic versions of unstable peace include government repression of opposition groups, as in Myanmar (Burma) in 1995.

Initiatives taken to defuse tension during a period of unstable peace are termed Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention, whose objectives include reducing tensions, resolving disputes, defusing conflicts and heading off crises. If the efforts are successful, tensions will subside.

Perspectives

Well, I personally experienced unstable peace when I was living and working in the former Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1991. This was a period of time in which the constituent republics of Yugoslavia were moving ever closer toward breakup and the disintegration of Yugoslavia as an entity. And the signs were all around me of unstable peace. In the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia, the level of belligerent rhetoric was rising. And in particular there was an increasing emphasis on threats and accusations that the parties to the

insipient conflict were making. In other words, leaders in all the parts of the former republics of Yugoslavia were beginning to accuse each other of criminal acts, unprovoked acts, unfriendly acts, hostile acts, that would if not check lead to an escalation of violence. There was sort of a barrage of accusation flying back and forth between the parties to what was to become the conflict, accusing each other of bad faith, accusing each other of breaking promise, accusing each other of discriminating against citizens of other ethnic groups, accusing each other of political repression.

-Anne Henderson

Well, preventive diplomacy is something that needs to be undertaken while there's still much more room for maneuver for peace than during a crisis. Preventive diplomacy really happens during the stage of -- perhaps it begins during the stage of stable peace, and it certainly is very, very important at a stage of unstable peace. But preventive diplomacy needs to be undertaken when there's still time for reasoned discussion, even if it's about military operations. Even if military operations are a factor, there still needs to be time to sit down and talk about those operations. So for example, at the height of the Cold War, when we were not yet in a crisis mode, but when there had been some incidents at sea, the United States and the Soviet Union sat down and talked about how to prevent incidents between the navies of the two countries.

-George Ward

2.4: Crisis

However, if preventive diplomacy and crisis prevention are not successful, tensions may continue to rise. Through various types of confrontation, relations may reach the phase of Crisis.

As Lund explains,

Crisis is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight and may be engaged in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes but have not exerted any significant amount of force. The probability of the outbreak of war is high.

For examples, Lund points to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, as well as relations in Bosnia in 1996. Continuing political violence, such as that seen in Colombia in 1995 and later, is a domestic equivalent of the crisis phase. Initiatives taken to diffuse tension during a period of crisis are termed Crisis Diplomacy and Crisis Management, whose objectives include containing crises and stopping violent or coercive behavior.

Perspectives

After unstable peace is crisis. It's a tense confrontation, and people are ready to fight. In a crisis situation you are not quite at war, but everybody's ready to go. So you could have a situation like the Beagle Channel issue between Argentina and Chile. Both sides were fully engaged and ready to go to war, but they were not quite at war. Yet the tension was so palpable and the confrontation was so imminent that the crisis situation required immediate assistance.

-Greg Noone

One of the most frequent indicators that a conflict has reached the crisis stage is the deployment of military and naval forces into the field in the area of conflict. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a good example of that sort of deployment. There, both the United States and Cuba -- and also Russian -- deployed forces and raised the state of alert of forces throughout the region. Also, during the crisis stage, it's very frequent that low level violence will have already begun -- not organized offensive or defensive combat between the armed forces that are in the field, but frictional violence between those forces.

-George Ward

2.5: War

If efforts at crisis diplomacy are not successful, there may be an outbreak of violence, and the conflict may enter the phase of War.

Lund explains,

War is sustained fighting between organized armed forces. It may vary from low-intensity but continuing conflict or civil anarchy...to all-out 'hot' war. Once significant use of violence or armed force occurs, conflicts are very susceptible to entering a spiral of escalating violence. Each side feels increasingly justified to use violence because the other side is. So the threshold to armed conflict or war is especially important.

As Lund points out, the term is used not only for major conflicts such as Vietnam and World War II, but also smaller ones such as Chechnya in early 1995 and later. Lund gives Somalia in early 1992 and Algeria in 1995 as examples of the type of civil anarchy that can be described as war.

Efforts by outside parties at ending hostilities are known as Peacemaking or Conflict Management. If an agreement to end hostilities has been reached, such outside parties might then engage in Peace Enforcement or Conflict Mitigation.

Perspectives

Well, one of the very important international organizations during a period of war is the international committee of the Red Cross. Because the international

committee of the Red Cross by international treaty has the role of ensuring that prisoners of war are treated correctly -- that they are accorded their rights for communication, that they're not used in illegal ways by the combatants. The ICRC also seeks to protect civilians during time of war.

The United Nations through the Security Council is also usually very active during a period of active hostilities, perhaps dispatching fact-finding missions, or special representatives to capitols when the state of violence permits the attempt to arrange a ceasefire.

-George Ward

2.6: Post-War

If efforts at peacemaking and peace enforcement are successful, fighting will subside. There may be a cease-fire, which may help reduce tensions and move the relationship from a state of war back simply to a state of crisis.

At this point, efforts to keep the conflict from re-escalating are typically called Peacekeeping and Conflict Termination. As the result of a settlement, the parties may begin the difficult processes of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building. Through such efforts, tensions can be reduced to a point where the relationship can be described as a stable peace or even a durable peace.

Such movement is difficult but not impossible. Lund gives Bosnia in 1996 as an example of a conflict that moved from war to crisis, Cambodia in 1995 as a conflict that moved from crisis to unstable peace, and South Africa in 1995 as a conflict that moved from unstable peace to stable peace. However, as Lund has pointed out, hard-won arrangements can also unravel. For any number of reasons, tensions can and often do re-escalate. The skills of the practitioner are just as important in consolidating peace and preventing recurrence of violence as they are in keeping a conflict from growing violent in the first place.

Related Resources from USIP

Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations
Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger and Thomas G. Weiss

Developed specifically to dispel misconceptions and promote cooperation, Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military gives readers the opportunity to develop a basic understanding of these leading players in peace and relief operations. For each type, the handbook presents its organizational philosophy and culture, internal structure, and working practices. It offers a series of quick but recognizable sketches, showing both the general characteristics and the most important variations.

Summary


Michael Lund's Curve of Conflict is traced along two dimensions, with time along the horizontal axis and depth of peace or intensity of violence along the vertical axis. As a graphical illustration, the curve helps in visualizing the evolution of conflict. As a conceptual tool, the curve shows relations among various terms and concepts used in the study of conflict.

Levels of peace or violence are divided into five phases: Durable Peace, Stable Peace, Unstable Peace, Crisis, and War. Associated kinds of third-party intervention include Peacetime Diplomacy or Politics, Preventive Diplomacy, Crisis Diplomacy, Peace Making, Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peace Building. As any conceptual model, the curve to some extent simplifies a complex reality. None of the five phases represents a "natural" state of relations between countries or within a country, and the course of an actual conflict will not follow a tidy bell curve.

But as Lund notes, the curve of conflict reminds us that few, if any, violent conflicts suddenly erupt out of nowhere. They have precursors in less violent and even non-violent disputes and tensions. Interventions are generally most effective when addressing disputes before they erupt into violence.

It's important to note as well that there is nothing automatic about such intervention. Third parties may or may not intervene in a conflict based upon their own perceptions of their own national interests—something to be aware of in the next two sections, where we will apply this conceptual tool to two recent conflicts, the conflict in Kosovo and the genocide in Rwanda.

3: The Curve Applied to Rwanda



"Never Again"

Heard often in commemorations of the Holocaust, the phrase "never again" has come to be associated with the commitment that genocide would never again take place. Yet the international community did little in 1994 when extremists in the Rwandan government and their supporters conducted a brutal, systematic campaign to eliminate an entire people.

In many ways, the genocide in Rwanda is comparable to the genocide in Central Europe. In both cases, killing took place on a massive scale. For the first 100 days, the rate of killing in Rwanda even exceeded that of the Nazi death camps. The genocide in Rwanda was no less horrifying. Exhorting their supporters over the public airwaves and executing those who refused to go along, the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide churned up a nightmare, where the majority of victims were killed by machete, where streets and roads were piled with corpses, where women and children were killed in some cases by women and children.

In the debates and soul-searching following the Rwandan genocide, there has been little agreement over what exactly could have been done when and by whom. However, on two points analysts generally concur: that individual nations, regional organizations and the international community need to be better prepared to prevent such catastrophes in the future, and that part of this preparation is attempting to understand what went wrong in Rwanda.

A comprehensive analysis of the Rwandan genocide is outside the scope of this course; however, a first step in understanding any conflict is learning about its history. Applying to this history terms and concepts from the curve of conflict

yields a particular focus, a preliminary analysis tracing levels of potential or actual violence at key points in the conflict's timeline.

Related Resources

We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families:
Stories from Rwanda
Philip Gourevitch

"In April 1994, the Rwandan government called upon everyone in the Hutu majority to kill each member of the Tutsi minority, and over the next three months 800,000 Tutsi perished in the most unambiguous case of genocide since Hitler's war against the Jews. Philip Gourevitch's haunting work is an anatomy of the war in Rwanda, a vivid history of the tragedy's background, and an unforgettable account of its aftermath. One of the most acclaimed books of the year, this account will endure as a chilling document of our time."

-Picador USA

The Nation of Rwanda

Rwanda is situated in the Great Lakes region of Africa, so named for the area's many magnificent bodies of water, including Lake Victoria, Lake Kivu, Lake Tanganyika and others.

The region was originally inhabited by the Twa, who lived in the forests as hunters and gatherers. The Twa were forced deeper into the forests upon the arrival of the Hutu, who felled trees, raised crops, and introduced more complex forms of social organization centered around clans. The Hutu were followed by the Tutsi, who through their ownership of cattle came to enjoy a position of prominence in the region.

Over time, Hutu and Tutsi intermarried and came to share the same language, Kinyarwanda. Through a feudal system known as ubuhake, those who tilled the soil, who were mostly Hutu, pledged their services to the cattle-owning aristocracy, who were mostly Tutsi.

When German colonists arrived in the region at the end of the 19th century, they found a highly-organized society, ruled by a Tutsi king, or mwami, and a hierarchy of chiefs, both Hutu and Tutsi. With the acquiescence of the mwami, the Germans established a protectorate in 1899, but the Germans would not be in Rwanda for long.

Perspectives

I think that growing up in Rwanda myself and being taught from a very early age that Rwanda is a very unique place, that we are beautiful people, that we have a great country (in Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda by the way, "Rwanda" means the universe), that Rwanda is God's home -- and all of the sudden this incredible, incredible violence -- all this became I think so traumatic that not only would many people never understand, but I think that we Rwandans really have not understood what happened to us.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

Rwanda is known as 'the land of a thousand hills,' and it's an absolutely beautiful country. These rolling hills that rolls up into the Northwest into the Volcano National Park where you can see the mountain gorillas. The people of Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi alike, are extraordinarily friendly. It is hard to imagine when you go to Rwanda that people could kill their neighbors. Rwanda is breathtaking in its landscape, and it's even more extraordinary when you realize the history that has gone on, that has lead to this cataclysmic violent genocide that wiped out a substantial part of the population.

-Greg Noone

3.1: Belgian Administration World War I

During the First World War, Germany lost the territory that would eventually become Rwanda. The territory was placed under Belgian administration by the League of Nations. With its substantial technical and military superiority, Belgium easily ruled over the native population, and the region enjoyed a long period of peace.

Yet practitioners in conflict analysis do not describe this period as a durable peace. Although there was little challenge to Belgian rule, and thus a period of general stability, the peace was not based on what Lund calls "shared values, goals, and institutions."

Rather, the stable peace was enforced through Belgium's vastly superior technical and military capability. Moreover, policies and actions taken by the European power during this period fueled the animosities and distrust that would eventually shake the foundations of this peace and ignite substantial violence, including the 1994 genocide.

Sharpening Ethnic Distinctions

In reports in the media in 1994, the Rwandan genocide was often portrayed as a conflict based on ancient hatreds, between peoples who had been killing each other in such a manner for hundreds of years. These reports were greatly

misleading. Throughout its history, the Great Lakes region had not been free from conflict; however, there was no pattern of inter-communal violence between Hutu and Tutsi, and nothing approached or even suggested the level of violence of the 1994 genocide.

In pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" had, after centuries of intermarriage, come more closely to represent distinctions of economic class rather than ethnic origin. A Hutu who gained in wealth could become a "Tutsi," and conversely, a Tutsi could fall in economic stature and become a "Hutu."

In 1926, however, the Belgians established policies to sharpen distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi. Those who owned more than 10 cows were designated as Tutsi and all others as Hutu, with no possibility of movement between the two groups. What had been a fluid distinction, developed over time and custom, was abruptly replaced by an inflexible, permanent categorization. In addition, the Belgians greatly favored the upper echelon of Tutsi, offering the wealthiest among them superior opportunities for education and economic advancement, and using them as administrators to enforce Belgian colonial rule.

Perspectives

Nothing could be further from the truth than to portray the conflict in Rwanda, or for that matter the conflict in Burundi, as a product of ancient antagonisms or long-standing historical rivalries and competition. In fact, in both cases the killing of one another on an ethnic basis, the inter-communal massacres that we have seen occur -- including genocide -- in both countries, is only of very recent vintage. Basically the killings began in the late 1950s and in many instances not really until the 1960s, and the killings do not have their origins in a pattern of traditional inter-communal violence. Rather, they have their origins in very modern-day manipulation by political elites of newly emergent ethnic identities that have taken a different form today than they did in the pre-colonial or colonial period.

-Howard Wolpe

'Hutu and Tutsi' in Rwandan society does not only mean 'the Hutu ethnic group and Tutsi ethnic group'. These words also refer to the economic status of the people of Rwanda. If one is rich, he's referred to as a Tutsi, because 'Tutsi' was a class, not a people. And a Hutu from a Hutu ethnic group could move from a Hutu class -- in other words, from a certain level of economic standing -- to a Tutsi class. But the teachings of the colonial administration left the permanent impression that those of the Hutu ethnic group could never cross the line to become Tutsi, and that those in the Tutsi ethnic group would remain permanently Tutsi -- whereas in the actual fact even their own brothers, who are poor, are Hutus. This created a very big socioeconomic disruption in Rwandan society.

-Lt. Col. Joseph Nzabamwita

Identity Cards

As part of their system of codifying ethnic distinction, the Belgians issued identity cards to all Rwandans. Modeled after similar cards used in Belgium, which helped to codify the distinction between the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons, the Rwandan identity cards made clear into which ethnic group each individual had been classified.

Forced Labor

Along with the identity cards, the Belgians continued to carry out policies that alienated Hutu and Tutsi from one another, including a system of forced labor where selected Tutsi overseers were tasked with physically punishing slower workers.

In this system, Hutu agriculturalists no longer grew produce for their own consumption but were forced to grow cash crops for the benefit of the colonial administration. Following European models of social organization, a substantial divide in wealth and power was created, with the Belgians and a small number of Tutsi as the beneficiaries at the expense of other Tutsi and Hutu.

Perspectives

So the colonial powers took this distinction, and they formalized it. They required that on identification cards the ethnic background of the person be listed, and they limited that really to three ethnicities, including Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (the third and much smaller ethnic group). And they in their policies favored the Tutsis, who were granted preferential status in terms of employment by the colonial authority -- such that a minority group, the Tutsis, were in a superior position of power to the majority group, the Hutus, by the end of the colonial period.

-George Ward

You had the introduction of a forced-labor system, and so essentially the Tutsis did the dirty work of the colonial power by organizing a forced-labor operation in which Hutus were the servile elements of that system. Conditions were very rough, and so you built in a whole series of animosities. And through this very dramatic transformation, the kinds of traditional balances that existed in the pre-colonial period were totally undone by colonial intrusion, by the colonial power's manipulation of the ethnic identities, and by the decisions of the colonial powers to essentially rule through the Tutsi that became an extension of the colonial power.

-Howard Wolpe

Moves for Self-Determination

After World War II, the status of many African colonies began to change. In 1946, Rwanda became part of a UN Trust Territory, administered by Belgium. As many colonial powers did in the post-war period, Belgium began to incorporate Rwandans more fully into the country's political institutions.

However, these institutions did not adequately address issues important to Rwandans, particularly to the Hutu majority. In 1950, the Hutu began to resist Tutsi authority, while both Hutu and Tutsi resisted Belgian rule.

The Tutsi and the Hutu began to consider themselves in competition for power and access to scarce resources, or in Lund's terms, to "perceive one another as enemies." Tension and suspicion ran high, and a period of unstable peace ensued. Belgian policies exacerbated rather than reduced the tensions. Peacetime diplomacy and politics failed to prevent escalation of tensions and eventual resort to violence.

Perspectives

So for the first half of the century you have essentially a stable peace because the Belgians are fully in control as they were over most of their colonies. The Tutsis are firmly in place as the government administrators and the Hutus are farmers. So you don't have any type of conflict just yet.

-Greg Noone

Violence and Independence

As tensions increased, unstable peace gave way to crisis in the late 1950s. The Belgians, who had favored the Tutsi throughout the colonial period, switched sides in 1959. They withdrew their support from Tutsi administrators, replacing them in all but a few cases with Hutu, and made little effort to stop outbreaks of violence.

Periodic political violence began in 1959 in the form of clashes between members of newly formed, ethnically-based political parties, or in the form of attacks on Tutsi orchestrated by newly appointed Hutu administrators.

This violence left hundreds of Tutsi dead and tens of thousands more displaced. Each violent incident prompted scores of Tutsi to flee the country. By 1961, some of the refugees had formed commando groups and launched the first of several, mostly ineffective, incursions into Rwanda.

Hutu-led political forces succeeded in abolishing the Tutsi monarchy in 1961, and a new colonial administrator, in concert with Hutu politicians, guided Rwanda to independence by July 1, 1962. With this victory, the Hutu proclaimed a republic

and drafted a constitution. At independence, the Belgians transferred power to the Hutu, who proceeded to exercise a monopoly over political, economic and social affairs.

Perspectives

The Belgians decided that it was time to change horses, essentially. And from having helped to build up the Tutsis as their preeminent power among Rwandans, suddenly the Belgians began to advocate the political mobilization of Hutu ... and began to do everything they could to elevate the standing of Hutu and to advance Hutus educationally within the new political structures that began to emerge as independence approached.

So there was really a tremendous role reversal that took place, and as Hutus began to acquire political power with the encouragement and support of the colonial power, they began to wreak vengeance on a number of Tutsis who were systematically discriminated against and attacked, as a consequence of which you had some 750,000 Rwandan Tutsis that fled into Uganda and Tanzania.
-Howard Wolpe

You know, being a refugee is the worst thing that a people can experience. My family was also one of the Rwandan families that fled the country, fled Rwanda in 1959 and took refuge in Uganda. I remember depending on handouts for food. We were not allowed to cultivate, we were not allowed to engage in any economic activity because that was contrary to national laws. Children were restricted in terms of education. They were restricted from going to middle schools, from going to high schools. In the internally displaced camps in Rwanda, people there were put in the worse areas, areas that were infested with Tse Tse flies, so they died from disease -- as indeed the people who fled to the neighboring countries, to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi. It's actually a destruction of a people.
-Lt. Col. Joseph Nzabamwita

3.2: Post-Colonial Struggles Guerrilla Incursions

After independence, refugee paramilitary commando units continued to mount periodic incursions into Rwanda, attacking local officials. Levels of violence rose briefly from those associated with crisis to those associated with war.

Hutu authorities used each attack as an excuse to strengthen their authority by massacring Tutsi civilians, causing more Tutsi flight. Following a particularly well-organized Tutsi raid in late 1963, rampaging Hutu killed an estimated 10,000 Tutsi civilians and drove another 200,000 into exile. By the end of 1964, 336,000 Rwandan Tutsi, nearly half the Tutsi population at that time, had officially become

refugees in neighboring Tanzania (then Tanganyika), Burundi, the Congo, and Uganda.

Tutsi commando incursions and Hutu reprisals ended for the most part in 1967. Crisis prevailed until mid-1972, when large-scale massacres occurred in Burundi. There, minority Tutsi army units and their supporters killed an estimated 80,000 Hutu. This exacerbated Rwandan mistrust of Tutsi. In early 1973 various Hutu groups in Rwanda began a campaign of intimidation and assaults on Tutsi to enforce a newly-introduced ethnic quota system in education and the workforce. This triggered another wave of Tutsi flight, including university students who feared they were targeted for death.

Coup d'Etat

In 1973, Army Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, carried out a bloodless coup d'etat and declared himself president of Rwanda. While promising to improve conditions for Tutsi in Rwanda, he quickly consolidated power, banning all political parties but his own and quashing political dissent. Through heavy-handed methods, he contained the violence in the region, with unstable peace prevailing throughout much of his rule. But the reduced tension came at significant cost.

In public service employment, the new president continued to enforce a strict policy of ethnic quotas. The Tutsi still living in Rwanda, who like all Rwandans still carried their identity cards, were restricted to 9% of available jobs in the public sector and to places in the schools and universities.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Tutsi in Rwanda suffered through a growing number of policies that amounted to official discrimination. They became a favorite target of rising Hutu politicians, who blamed them for any number of the new nation's woes, and they continued to fear for their physical safety as convenient targets of military reprisal.

Perspectives

Just prior to 1959 we're moving from unstable peace to crisis. More Tutsi are killed, more Tutsi flee the country. This pattern continues throughout the 1960s. So you have a situation that is fluctuating from an unstable peace through crisis and ultimately into what would be the war phase. Whereas crisis would be defined as sporadic violence with some people being killed, now we're into a situation where thousands are being killed.

-Greg Noone

Juvenal Habyarimana came to power, and he actually took power through a military coup. For the Tutsi it was an interesting time because he came to power claiming to bring about unity between the Hutu and the Tutsi. He had to appease

the international community at that time, and so for the first few years he sort of had to behave, if you will. But it became very clear in the 80s through his policies -- such as the quota system in the education policies of Rwanda where only a small percentage of Tutsi were allowed even to go to high school, where the justice system really never took into account the grievances of the Tutsi -- it became very clear that Habyarimana didn't mean what he said when he came into power.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

Formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front

From the beginning, Tutsi refugees in the countries neighboring Rwanda faced difficult circumstances. Many left Rwanda with nothing more than they could carry. The Great Lakes region is extremely poor, and with their status as refugees the Tutsi had little means to improve their lot.

In Uganda, many Tutsi joined the National Resistance Army of Yoweri Museveni in the early 1980s to help in the struggle against the country's dictator Milton Obote. The Tutsi had their own grievances against Obote, who had allowed his henchmen to attack the refugees, steal their cattle, and occupy their land. After Museveni took power in Kampala in 1986, he appointed many Rwandan Tutsi to prominent positions, especially in the army, to reward them for their support.

The Tutsi had come to represent a significant component of Museveni's army. However, the tide of public opinion in Uganda soon turned against the Rwandan Tutsi and they became a liability for Museveni. So, in 1987, the refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an organization dedicated to the democratization of Rwandan society and the return of Rwandan refugees.

The organization was officially committed to achieving this repatriation through peaceful means; however, the Rwandan President insisted that the country had no room for the return of Tutsi exiles, and clashes between the Government and the RPF were inevitable. In 1988, massacres of Hutu occurred again in Burundi. Following Hutu attacks on Tutsi civilians, the Tutsi-dominated army killed up to 50,000 Hutu in retaliation. This heightened Rwandan anxiety about the return of exiled Tutsi.

Eventually, the Rwandan Patriotic Front formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which, in a surprise move, invaded Rwanda in October 1990. Although it was initially pushed back into Uganda, the RPA continued to wage a low-intensity war at the Rwandan-Ugandan border until the two sides agreed to a cease-fire and began peace negotiations in July 1992. By then, there were about 600,000 displaced persons inside Rwanda as a result of the conflict.

Perspectives

The Rwandan Patriotic Front as a rebellion back in the late 1980s and early 1990s was formed by young Rwandans who fled with their families as kids in 1959 and 1960, who were never allowed to come back to their homeland, who lived in very difficult conditions as refugees, and who thought it was their right and prerogative to try to change perceptions in Rwanda and come back to their country.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

The Rwandan Patriotic Front was formed to negotiate the return of Rwandans in exile back to their country. I joined the RPF in 1988. In 1990, these negotiations had stalled, had reached a dead end, and a military drive was necessary to back the political pressure. I finished my university education in law, and in 1991 I joined the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Rwandan Patriotic Army.

-Lt. Col. Joseph Nzabamwita

Peace Process

Under pressure from Western governments, the Rwandan President launched political reforms that saw political parties legalized in 1991 and a multi-party government headed by an opposition Prime Minister installed in early 1992. The new government's priority was to negotiate peace with the RPF. Though significantly outnumbered, the battle hardened RPF had proved a formidable match for government forces. In mid-1992, the two sides agreed to a cease-fire and launched peace negotiations aimed at integrating the RPF into Rwandan political and military institutions.

The President never publicly endorsed the peace process. Nor did he stop his supporters from instigating widespread violence in late 1992 that culminated in a massacre of Tutsi and opposition followers in early 1993. In February 1993 the RPF retaliated, launched a fresh offensive and drove to the outskirts of Kigali, the Rwandan capital. One month later, the Government and the rebels reached agreement on a new cease-fire and resumed negotiations on political and military reform.

Zero Network and Interahamwe

Despite ongoing peace negotiations, the Rwandan President was forging alliances with the radical Hutu Power movement that rejected the power-sharing arrangements agreed in the talks. Pro-Hutu political party cadres, known as the Interahamwe ("those who attack together"), were transformed into militia, guns were issued to civilians, and the Zero Network, a clandestine group of Presidential confidants, was formed. The party cadres, drawn mainly from the

ranks of young, unemployed men, committed violence and carried out scattered massacres against Tutsi civilians and Hutu political opponents.

Arusha Accords

In August of 1993, the Government and the RPF signed a new, comprehensive agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accords provided for substantial power sharing, but vocal Hutu in Rwanda denounced the agreements, and with the President's history of bad faith negotiations, many wondered how serious he would be in implementing the new agreements.

Perspectives

Although the Arusha Peace Accord was a very decent agreement and many Rwandans were satisfied with it, Habyarimana had never really wanted to negotiate. I think he basically realized that he was losing militarily, and so he had no other choice. So he negotiated all along in bad faith. And so while the accord was signed, and he signed it, and different parties signed it -- and every Rwandan was looking forward to having the accord implemented -- Habyarimana had been secretly organizing for the genocide. He had a private militia called the Zero Network, and the Zero Network in Rwanda was already in place soon after the signing of the accords. And there were many incidences of violence soon after the accord was signed.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

They were training -- the government was training militias specifically to kill people. And they did kill. There were massacres. You have massacres in a place called Bugesera, one of the internally displaced camps that I told you of earlier. They killed very many people there. They torched their houses. You have the massacres of Bagogwe in the Northwest Rwanda, near Ruhengeri Province. These massacres were investigated by human rights organizations. There were human rights commissions that were established -- international commissions. They investigated, and we knew that these militias were being trained and armed to kill people.

-Lt. Col. Joseph Nzabamwita

3.3: Genocide

Planning and Preparation

When the killing began, it seemed sudden and spontaneous. Only later did the world at large become aware of the extensive planning and preparation that took place in advance of the genocide.

Presidential Assassination

In April 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were both killed when their plane was shot down with a surface-to-air missile as it approached the airport in Kigali. Many have come to suspect Hutu extremists of committing the attack, either out of fear that Habyarimana would finally implement the Arusha Accords, or for the express purpose of touching off the genocide. Whatever the case, over the radio and in newspapers extremists in Rwanda blamed Tutsi for the murder and urged Hutu throughout the country to take swift revenge.

Mass Killing

In response, the Presidential Guard in Kigali, the Rwandan Army and the Interahamwe militias began systematic and unrelenting attacks on Tutsi civilians. In a carefully orchestrated set of maneuvers, specific groups set up road blocks to close off escape routes, while others went from door to door to flush the victims out. Extremist radio stations not only cheered the killers on, but in some cases also directed their movements. Those bearing identity cards that said "Tutsi" were killed. Those without identity cards were assumed to be Tutsi and killed. Politically-moderate Hutu, those supporting power sharing with the Tutsi, were singled out and killed along with them, as were Hutu who refused to participate in the killing, creating a climate of terror among Hutu and Tutsi alike.

Perspectives

The events in Rwanda in 1994 were quite unprecedented in terms of cruelty, in terms of violence, in terms of disregard for human life. And I think to this day many people don't understand really what happened in Rwanda in 1994, and more importantly what happened to Rwandans as a people -- where for the first time in the history of Rwanda women were killing and young children were being used to kill off those who were not dying quickly, where siblings would kill each other just because one happened to have Tutsi features more than Hutu features, where really many of the values of Rwandans as a people were destroyed, not just human life.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

When I was in Rwanda, they took us down to one of the mass gravesites in Gikongoro, and the Rwandans felt that part of the international community was already saying that it was impossible that that many people were killed. So in Gikongoro they exhumed all the bodies that were just dumped into mass graves, some even been buried alive. It happened at a location where a school was, and the school had scores of buildings, and each building had approximately ten rooms. They laid out the bodies in each of these rooms and covered them with lime.

We were allowed -- in fact encouraged to take pictures because the Rwandans wanted the international community to see what they saw. The Rwandans felt it was important that people know that this really did happen, that as many people were killed as they thought were killed. And indeed, in the photos we took there are easily 2500 to nearly 3000 bodies that had been exhumed.

These photos are troubling and very difficult to look at. But it's an important piece in understanding that they were individuals and real people that were killed. 800,000 just seems like an amazing number, and oftentimes when we talk about numbers that big, we don't put faces with those numbers. It's important for the victims that their stories continue to be told.

-Greg Noone

The Withdrawal of the International Community

Still, many Tutsi felt safe in Rwanda due to the presence of United Nations peacekeepers. However, in spite of some advance warning, the UN did nothing to avert the catastrophe. The UN force there was relatively small. When authorizing its mandate and rules of engagement, the Security Council had not envisaged such an intervention.

As deaths continued to mount, local UN commanders warned their superiors in New York of the nature and extent of the killing; however, member nations on the Security Council decided to reduce the UN force to a bare minimum. The United States, stung by recent military casualties in Somalia, was among those nations that advocated the reduction. As UN peacekeepers pulled out, thousands of civilians who had taken shelter in UN compounds were massacred.

Victory of the RPF

Without support from the international community, the Rwandan Patriotic Army was on its own in trying to stop the genocide. To save innocent civilians—in many cases, friends and family members—soldiers in the RPF fought furiously, cutting rapidly through Government lines. By mid-July, the RPF had taken control of the country and installed itself as the new authority in Kigali.

Although isolated killings continued, the genocide was over. In just 100 days, an estimated 800,000 Rwandan civilians, almost all Tutsi, had been killed.

Perspectives

My brother Lando was leading the non-power branch of the liberal party of Rwanda in 1994. He along with other opposition figures in Rwanda was under the protection of the United Nations, or so they were told. For several months -- I think three or four months before the genocide actually started -- he had armed guards at his home and in his car. But when the genocide started on April 7,

1994 in the very early morning, the UN soldiers that were guarding him just fled. They just left him and his entire family to be killed by the presidential guard at that time.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

When the genocide started, we realized that we were the ones to do whatever was required, to at least ensure that we save as many people as possible and stop the genocide as soon as possible, by reaching out to the whole country and defeating the genocidal army.

So ... it was tough work, it was a lot of work, because on one hand you have to conduct raids in the enemy territory to save people who are being massacred, and at the same time you conduct a military offensive along the battle lines.

As we were progressively dislodging the national army, we were coming across dead people. Examples being the church -- the majority of people had taken refuge in churches. So you would come across thousands of people who had just been killed, a few survivors among the dead, bleeding, still bleeding. The responsibility was saving as many Rwandans as possible ... bringing the genocide to a stop as soon as possible.

-Lt. Col. Joseph Nzabamwita

Post-Genocide Reconstruction

Since the genocide, the new government in Rwanda has faced almost insurmountable problems.

Criminal Justice

Rwanda's criminal justice system has been thoroughly overwhelmed. An estimated 140,000 have been accused of participating in the genocide and incarcerated in hopelessly overcrowded, stockade-like prisons. With extremely limited resources, the new government has struggled to provide thirty-nine lawyers to prosecute of all those detained.

On September 1, 1996, the government passed a law designed to help expedite the process. The new law divided the accused into four categories: 1) organizers and notorious killers; 2) murderers; 3) those who committed assaults that did not result in death; and, 4) those who committed property crimes — such as looting. The new law also introduced the idea of plea-bargaining with the hope that some suspects would provide information in exchange for leniency to assist the prosecution of those who had committed greater crimes. Even with the new law, court officials have been forced by limited resources to dispense with the highly standardized processes and rigorous rules of evidence used in formal court proceedings, and have been criticized by both accused and victim alike.

By contrast, the United Nations' International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), set up in Arusha, Tanzania, has received millions of dollars in funding to prosecute fewer than seventy accused. With a fraction of those resources, the domestic courts of Rwanda had by 2003 conducted over 6,000 trials, an impressive number but one that still represented only a small percentage of the detainees awaiting trial. With far too many people to prosecute through usual channels, officials have instituted a new system, known as gacaca, based on traditional community hearings used to resolve disputes.

This problem simply highlights one of the most difficult problem Rwandans face, trying to rebuild a society after the devastation of genocide in which over half the country was implicated.

Perspectives

Justice is a very tricky concept in the case of a genocide, and the Rwandan genocide in particular, because the way we understand justice in the United States and the way justice should be dispensed is impossible for Rwanda. Because not just the people who killed but those who witnessed, those who did not protect, those who showed where their neighbor was hiding -- that would be too many people for any justice system to deal with. So justice in the sense of prosecution I think is very limited concept for Rwandans.

I personally don't think there's ever going to be justice for me and my loss, and I sort of have to find ways to deal with this lack of justice, and so I get involved in many things. I get involved in advocacy, I get involved in education about the Rwandan genocide, and it's my way of dealing with it.

-Louise Mushikiwabo

Rwandans feel that women [bore the brunt of the genocide] because they watched their husbands, and sons, and brothers kill and die, because they lost their children, because they were raped and displaced, and watched the entire social fabric disintegrate around them, and then in the aftermath were left alone to grapple with this problem. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, women and girls were seventy percent of the populations. It is very common after war to have a female majority, but this was quite a skewed statistic. So women were literally the ones left, the society had been literally decimated, and they picked the pieces and began the rebuilding.

Rwandans talk about how women are now truck drivers and bricklayers and homebuilders, and have social roles and economic roles that were fundamentally transformed by the genocide. They had to carrying on not just their old roles and positions and traditional responsibilities, but assume new ones -- and they met that challenge. So it was partly the character of the genocide and the awful violence that they witnessed and experienced -- and the fact that they are the majority of survivors and stepped forward in the aftermath to lead, to rebuild both

physically and psychologically the country -- that makes Rwandans identify them as those who 'bore the brunt,' and that is their language.
-Elizabeth Powley

Refugees

Refugee camps in and around Rwanda have posed an enormous and intractable humanitarian crisis. Sheltering innocent men, women and children, camps in neighboring countries have also been used as staging areas by Hutu extremists intent on continuing the fight—or finishing the job.

In the sprawling camps, international organizations had little success separating killers, or genocidaires, from innocents, creating conditions where true refugees have in many instances been held virtually as hostages. There has been insecurity along Rwanda's borders, along with incursions into the country's northwest provinces by genocidaires intent on killing surviving witnesses to the genocide.

The security problems posed by the camps led the Rwandan Patriotic Front to take a leading role in the rebellion in neighboring Zaire. By May 1997, with the assistance of Rwanda, Laurent Kabila replaced Mobutu Sese Seko as the new leader of the country, which was then renamed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In August of 1998, the fighting in the DRC evolved into a wider conflict involving several African nations and costing countless lives.

Over time, millions of refugees, both Hutu and Tutsi, have returned to Rwanda. There have been very few revenge killings. Some hard-core groups of genocidaires remain in the Congo, but as of early 2004, the Rwandan Government was negotiating with them and the Congo for their return.

Democratization

After its victory in 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front formed a Government of National Unity (GNU) that governed Rwanda for nine years. During this period, the GNU drafted a new constitution and held elections under it in August of 2003. In attempting to rebuild after the genocide, the country faces enormous challenges, including mass poverty and illiteracy.

Perspectives

There is an amazing sense, in Rwanda now, that the country has to move forward, that the genocide cannot be allowed to happen again, that economic development has to happen, that education and literacy have to be promoted, that women have a role in it but that the whole country must move forward. It's really tremendous -- the genocide was only nine years ago, and the wounds are very deep, and the trauma is very real, and Rwanda will have a lot of work to do

to heal that -- but in everyday interactions there is an unbelievable sense that we must move forward and rebuild and reconstruct, and above all develop economically and get access to resources and education and those things that can support and stabilize Rwanda, so that we don't ever again return to that horror.

-Elizabeth Powley

As a genocide survivor, you realize that you only have two choices, either to give up or go on. And once you decide to go on, as is the case for many Rwandans including myself, you have to get engaged in daily life activities. You have to get up and take a shower and go to work, and that is part of the daily life. But the memories never leave you, and some days are not good days, but many days are just normal days. April is always a very difficult month in Rwanda and with Rwandans everywhere. It's balance between remembering and going on that varies depending on individuals. Personally, I think I have discovered in myself so much strength that I never thought I had back in 1994. Sometimes, some days, I am walking on the street in Washington or driving or sitting at work, and I feel like I am in a totally different world. So each day is different.


-Louise Mushikiwabo

Summary

Applying Lund's concepts to recent Rwanda history provides a graphical method of visualizing the escalation and de-escalation of violence leading to the genocide.

For the first half of the century, a stable peace prevailed as substantial divisions in society, brought on by colonial rule, were masked by the superior technological and military powers of the colonial administration. The Belgians failed to provide for a secure transition when it pulled out of the country, and this period of stable peace came to an abrupt end. By mid-century, tensions quickly escalated to levels associated with crisis and low-intensity warfare, a state of relations that continued for three decades. Efforts at crisis diplomacy showed promise in the early 1990s, but ultimately failed catastrophically.

4: The Curve Applied to Kosovo



The Battle of Kosovo

On June 28, 1389, on the plains of Kosovo Polje, Serbia fought the most famous battle of its history. Exactly 600 years later, at an outdoor assembly on the same battlefield, Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milosevic stirred up this memory, rallying Serbs behind his move to end the limited autonomy enjoyed by Kosovo's Albanians. Milosevic's rhetoric was based on a long tradition. In their struggles against the Albanians, Serbian nationalists often conjured up the memory of the Battle of Kosovo.

There are, however, problems with this rhetoric, as Dan Serwer points out. For one thing, the battle of 1389 was against the Ottoman Turks. Serbs and Albanians fought on the same side—and lost the battle. Like many traditional memories used to justify conflict, this one has developed a significance quite apart from the actual events upon which it is based.

Competing Versions of History

Amid competing and often contradictory versions of history, those who analyze the conflict in Kosovo face a difficult task. A comprehensive study is outside the scope of this course; nevertheless, a few basic facts begin to explain some of the region's tensions.

Both Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Albanians have lived in Kosovo since before 1389, and for this reason both have developed strong attachments to the land. In

the early centuries, Serbs outnumbered Albanians; however, over time Serbs in search of a better life tended to move inward toward Belgrade, while Albanians tended to move northward into Kosovo. As a result, although Serbs still have greater numbers in the region as a whole, Albanians have since the end of the 18th Century been the majority in Kosovo. In a small region with limited resources, the two communities have often struggled against one another, either on their own or as a part of wider events, such as the fighting in World Wars I and II.

Perspectives

I think it does have long, historical roots, and you can go back to 1389, if you like. But the fact is that in 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo Ploje, which is often cited as one of the seminal moments of Serbian history, it was the Serbs and Albanians together fighting against the Ottomans, not against each other.

This is often misunderstood. There is a long history, however, of conflict between Serbs and Albanians, in Kosovo especially. It's only in Kosovo of the Albanian territory in the Balkans that you find great predominance of Muslim Albanians, with some Catholics but no Orthodox. And this difference in religion and the difference in language, in particular, are at the root of the conflict.

The languages are mutually incomprehensible, and they bear no relationship to each other, really. There has been some mutual influence over the years, but the fact that they don't understand each other in their native languages and that Albanians define their ethnic group as a language group, not as a religious group, is extremely important and is the background to the conflict.

-Dan Serwer

The one most important thing to understand about the history of Kosovo is that there is no such thing as the undisputed, factual history of Kosovo. The parties to the conflict have their own rival histories, which differ in almost every significant detail. These histories are very, very deeply believed and a great deal of ink has been spilled on both the Serbian and the Kosovar Albanian side arguing over these obscure points of things that happened in 1389, or the true nature of the Ottoman occupation in the Middle Ages. To a lot of us these disputes seem incredibly obscure and abstruse. But for Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, these debates have tremendous resonance.

-Anne Henderson

Yugoslavia Under Tito

Following World War II, Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo lived in relative peace in a one party, authoritarian socialist state—the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)—under Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980).

Tito maintained a complex balance among the country's various nationalities. Serbs, as the largest group, enjoyed a position of prominence. Albanians, more numerous as a people than Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenians (each of whom had their own republic within the SFRY, as did the more numerous Croats), were categorized as a "nationality" or narodnost. A rationale for this was that unlike other peoples of Yugoslavia, Albanians constituted the majority in a neighboring nation-state, Albania. Thus, they already had a separate independent republic "of their own."

Within Yugoslavia, the Albanian population was actually divided among three republics (Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and constituted a linguistic and cultural minority in all three. The largest number lived in the province of Kosovo within Serbia, where they constituted a local majority, and where Albanian cultural and political activism was most intense.

Using terms from the curve of conflict, practitioners in conflict analysis describe the period immediately after 1945 in Kosovo as a stable peace. The calm was not based on the shared goals, values and understandings characteristic of durable peace. Rather, peace and stability were maintained through the decisive strength of those in power, and regulated through a complex dispensation among the country's various nationalities. Tito's political skills, augmented by his status as a resistance leader during World War II, were a crucial element both of the balance and of the center's power.

In this way, the stable peace in Kosovo after World War II shared some of the characteristics of the stable peace in Rwanda under Belgian administration. Both cases also highlight the fact that a stable peace, either domestic or international, cannot be counted on to maintain itself. Value and goal differences exist, and active effort is often needed to work out disputes in ways that preserve and if possible strengthen stability. Though some such efforts were made in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia as a whole, these efforts ultimately proved insufficient.

Yugoslavia During the Cold War

In 1948, Tito broke with the Soviet Union. He helped found the Non-Aligned Movement and made Yugoslavia one of the new movement's leaders. Within Yugoslavia, his countrymen took pride in the nation's enhanced international profile, and this pride helped strengthen the country's internal cohesion. Most groups, whatever their differences, shared Tito's desire to limit Soviet influence over the country. Under Tito's leadership, the country experienced an extended period of stable peace.

Still, underlying problems between the various nationalities were only stifled, not resolved. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia's anti-Soviet stance led the West not to focus on human rights there, or on the nationalities problem. Moreover, to discourage a Soviet invasion, Tito built a relatively strong army and encouraged a well-armed

citizenry to be prepared for the sort of guerrilla resistance he had led in World War II. When confrontations within Yugoslavia turned violent in the 1990s, the antagonists had ready access to weapons and were well prepared to fight.

Perspectives

There were some conflicts, and here I am thinking particularly of the conflicts in the Balkans, that in effect were masked by the superpower relationship. Yugoslavia was formerly communist, but in effect sat between the two blocks. They were politically neutral, and it was very important for both sides that Yugoslavia not become a fomenter, a center of conflict. So that under the rule of Tito, and briefly thereafter, and for some time thereafter, there was an effective national state that superseded some of the ethnic tensions that had existed for centuries.

-George Ward

Well, Yugoslavia under Tito was mostly in stable peace. It was a repressive society; one that didn't allow people freedom of speech, that put people in prison, that had extensive secret police apparatus. It was a dictatorship in the sense that ultimately all important decisions were made by Tito. But it was in terms of conflict a more or less stable situation. There were moments of social unrest in the former Yugoslavia, especially among the Albanians, but still we're talking about a more or less stable peace for most of Tito's rule.

-Dan Serwer

Struggle for Autonomy

Throughout Tito's rule, Albanians in Kosovo worked to gain greater say in their own affairs. On occasion, they were granted concessions by the central government.

1968

In 1968, a year known for political protest in both East and West, Albanian Kosovars held demonstrations demanding greater regional autonomy and earned several concessions from authorities in Belgrade.

Along with the region of Vojvodina in the north, Kosovo was conferred the status of "province" within the Republic of Serbia. Also, below the Yugoslavian flag, Communist Party leaders in Kosovo were allowed to fly the Albanian flag. In Pristina, the capitol of Kosovo, a new university was established. Courses were taught in Albanian, and Albanian-language textbooks were introduced throughout the region's school system. At least for the short term, these actions served to strengthen the stability of peace in Kosovo, although the underlying problems posed by the conflict between Serb and Albanian nationalism persisted.

1974

A new federal constitution established in 1974 granted more autonomy to Yugoslavia's constituent republics, while raising Kosovo's status close to that of a republic, with a government, a local constitution, and control of legal and educational systems. The new constitution was designed to give the country's nationalities more control over specific issues that affected them.

However, in practice the republics frequently used their new powers to frustrate actions of the central government, and overall stability thus became more dependent on Tito himself. When the Albanians acted independently of the central authority, Kosovo's Serbs grew anxious. At the same time, Kosovo's expanded autonomy was incomplete and did not include internal police functions, leading to continued frustrations among Albanians. These frustrations were exacerbated by a deteriorating economy in Kosovo and throughout Yugoslavia. More Serbs emigrated from Kosovo to the region in and around Belgrade, while more Albanians immigrated to Kosovo from neighboring Albania.

Thus, while events of 1968 had resulted in a lowering of tensions in Kosovo, those of 1974 did not. The constitution of 1974 was a generally unsuccessful effort by diplomatic and political means to preserve stable peace. Instead, tensions began to rise.

Perspectives

Tito came to believe that one way to maintain a level of peace and harmony between the very different constituent parts of Yugoslavia was to grant each significant part substantial autonomy, within which they could, to an extent, govern their own political, cultural, economic and social affairs. What was to bind all of this together was the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which would provide the unifying, ideological force that would maintain a tie, a link, a bond between all the parts of Yugoslavia. So as part of this decentralizing vision, I think an important date is 1974, for Kosovo at least, when the new Yugoslav constitution gave Kosovo a degree of autonomy that it had never had before. It almost gave Kosovo equal status within the Yugoslav Federation along with the acknowledged republics. Tito hoped that this solution would reduce nationalist and separatist sentiment in Kosovo.

-Anne Henderson

It is my sense that the Albanians never really felt in Yugoslavia as at home, because there were just so many differences in terms of language, of decent, of tradition, of religion between the Kosovar Albanians and the rest of the Yugoslavs. I mean the name "Yugoslavia" in itself is exclusive because it means "the Slavs of the south" and the Albanians are not Slavs.

-Ylber Bajraktari

4.1: The Break-up of Yugoslavia

Death of Tito

Tito never designated a successor. After his death in 1980, an eight-member presidency exercised power. It was composed of representatives from the six republics and the two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. These representatives rotated as President, ensuring discontinuous and, eventually, highly sectarian and factional leadership.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, along with confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Central America and over nuclear issues, raised Cold War tensions throughout the world and prompted increased militarization of Yugoslavian society. To some extent, continued resistance to the Soviet threat provided the last agreed-upon basis for central authority among the republics and provinces that made up Yugoslavia.

With such a limited foundation, central authority became increasingly ineffective, and internal problems worsened. As the most powerful republic, and the seat of the national capital (Belgrade), Serbia benefited most from what remained of central power structures, to the detriment and resentment of the other republics and provinces. Throughout the 1980s, the economy continued to deteriorate.

Problems in Kosovo

In Kosovo, Albanians pressed for formal recognition as a republic, a move seen in Belgrade as an unacceptable step in a secessionist agenda. Territorial integrity remained vital to the regime. Its importance only increased when the extent of foreign debt built up during the last years of Tito's rule came to be known. As unrest in Kosovo continued to rise, the peace became increasingly less stable. The province was placed under martial law in 1981.

Perspectives

Tito died. One of the biggest problems authoritarian, dictatorial governments have is succession. In the democracies there is a process for this. In dictatorships, whatever process there is, if there is any at all, there are a lot of people who don't like it. He set up a system that had a totally ineffective presidency and tried to balance the six republics among themselves. Inevitably, power gravitated towards Serbia as the largest republic and the republic where the capital was; and the people who were in power in central Serbia used Serb nationalism as their means of retaining power.

-Mike Lekson

The whole situation in Yugoslavia generally started to deteriorate in the sense it was much harder to hold it together after the death of Tito. A lot of the republics

were starting to go their own way, which made it much more difficult to run it from Belgrade than it had been previously. So there was a general deterioration -- also in the economic situation [there was deterioration]. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was clear that Yugoslavia was no longer going to be a socialist country, and it came apart along national lines.

-Dan Serwer

The Rise of Milosevic

After Tito, there was fierce infighting within the communist party structures of Yugoslavia's constituent republics. In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic became party chief in Serbia, with a mission to recentralize the republic.

He quickly rescinded the autonomy of Vojvodina and then turned his attention to the resistance in Kosovo, where in 1989 he gave his speech on the 600th anniversary of its famous battle.

With control of Vojvodina, loyal allies in Montenegro, and Macedonia largely dependent upon Serbia, Milosevic could, with the capitulation of political resistance in Kosovo, control five of the Federal Presidency's eight seats, and thus have power to bring about constitutional recentralization. To counter his bid, leaders in the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia expressed solidarity with the effort of the Albanians in Kosovo to retain the political rights that they had gained under Tito, and denounced Serbia's actions as illegal. Nevertheless, riding the wave of Serbian nationalism that he had stimulated, Milosevic overrode the Albanian resistance, installed his own loyalists in the local parliament, and overturned the autonomy the region had enjoyed since 1968.

These steps did not reverse the growing destabilization in Kosovo, and in Yugoslavia as a whole—just the opposite. Serb and Kosovar Albanian nationalists were on a collision course.

Protests throughout Kosovo, including a hunger strike by Albanian miners at the Trepca lead and zinc mines, erupted into massive demonstrations, prompting violent reprisals by police. Kosovo went from a period of stable peace to unstable peace.

From the international standpoint, it was only in retrospect that the deteriorating situation highlighted the need for better institutional mechanisms for preventive diplomacy. At this point, the United States and the Soviet Union were just beginning to develop areas of cooperation, such as nuclear arms reductions and regional conflicts outside Europe. Coordinated European foreign policy was an idea, not a reality. In any case, the political will to act was lacking.

Perspectives

One interesting thing about Milosevic is the extent to which his rise was propelled by Serbia's nationalist media. A very frequent event that is cited as crucial to Milosevic's rise is a speech that he gave in 1989 at Kosovo Ploje, the site of this great battle that is so central to Serbian mythology -- that took place back in 1389. And so Milosevic went to Kosovo Polje to give this speech, and the speech itself was covered in extraordinary detail in the Serbian nationalist media.

Serbian nationalist editors and media leaders pretty much deluged the airwaves with Milosevic making these claims, "we will not let you be beaten again," "we will defend you," "Serbia for the Serbians." And through careful and skillful editing, Milosevic became almost overnight a media star and then later a very powerful political leader in his own right. Milosevic was then a captive in a sense of his own rise because he had risen through capitalizing on Serb despair, Serb angst, Serb resentment over what they saw as pernicious persecution and discrimination at the hands of the Albanians in Kosovo.

-Anne Henderson

Milosevic was for all intents and purposes the president of Yugoslavia, who was constantly playing political games, changing the constitution, firing judges, hiring police who supported him, hiring military staff that supported him, and firing others who didn't. This was a guy who solely wanted to be in power and was willing to do anything it took to be in power. So you had many wars throughout that time -- four wars in ten years time. Again, obviously there were some ethnic roots to it. There were some other issues going on there, but it was really for the fact that Milosevic and others like him were stoking those fires that really caused problems.

-Albert Cevallos

Discrimination in Kosovo

Undeterred by Albanian protest, Milosevic cracked down in Kosovo. His regime set about removing Albanian employees from state institutions. Albanians were fired from their jobs in schools, hospitals, factories, and public administration.

The "Shadow State"

Kosovo's Albanian political leaders continued to resist. In December 1989, Ibrahim Rugova founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (or LDK, by its Albanian initials). In July 1990, with wide support from Kosovar Albanians, Rugova declared Kosovo a republic. This initiated a period of parallel administration or a "shadow state" in Kosovo.

Rugova's parallel administration organized an "underground referendum" in September 1991, which indicated overwhelming support for independence, and then elections, in which the LDK dominated the new parliament, and Rugova

became president. While there was no international monitoring and the central government did not recognize the results, these votes, flawed as they were, gave focus to Albanian nationalist aspirations. The shadow state offered employment and services to Kosovo's Albanians who had lost their jobs and who were increasingly treated as second-class citizens by the Serbian authorities.

Kosovo's fragile peace became ever less stable; however, the region was not yet in a state of crisis. Repression intensified, but under Rugova's leadership, Kosovo's Albanian population preached and largely practiced non-violence. Meanwhile, tension in the rest of Yugoslavia, and the issue of the future status of Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, diverted the attention of the Belgrade leadership. The two sectors of Kosovo, a Serb-dominated official administration, and a rival Albanian society, did not clash often, and so little violence occurred even though there were frequent demonstrations.

Potential Serbian violence may also have been curbed by a clear statement from the first Bush Administration to Milosevic that it would be met by U.S. intervention. The Bush Administration feared that a clash in Kosovo could lead to a wider war involving the Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia and the separate nations of Greece and Turkey.

Perspectives

There were a lot of things that just come to your face, and they change in a matter of one month. For example, we used to play soccer, and we had a soccer field in the neighborhood where I used to live. So we used to play soccer. Initially, when there were no problems, we usually had mixed teams comprised of Albanian players, of Serbian players, or of other minorities. And then all of a sudden when Milosevic comes to power and Kosovo's autonomy is revoked, then you have teams that are divided along ethnic lines. You have Albanians on one side, and Serbs on the other side. So it becomes more than winning a game. It becomes a victory with a bigger connotation. So that's one part of it.

Then you go to school. Schools are segregated, initially; eventually, you are expelled from school. You know, there are so many things you cannot enjoy because you are an Albanian. You belong to a different ethnic group. You cannot enjoy the convention centers any more, the sports hall. You cannot go ski-skating because you are an Albanian. You cannot enjoy the facilities of the public libraries because you are an Albanian. You cannot shop at a specific shopping center because all the stores there are owned by the Serbs. So you cannot go there. You cannot go to a bar in the downtown because those bars are exclusively owned by the Serbs. So you have to modify your life to adjust to this new reality that was suddenly imposed on you.

-Ylber Bajraktari

Throughout the 90s, Milosevic and the Serbian government systematically expelled the Albanians from many of the institutions and many of the symbols, frankly, of life in Kosovo. They were not allowed were not allowed to go to school, weren't allowed to work in the hospitals, weren't allowed to hold jobs, weren't allowed to be involved in political office.

So the Albanians created what many people called a "shadow government." They elected their own president, they elected their own representatives, they had schools in people's homes, they [operated] hospitals, women's clinics -- I remember visiting a few women's clinics before the war that were literally in people's living rooms. They didn't have supplies. They didn't have trained nurses, doctors, anything -- medicines -- but that's were they worked out of because that's what they were forced to do.

At a certain point, a group of students were very upset with this -- and understandably so -- so they started to protest. They did it non-violently because they didn't have weapons, and they didn't want to take up weapons against a much stronger opponent in any case, so they started to do it non-violently.

-Albert Cevallos

Wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia

The end of the Cold War had also taken its toll on the legitimacy of the federal regime in Belgrade and its ability to maneuver effectively internationally. In June of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia officially declared independence from the Yugoslavian Federation. The Serb-dominated federal army soon gave up on Slovenia, which did not share a border with Serbia and whose population was overwhelmingly Slovene. Federal forces were out of the republic by October of 1991. By contrast, Milosevic sought to hold Croatia, which is adjacent to Serbia and whose Serb population stood at approximately 12%. For a time, Serb forces held on to almost a third of the Republic's territory, but by 1995 Croatia had regained all but a thin slice of its lands.

Bosnia-Herzegovina also declared independence, but with its mix of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, was split along ethnic lines. In the war that followed, Milosevic actively intervened to support the Serb side, as the new Croatian Government did to support the Croat side. The savagery of the fighting, which included rape as a weapon of war and the murder of civilians, generated enormous hate, fear and mistrust.

Efforts by the international community to halt the violence were ineffective during most of the war, as demonstrated most tragically in the 1995 Serb massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in the village of Srebrenica, which was supposedly under UN protection. Finally, after concerted international intervention and pressure, the Bosnian war ended with the formal signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December, 1995.

Formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army

For Kosovo, these events spelled the end of unstable peace and the onset of a rapidly escalating crisis. Having lost Slovenia and Croatia, and ultimately abandoning the Serbs in Bosnia, Milosevic stepped up his repression in Kosovo as a new "last stand" for Serbian nationalism. He cast his hard line against Kosovar Albanians as dictated by the imperative of protecting Serbia's territorial integrity. Serbian military resources shifted for action in Kosovo. At the same time, Albanians in Kosovo saw the Croats and Slovenes gain independence and, in spite of the violence, took encouragement. A new guerrilla force had appeared in Kosovo, calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA (in Albanian, UCK). Members of the KLA openly advocated Kosovo's unification with Albania and escalated their campaign of violence against the Serbian presence in the province.

Collapse of Albania

By 1996, the new Democratic Party in Albania had overseen the rapid termination of perhaps the most dysfunctional communist economy in the world, followed by a generally unsuccessful effort to introduce a free-market economy.

Instead of productive investment and capital formation, pyramid schemes of investment, which promised large and swift returns on capital investment by private individuals, were numerous.

In early 1997, a number of these schemes collapsed (as they were bound to), enriching a handful at the expense of many other, smaller investors, who reportedly lost over a billion dollars.

This prompted a virtual collapse of the Albanian state. Huge quantities of weapons were looted from barracks and armories, many of which fell into the hands of the KLA. As Albanian instability threatened to spread across borders, international efforts to help Albania highlighted the need for similar efforts in Kosovo.

Crisis Diplomacy

By the late 1990s, new institutional mechanisms had come into being to help the international community conduct crisis diplomacy, under the assumption that the political will existed to use them. Both the United States and the European Union (which had greatly strengthened its foreign policy coordination) had become increasingly committed to stability in the former Yugoslavia as a result of their involvement in Bosnia. The "Contact Group," which included the U.S., Russia and key European states, had witnessed the US-led negotiation of the Dayton Accords and helped to oversee their implementation; it now turned its attention to managing the crisis in Kosovo. The OSCE, which had maintained a Kosovo

watch for years, had also become increasingly operational as it played a major role in Dayton implementation.

But from the war in Bosnia, the international community gained not only a greater sense of how bloody a war in Kosovo could turn out to be, but also how difficult it could be to prevent, based on how much diplomatic effort it had taken at Dayton to end the Bosnian war. Crisis diplomacy in Kosovo proved no less of a challenge.

Perspectives

This was the origin of what are now referred to as the wars of Yugoslav succession. What you get first is a very brief war over Slovenian independence, but there are relatively few Serbs who live in Slovenia, so Milosevic lets it go pretty easily. Then you have a similar war over Croatian succession, and there it's a much more serious question because a much larger percentage of the population of Croatia is Serb, and in particular in the border areas between Croatia and Bosnia. Serbs were settled there hundreds of years ago. Milosevic makes an effort to establish a Serb republic in those territories, so that Croatia succeeding from Yugoslavia can't take those Serb territories with them, and he ethnically cleanses the Croats out of those territories. And then the war advances to Bosnia where there is an enormous mixture of population, much more than in Croatia.

-Dan Serwer

Basically, for young people of Albanian decent in Kosovo there wasn't much you could do in the 1990s. When the KLA emerged, you had two alternatives. Either you continued to be non-violent and achieved no results whatsoever, or you joined the ranks of the guerillas. So now I was kind of in the middle because I disagreed with nonviolence at that point because I saw it was bearing no fruit. But on the other hand, I was not ready to join a guerilla force because I just thought utilizing violence was not something that was consistent with the way I was brought up. So I was kind of in the middle but there was this great need that you make some contribution -- you need to have an impact and change things.

So what my friends and I came up with was -- because the Kosovo conflict started to gain a lot of international media attention there would be a lot of American journalists coming, a lot of British journalists coming, so they would hire us. The BBC would hire one of my colleagues, ABC News would hire me, CNN would hire someone else, APTN would hire someone else. So we'd act as their field experts, in a way. You take an ABC news crew to the village that came under attack. Now, ABC News would provide you protection and would take you as a local journalist to that particular village because the Serbian police will never kill you, as an Albanian, if you are with ABC News. So you go with ABC News, you translate for them, you interview the survivors, and then you come back and write a story for yourself.

Now this had a two-fold importance for us. On one hand it enabled us to do our job, which was to report what was happening in the field to our audience. The second level of importance was even more important, and that was to convey the message abroad, to convey through ABC News what was happening in Kosovo.

I remember this one story once when I used to work for ABC News and we did this story on a massacre that happened in the village of Racak. Then our producer called Washington, and the bureau in Washington found out that President Clinton had watched the piece we did and was very touched by the piece we did. So that was kind of rewarding to us because we knew that the message was getting across and that eventually help would be on its way.

-Ylber Bajraktari

4.1: The War in Kosovo

War

By early 1998, violent clashes between the KLA and Milosevic's Yugoslav National Army (which by then had become, in effect, a purely Serb force) were widespread. The conflict had risen from crisis to war level, prompting third-parties to shift their focus from crisis diplomacy to conflict management.

The international community, led by the United States, tried to persuade both sides to step back, but violence continued to escalate as Serbian forces sought to destroy the KLA and regain control of the province. For its part, the KLA fought an often brutal and bloody guerrilla campaign. On numerous occasions, regular Serb forces and Serb paramilitary police overreacted to deliberate KLA provocations, expelling women and children from their homes, looting and burning houses with no direct connection to KLA fighters, and executing adult males in villages.

Final Phases of the War

Over half a million people were internally displaced by the fighting, in which federal forces experienced major successes. In October, the threat of peacemaking by NATO air strikes finally forced Milosevic to cease all-out offensives, withdraw some forces, and permit international observers.

But NATO's intervention was insufficient to end the conflict, and military activity continued on both sides. A turning point was reached in January of 1999, when international observers reported that Serbian security forces killed over 40 Albanian civilians in the village of Racak.

The international community undertook efforts at diplomatic conflict management, backed by the prospect of peacemaking by military force.

NATO again threatened air strikes to get the Belgrade government to attend a peace conference held in Rambouillet, France, in February. The two sides were presented with a draft of a political settlement, along with an authorization for a NATO-led international force to guarantee the Kosovars' security.

After resisting the settlement proposal for over two weeks, the Kosovar Albanian delegation finally signed the agreement — but only after they knew it would not take effect because the Serb delegation had refused to sign it.

In the face of widespread ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian security forces, and amid international determination not to permit mass murder of civilians as had occurred in Bosnia, a NATO air campaign was launched against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999 and continued for almost three months.

As the scale of Serb military operations against the Kosovar Albanian civilian population increased, Serbian paramilitaries also began to operate in the province. Mass killings of at least 2,000 Kosovar Albanians occurred in the province, and hundreds of thousands of people were forced from their homes. Fearing for their own safety from government forces and the paramilitaries, over half of Kosovo's Albanian population sought refuge outside Yugoslavia, either in Albania or Macedonia. While a majority of the refugees were sheltered privately by family or friends, many were housed in camps. The KLA, meanwhile, continued to fight against Yugoslav forces.

The NATO air campaign did serious damage to infrastructure within Serbia. In June of 1999, Milosevic signed an agreement to withdraw Serbian military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and allow NATO forces to enter. Peace making had finally succeeded, and the stage was set for peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

Perspectives

By the summer of 1998 major fighting was occurring in Kosovo between the Serbian troops and the KLA. As a result, there was a great human suffering among the civilians, the Albanian civilians in Kosovo. A lot of civilians were displaced, so you had this humanitarian catastrophe emerging, both within Kosovo -- but also a lot of refugees fled to Albania and Macedonia, so there was this greater potential for broader conflict in the region. So the international community was now more aware of what Milosevic was capable of doing. Knowing what he did in Srebrenica in '95 in Bosnia, knowing about the camps that his forces set up in Bosnia, knowing what he was capable of doing in Croatia, the international community was quicker to respond to what was happening in Kosovo. They knew that Milosevic eventually was going to do the same thing to Kosovar Albanians that his forces did to Muslims in Bosnia and to Croats in Croatia.

-Ylber Bajraktari

It was escalating, and there was no restraint being shown or no evidence of any restraint being shown by the central government as it fought the war. And it was certainly not winning hearts and minds. It was a war where there was considerable concern – given the record of ethnic cleansing that the Milosevic government had established in Bosnia -- that what they were seeking to do was either to kill or to cause to flee the vast majority of the Albanians in Kosovo. So it was a very grim and very violent struggle, which only ended when the international community intervened, both with a diplomatic plan and militarily when NATO began to strike targets in Serbia itself -- in all of Serbia, not just Kosovo.

-Mike Lekson

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

As soon as Milosevic agreed to the withdrawal, Kosovar Albanian refugees started to return, and many of the remaining Serbs began to leave. With the end of the war phase of the conflict, it again became a crisis. To manage the crisis, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized and established a large NATO-led military and UN civilian presence to oversee post-war reconstruction. Non-Governmental Organizations mushroomed in Pristina and elsewhere to provide services and assist in the rebuilding of civil society.

There was an initial spurt of "revenge" killings of Serbs and perceived collaborators, which hastened the departure of those who considered themselves targets. One priority of the international community therefore was to build a basis for lasting conflict termination by reestablishing law and order in the province. The UN deployed international civilian police (CivPol). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organized the training of local police, in addition to playing a wider role in institution building, conducting elections, human rights monitoring and support of a democratic media.

The KLA was formally demilitarized and transformed into various political parties. Some former KLA members retained arms and continue to use them for political and private purposes. Serbs in particular continue to be targets for attacks. Deadly violence is also used in political struggles among different Albanian parties.

Perspectives

The NATO bombing campaign ended in June of 1999 following an agreement that was reached with the government of the former Yugoslavia. The main conundrum now is that Kosovo's final status remains unresolved. The Albanians continue to maintain, as they have since the beginning of the conflict, that only outright independence is an acceptable end to this conflict. They categorically reject any continued relationship with Serbia, and it does seem that to insist on a

continued relationship with Serbia is simply not plausible given the fact that the last elements of the old Yugoslav Federation, which is the current, quasi-union between Serbia and Montenegro – that's probably going to dissolve within a couple of years as well. And then there would really be no justification for continuing to insist that Kosovo, alone of all the components of the former Yugoslavia, somehow remain within this rump state.

-Anne Henderson

Partnerships for Peace grew out of a series of meetings between Serbian and Albanian students in 1998, that is, before the war in Kosovo. At the time, it was still dangerous for these guys to be meeting. Tensions were increasing every day, Serbs were supposed to hate Albanians, police were beating up students -- it was pretty tough.

These students had been meeting behind the scenes, and I had been involved in facilitating some of those discussions. About a year after the war in Kosovo, towards the end of 1999 into 2000, some of those same students were all of a sudden in parliament, were the assistants to prime ministers, or were in charge of the largest organizations in the region -- in other words, they had impact. They had authority, and they weren't afraid to use it to do good things, so they started to ask me about one another.

So I decided to take a few of them away for a weekend, five or six of them. We went to Montenegro where it was safe, where they could meet outside the limelight, to see what it was like to reconnect. There was a lot of emotion, there was a lot of tension, a lot of misperceptions about one another, but the meeting went great, and everybody decided that the time was right to start bridging some of those gaps, to get back in touch with one another, to develop relations with the next generation of leaders who wanted to work together and who were sick of the wars and wanted to move on.

-Albero Cevellos

The Ouster of Milosevic

Milosevic's actions throughout the 1990s eventually led the international community to treat the Government of Serbia as a pariah. International financial support for free media and the political opposition made its way into the country, along with the promise that further aid for reconstruction and recovery would be allocated for any new democratically elected government.

In the meantime, the atmosphere in Serbia became increasingly violent, as mafia-type killings and assassinations became almost commonplace. A new coalition was formed, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which agreed on a single candidate to challenge Milosevic.

The candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, was a lawyer and a nationalist generally recognized as wholly free of the corruption that had become such a feature of Serbian politics.

Drawing on support from the coalition and from OTPOR, an anti-Milosevic student-led organization, Kostunica won in the first round. As he had done earlier in his political career, Milosevic disputed the results. This time, though, opposition protests were organized and widespread, and the security forces did not or could not resort to force to quell them. Milosevic conceded defeat. With the ouster of Milosevic, the situation in Kosovo finally wound down from a state of crisis to one of unstable peace.

Kosovo Today: Unstable Peace

Security Council Resolution 1244 did not define the province's final status, and its future remains undecided. While technically still a part of Serbia, Kosovo is not under Belgrade's authority. Kosovo's Albanians continue to insist on independence, while Kosovo's much-reduced Serb minority insists on remaining within Serbia-Montenegro (all that is left of the former Yugoslavia).

Meanwhile, Kosovars face the challenge of working together to deal with pressing current issues. The municipal elections of October 2000 were both preceded and followed by assassinations of political leaders. However, these elections, along with elections for a Kosovo-wide assembly in November 2001, established the basis for democratic self government in Kosovo.

A government with limited powers under UN authority was formed in March 2002. As of late 2003, Kosovo remained an international protectorate administered by the United Nations.

Perspectives

The key strategy that led us to be effective against Milosevic was the non-violent struggle against him, because first of all when somebody is in possession of the force of the state, and you are not, you don't go and fight him where he is strong. That's how you lose. So what we did was we just tried to hit them where they were weaker. We focused on youth, the future. We gave out this positive message, and I think that this non-violent, if you will, Gandhi-like struggle and way of work was our key strategic advantage against Milosevic because he just couldn't convince the people -- he couldn't put anything on us. We were just there, stating our point of view in a legitimate, democratic fashion, and he just didn't have anything on us. We were all university students, you know, nice kids, and I think that's what really kind of put him in a position where, if he wanted to hit us, it would cost him dearly.

-Milan Samardzic

There were thousands of students across the country, hundreds of thousands, who in turn -- once they started to get arrested, harassed by the police -- their parents got involved. And their brothers and sisters got involved. A very famous quote from the October 5 revolution was of a police officer. When he was asked why he didn't fire on the crowd, his response was, "because I knew my kids were in that crowd." That's what happened. They were able to pull in the everyday people, who all of a sudden had nothing to lose and everything to care for.
-Albert Cevallos

Summary

As in the case of the genocide in Rwanda, applying Lund's concepts to recent history in Kosovo provides a graphical method for visualizing the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict.

For more than thirty years following World War II, nationalist tensions were kept in control by a one-party, socialist state, in which different republic and ethnic interests were balanced. Albanians in Kosovo even made some progress toward autonomy during this long period of stable peace.

However, after the death of Tito Yugoslavia began to unravel, and tension in Kosovo began a steady rise through unstable peace, crisis and war levels.

Repeated efforts at conflict prevention and crisis management finally failed in 1999, leading to the NATO bombing campaign that ended the war. Kosovo reverted to crisis in the post-conflict phase, with the international community working to help it move towards peace, even if unstable at first.

5: Analytical Framework

Complementary Tools

As the examples of Rwanda and Kosovo demonstrate, plotting the intensity of a conflict over time produces a history with a particular focus. The resulting graph traces the intensity of the conflict from stable peace, unstable peace, crisis, through war, and a beginning of a reversal of this sequence.

Moreover, familiarity with corresponding concepts along the curve, preventive diplomacy, crisis diplomacy, peace making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction, suggests the type of intervention that was used, or might have been useful, at a given point in the past, or—in the case of a continuing conflict—the type of intervention that might be useful at present.

In the same way that the curve of conflict provides a structured way of looking at a conflict's history, the analytical framework provides a rigorous method for studying a conflict at a particular point in time. The framework is derived from

Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators [copyright © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 1998, <http://www.idea.int/>].

The framework is a verbal tool consisting of a series of questions organized along five key themes:

Actors

Who are the primary actors in the conflict?
Who are the secondary actors?
Who else has influence over events?

Root Causes

What is driving the conflict?
What are the needs and fears of each group?

Issues, Scope and Stage

What are the key issues for each side?
What phase is the conflict in?
Who is suffering the most?

Power, Resources and Relationships

What are the resources and capacities of each side?
What is the state of the relationship among the leaders?
What are the existing channels of communication?

History of the Relationship

Did the parties ever co-exist peacefully?
What were the previous attempts at a settlement, and why did they fail?
Was there a pattern to the failures?

This list of questions is not final—no such list could be. For a particular conflict, some questions will be more useful than others; in fact, additional frameworks have been written tailored to specific types of conflicts. Of course, a probing analyst will continually find new questions to ask. This framework is intended as a starting point, as a minimum series of questions that should be asked for any conflict.

In the pages that follow, we will apply this framework to the conflicts in Rwanda and Kosovo. In both cases, we will focus on that point of the conflict just prior to the outbreak of major hostilities, in Rwanda at the beginning of April, 1994, and in Kosovo at the end of December, 1997.

Perspectives

In a way, I think of the framework as a snapshot and of the curve as a motion picture. The curve is a history. It looks at where the conflict has been over a period of time and where it is today. And that gives a sense of the flow. The framework involves looking at actors, at root causes, at relationships, at balance of power at a point in time. Now naturally it's important to look also at the history, but to some extent the framework freezes the conflict in the present and evaluates it on that basis. So there is a reciprocal relationship between the two devices.

-George Ward

What we have with the framework is a way of ensuring that as you define the problem, you've looked at the essential elements of it, and you've actually thought about each one of them. It would apply to a conflict at any stage on this so-called curve, whether we're talking about unstable peace, crisis, or war, or going up this escalatory bell curve or down. It's a way of looking at a situation and ensuring that you've looked at all the important factors. It may help you define whether a conflict is at a particular stage or at some other stage, or you may already feel that you know what stage it's at. But either way, the analytical framework is a manner to ensure that you have looked at the essential elements of what the conflict is in order to be able to decide how to approach it and what to do about it.

-Mike Lekson

5.1: Actors

Analysts usually begin by identifying the actors in a conflict. In addition to governments, actors might include international organizations and financial institutions, as well as identity groups, factions within groups, single-issue groups, external actors, potential peacemakers, and potential spoilers. Within groups, analysts usually distinguish between top leadership, middle-range leadership, and grassroots leadership.

Who Are the Primary Actors?

Primary actors are normally thought of as those directly involved in the conflict. In Kosovo, primary actors included the Serb side led by Slobodan Milosevic, the Democratic League of Kosovo and its "shadow government" led by Ibrahim Rugova, and the Kosovo Liberation Army. In Rwanda, primary actors included the multi-party government led by moderate Hutu, the hard-line Hutu Power leadership, the Hutu-led Rwandan Armed Forces, and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front.

Who Are the Secondary Actors?

Secondary actors are not actual parties to the conflict but nevertheless have a high degree of interest in and influence over it, often due to their proximity. In Kosovo, secondary actors included the Republic of Albania and the ex-Yugoslavian Republics, particularly Macedonia and Montenegro with their large Albanian populations. In Rwanda, one very important secondary actor was Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), the station that urged the killing of Tutsi and moderate Hutu over the airwaves.

Who Are Other Parties with Influence over Events?

In addition to primary and secondary actors, analysts consider other parties with interests in and influence over events, including regional and global players. In Rwanda, regional actors included Uganda and Tanzania. International actors with influence included the United Nations, the United States, Belgium and France. In Kosovo, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, France, and Italy formed the Contact Group, which had considerable influence over events. International organizations with influence included the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and NATO.

Perspectives

First you want to look who the actors are, who the primary and secondary actors are, what other outside influences there are. That's the first piece. For example, in Rwanda, look at the spring of 1994 right before the genocide. You have the Hutu power clique surrounding the president -- Hutu extremists. You have the RPF, who are in this brokered peace agreement. You have the Rwandan Armed Forces. You have the radio station that is being used by the Hutu power, the RTLM, just spewing messages of hate. You have some international involvement in that there is a small UN force there. Ultimately, the French will also be involved when the genocide begins, and they launch their Operation Turquoise. Uganda has told the RPF, "you're not coming back to Uganda," so essentially forcing their hand to only move forward. So you have a lot of different actors, primary and secondary actors, involved in the spring of 1994.

-Greg Noone

Well, first and foremost you have the parties involved in the conflict. On the one side, you have the Yugoslav government, the Serb government, you have its military forces. On the other side, you have the KLA most actively involved on the Albanian side in military action. You also have on the Albanian side the shadow government, which is not involved in the hostilities, or not involved in the violence, but still had its own demands constantly forced to increase by pressure from its own public.

-Ted Feifer

5.2: Root Causes

In every conflict, the actors, particularly the primary actors, raise various grievances. For conflicts such as those in Rwanda and Kosovo, analysts look beyond the stated grievances in an attempt to determine root causes, some of which are listed below.

What is driving the conflict?

What are the needs and fears of each group?

When analysts attempt to discern root causes of the genocide in Rwanda, they often refer to the substantial fear and mistrust that the Belgians fostered between Hutu and Tutsi during the colonial period—and that the Hutu perpetuated during independence—along with the scarcity of resources, especially land, in one of the poorest nations in Africa.

For more immediate causes, analysts note the refugee crisis that resulted from the massacres of Tutsi beginning in the late 1950s, the desire of the Tutsi refugees to return to Rwanda, Hutu fears of the return of the refugees, and the willingness of the Hutu establishment to exploit those fears to remain in power.

In Kosovo, analysts point to the strong attachment that both Serbs and Albanians have for the land; the scarcity of resources and generally poor economic conditions in the region; the long-running desire of the Albanians, who form the local majority in Kosovo, for independence; and the greater strength in economic and military resources of the Serbs, who form the majority in the region as a whole.

As more immediate causes, analysts refer to the movements for independence and wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, which encouraged the Albanians in Kosovo to seek their own independence, while helping to inflame Serbian nationalism. As in the case of Rwanda, analysts note the willingness of politicians to exploit ethnic nationalism to gain and hold power.

Perspectives

By the time we're talking about, there was genuine ethnic antipathy between Serbs and Albanians, of a sort that was intense even by Balkan standards. There was also the "domino effect," if you will, of the other republics of Yugoslavia, in particular Slovenia and Croatia, having gotten independence, and that made those Albanians who felt themselves trapped in Serbia feel even more oppressed. And then there was the collapse of overall authority that the central government had as the Yugoslav experiment, which Tito had started, came to its end. And all that was left, the only authority that was really left in Belgrade, was clearly based on the principle of Serb nationalism, which was totally incompatible with the aspirations of the Albanians in Kosovo.

-Mike Lekson

You also probably need to think in terms of what are root causes and what are precipitating causes -- the root causes, as we discussed, going back to questions like the reinforcing of the perception of ethnic differences under the colonial regime and the actual decisions taken to favor one group against the other, which probably left a legacy of victimization and discrimination that was subject to manipulation, later, if not simply there for all to see. I think as a root cause, and maybe as a precipitating cause, you'd have to look at what was happening with the economy of the country.

-Ray Caldwell

5.3: Issues, Scope and Stage

Analysts study how root causes manifest themselves in contemporary issues. Analysts also determine the phase and intensity of the conflict.

What are the key issues for each side?

In Rwanda, the main issue prior to the genocide was implementation of the Arusha Accords by the Hutu-led Government. The accords, signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1993, would have provided for the return of the Tutsi refugees and led to a power sharing arrangement between the Government and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. The President and the hard-line Hutu were accused of blocking implementation of an agreement that they contended would have given a disproportionate share of power to the RPF.

In Kosovo, the key issue was the governance of Kosovo: to what degree the majority Albanian population would have local autonomy or, alternatively, take a subordinate position to central authority in Belgrade.

In both cases, these central issues led to many related disputes, including access to public sector employment, control over educational institutions, and others.

What phase is the conflict in?

What is its intensity?

Who is suffering most?

In this exercise, we are using the framework to study points in the conflicts just prior to the outbreak of major hostilities. Thus, in both cases the conflicts were in a state of crisis, with tensions running high.

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In Kosovo, Albanians suffered greatest damage to life and property; however, many Serbs lost similarly. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suffered

continuing political damage and economic loss due to international sanctions and ostracism.

In Rwanda, Tutsi civilians suffered on an unimaginable scale.

Perspectives

In this situation, in Rwanda, you have the President of Rwanda trying to maintain power within his country. He is receiving pressure from this Hutu-power clique of extremists. In fact, there is some belief that they're the ones who actually order his plane being shot down when he returns in April 6, 1994, from Arusha.

-Greg Noone

In the comparative good times in the 1960s, both economic and political, certain rights and privileges were granted to the Albanians in Kosovo and to Kosovo itself, which were then taken away later. And when one takes away something that has been extended to someone, almost inevitably the resentment is quite strong. Often the resentment is even greater than if one had never had that particular right or privilege in the first place.

-Mike Lekson

5.4: Power, Resources and Relationships

Analysts study the relationships among the leaders of each group, as well as the resources available to each side.

What is the state of relations among the leaders?

What are the existing communication channels?

In Rwanda, the Hutu moderates, who had developed excellent communication lines with the RPF during the Arusha negotiations, were killed when the genocide began. The UN and the diplomatic community that had provided critical channels of communication between the hard-line Hutu and the RPF, were unable to sustain this role once the genocide began.

In Kosovo, all communication was through the media or third parties, above all the Contact Group. There was no regular communication directly between the Milosevic government and Albanian leaders. The Albanians considered Serb leaders to be war criminals; the Serbs saw the Albanians as traitors to the state.

What are the resources and capacity of each side?

Rwanda is one of the poorest nations in Africa. Although Hutu leaders had all the resources of a government in power, the Rwandan Armed Forces were ill-trained and had little combat experience. By contrast, soldiers in the Tutsi-led Rwandan

Patriotic Front had significant combat experience from their participation in the Ugandan war for independence.

In the conflict in Kosovo, the Serb side had the majority of assets from the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including a substantial police establishment and remnants of an army that was originally configured to resist the Soviets. Albanians in Kosovo had local weaponry plus additional weapons liberated from the collapse of the Republic of Albania. Both the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians were in poor shape economically. Both inherited weak socialist economies. The Serb side had more resources to begin with, but was weakened from years of war and economic sanctions.

Perspectives

As far as resources go, you have what by all means is an ill-trained Rwandan military. They're well armed -- they have received more than enough arms from Egypt, France, and South Africa, but they're not well trained; whereas the RPF is heavy with combat veterans. They fought the wars in Uganda, so you have some really savvy combat veterans, and that is the most powerful resource the RPF has.

-Greg Noone

Well, if you look first at the Serbian side led by Slobodan Milosevic, and you talk about resources and capacities -- looking at military resources and capacities, clearly the Yugoslav National Army had already been weakened by the conflicts of the previous decade as well as by arms embargoes, so it was in no way, shape, or form a modern, powerful military.

However, it did have greater capacity than, say, the Kosovo Liberation Army, in terms of destructive capabilities -- different kinds of capabilities, though, because of course the Kosovo Liberation Army had the capacity to wage a particular kind of guerilla warfare. They had the capacity to carry out assassinations, bombings, to induce a climate of fear, even terror in the targeted populations.

-Anne Henderson

5.5: History of Peacemaking Efforts

To learn from previous attempts at intervention, analysts pay particular attention to the history of peacemaking efforts.

Did the parties ever co-exist peacefully? What changed?

Before European colonization, Hutu and Tutsi co-existed in relative harmony. However, relations changed dramatically during the colonial period when Belgians sharpened distinctions between the two groups, favoring Tutsi at the

expense of Hutu. The country eventually gained independence from Belgium, but the enmity of the colonial period remained and was nurtured by the Hutu leadership after independence.

In Yugoslavia under Tito, peaceful coexistence rested on balance among the country's various ethnic groups, coupled with a degree of economic stability. Albanians in Kosovo even gained some measure of autonomy during this period. However, the death of Tito led to the eventual collapse of central authority in Yugoslavia. When Milosevic came to power in Serbia, Albanians lost the autonomy that they had gained.

What were the previous attempts at a settlement?

Why did they fail?

Was there a pattern to the failures?

Between the Hutu-led Government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, there were several attempts to negotiate a power-sharing agreement, along with a return of Tutsi refugees. The most successful negotiations resulted in the Arusha Accords. However, in each case the Government stalled in implementing its responsibilities under the agreements, leading observers to suspect that the Government was not negotiating in good faith.

As the post-Tito system collapsed in Yugoslavia, the Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnians declared their independence. In each case, negotiations failed, leading to war. At the same time, Milosevic held tightly to Kosovo, a symbol to Serb nationalists, while Albanians in Kosovo increasingly wanted the independence that others were achieving. Efforts to facilitate negotiations between the parties failed.

Perspectives

There had been innumerable attempts to resolve the Kosovo conflict, some backed by threat or threats of force. I mentioned the December 1992 ultimatum by President George Bush. There were also attempts by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- in particular the OSCE -- to put a force to separate the combatants and to monitor the situation.
-George Ward

There were efforts being made to address, if not the causes, the manifestations of the conflict. But they tended to be halting and dragged-out and ultimately inadequate to the need. And then, who knows, it's a "what if," if that plane had not crashed or been shot down, would there have been other opportunities to do something -- or was this going to blow up sooner or later because it had simply gone beyond the point where it could do anything but that.
-Ray Caldwell

Summary

The analytical framework complements the Lund curve by providing a detailed snapshot of a conflict at a particular point in time. The framework consists of a set of questions organized around five themes:

Actors

Who are the primary actors in the conflict?
Who are the secondary actors?
Who else has influence over events?

Root Causes

What is driving the conflict?
What are the needs and fears of each group?

Issues, Scope and Stage

What are the key issues for each side?
What phase is the conflict in?
Who is suffering the most?

Power, Resources and Relationships

What are the resources and capacities of each side?
What is the state of the relationship among the leaders?
What are the existing channels of communication?

History of the Relationship

Did the parties ever co-exist peacefully?
What were the previous attempts at a settlement, and why did they fail?
Was there a pattern to the failures?

In the next section, you will have an opportunity to apply the analytical framework to a case study of the conflict in Tajikistan.

6: Case Study: Tajikistan

Case Study Directions

This case study will give you an opportunity to apply what you have learned about the analytical framework to a real-world conflict.

The passage describes the conflict in Tajikistan in the early 1990s. As you read the information, pay particular attention to framework topics that you have learned:

Actors

Root Causes
Issues, Scope and Stage
History of Peacemaking Efforts

The narrative does not provide information about Power, Resources and Relationships.

When you have finished reading, go to the next page to begin the exercise.

Conflict in Tajikistan

Tajikistan is the poorest of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The country had been formed and held together only under Soviet rule. There was little sense of national identity.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of its constituent republics, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan in May 1992. The main Tajik actors were the northerners from the Khojand region (the major industrial and agricultural area) and southerners from the Kulob region. Ideology was not a factor; the conflict was a power struggle among different clan-based regional parties for access to the country's political and economic spoils.

There were, however, democratic, Islamic and nationalist movements also opposed to the communist-style government allied to the Kulobis. There was also an Uzbek ethnic minority in the country. Outside forces were also involved: Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia provided support to the Islamic movement. Russia became militarily involved to protect the southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states were concerned at the possibility that a fundamentalist Islamic movement might take power.

Efforts to resolve the civil war began in 1993 as influential citizens from different regions and factions started an unofficial dialogue under the auspices of an American-Russian academic team. The UN launched an official mediation process in 1994 involving the major combatants, the government and the United Tajik Opposition. Meanwhile, Tajik non-governmental organizations working on citizenship education and civil society sought to work across the regional divides. A comprehensive peace agreement was reached in 1997. The OSCE has been acting as a guarantor of the agreement, and working on human dimension issues and national reconciliation.

Analytical Framework

Actors:

Who are the primary actors?

Secondary actors?

Root Causes :

What were the parties' motivations?

What were their underlying fears?

Issues, Scope and Stage:

What phase is the conflict in now?

History of Peacemaking Efforts:

Was there a time when the parties coexisted peacefully?

What changed?

What were previous attempts at settlement?

Answers: Conflict in Tajikistan

Actors:

Who are the primary actors?

The main Tajik actors were the northerners from the Khojand region (the major industrial and agricultural area) and southerners from the Kulob region.

Secondary actors?

There were, however, **democratic, Islamic and nationalist movements** also opposed to the communist-style government allied to the Kulobis. There was also an **Uzbek ethnic minority** in the country. Outside forces were also involved: **Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia** provided support to the Islamic movement. **Russia** became militarily involved to protect the southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent States. **Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states** were concerned at the possibility that a fundamentalist Islamic movement might take power.

Efforts to resolve the civil war began in 1993 as influential citizens from different regions and factions started an unofficial dialogue under the auspices of an **American-Russian academic team**. The **UN** launched an official mediation process in 1994 involving the major combatants, the government and the **United Tajik Opposition**. Meanwhile, **Tajik non-governmental organizations** working on citizenship education and civil society sought to work across the regional divides. A comprehensive peace agreement was reached in 1997. The **OSCE** has been acting as a guarantor of the agreement, and working on human dimension issues and national reconciliation.

Root Causes :

What were the parties' motivations?

Ideology was not a factor; the conflict was a power struggle among different clan-based regional parties for access to the country's political and economic spoils.

There were, however, democratic, Islamic and nationalist movements also opposed to the communist-style government allied to the Kulobis.

What were their underlying fears?

Russia became militarily involved to protect the southern border of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states were concerned at the possibility that a fundamentalist Islamic movement might take power.

Issues, Scope and Stage:

What phase is the conflict in now?

The OSCE has been acting as a guarantor of the agreement, and working on human dimension issues and national reconciliation.

History of Peacemaking Efforts:

Was there a time when the parties coexisted peacefully?

The country had been formed and held together only under Soviet rule.

What changed?

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of its constituent republics, a civil war broke out in Tajikistan in May 1992.

What were previous attempts at settlement?

Efforts to resolve the civil war began in 1993 as influential citizens from different regions and factions started an unofficial dialogue under the auspices of an American-Russian academic team. The UN launched an official mediation process in 1994 involving the major combatants, the government and the United Tajik Opposition. Meanwhile, Tajik non-governmental organizations working on citizenship education and civil society sought to work across the regional divides.

7: Final Exam

Good luck with the exam!

Glossary

A

Albania

A country in Southeastern Europe that was largely isolated from both East and West during the communist rule of Enver Hoxha from 1945 to 1985. Established a multiparty democracy in 1992, though transition has proven difficult. Ethnic Albanians form the majority population in neighboring Kosovo.

Analytical Framework

Derived from *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators* [copyright © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 1998, <http://www.idea.int/>], the analytical framework helps generate questions that should be asked when studying a conflict.

Angola

A country in Southwest Africa that was plagued by civil war and factional fighting through much of the latter half of the 20th century.

Armenia

A country in the Caucasus that was part of the Soviet Union until its break-up in 1991. Disputes the region of Ngorno-Karabakh with its neighbor Azerbaijan.

Arusha Peace Accords

A comprehensive agreement signed in Arusha, Tanzania, that provided for substantial power sharing in Rwanda between Hutu and Tutsi. Vocal Hutu in Rwanda denounced and ultimately abandoned the agreement.

Azerbaijan

A country in the Caucasus that was part of the Soviet Union until its break-up in 1991. Disputes the region of Ngorno-Karabakh with its neighbor Armenia.

B

Banja Luka

Capital of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Belgrade

Capital of Serbia. Formerly capital of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).

Bosnia-Herzegovina

A former republic of Yugoslavia that declared independence in 1992, touching off a war that did not end until 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords.

Burundi

A country in East Central Africa that, like its neighbor Rwanda, has in the latter half of the 20th century seen periodic violent conflict between its Hutu and Tutsi populations.

C

Chechnya

Official name: the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Currently seeking independence from Russia.

Conflict Analysis

The systematic study of conflict, including the study of conflict in general and the study of individual conflicts.

Conflict Management

A general term used to describe efforts to prevent, limit, resolve or transform conflicts. This can involve preventing conflicts from breaking out or escalating, as well as stopping or reducing the amount of violence by parties engaged in conflict. In Lund's curve of conflict, conflict management is an equivalent term for Peacemaking and is associated with early stages of war.

Conflict Mitigation

On Lund's curve of conflict, conflict mitigation is an equivalent term for peace enforcement and is associated with late stages of war. Describes efforts to impose or enforce agreements.

Conflict Prevention

On Lund's curve of conflict, conflict prevention is an equivalent term for preventive diplomacy and refers to third-party actions taken at the early stages of unstable peace. In Preventing Violent Conflicts, Lund further defines preventive diplomacy as an activity that comes into play when "policies, institutions, and procedures between states and groups at the local, national or regional levels that could handle disagreements and maintain a process of orderly resolution either do not exist, are breaking down, or fail to regulate political disputes and conflicts of interests."

Conflict Resolution

In Lund's curve of conflict, conflict resolution is an equivalent term for post-conflict peace building and is associated with de-escalation from crisis to unstable peace and stable peace. Involves assisting in the termination of conflicts by finding solutions to them.

Conflict Termination

On Lund's curve of conflict, conflict termination is an equivalent term for peacekeeping and is associated with a post-war state of crisis. Describes efforts

to keep conflicts from re-escalating and to move them in the direction of resolution.

Coup D'Etat

The sudden overthrow of a government by extra-legal means.

Croatia

A former republic of Yugoslavia that declared independence in 1991 but did not gain control over all its territory until 1998.

Crisis

From Lund: "Crisis is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight and may be engaged in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes but have not exerted any significant amount of force. The probability of the outbreak of war is high."

Crisis Diplomacy

On Lund's curve of conflict, crisis diplomacy is an equivalent term for crisis management and is associated with early stages of crisis. In Preventing Violent Conflicts, Lund further defines crisis diplomacy as the effort to "manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level of confrontation. The threat of force by one or more parties is common, and the actual outbreak of hostilities is highly likely."

Crisis Management

On Lund's curve of conflict, crisis management is an equivalent term for crisis diplomacy and is associated with early stages of crisis. In Preventing Violent Conflicts, Lund further defines crisis diplomacy as the effort to "manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level of confrontation. The threat of force by one or more parties is common, and the actual outbreak of hostilities is highly likely."

Curve of Conflict

Developed by Michael Lund, the curve of conflict is a visual tool that helps illustrate how conflicts tend to evolve over time. The curve helps in conceptualizing how different phases of conflict relate to one another, as well as to identify associated kinds of third party intervention. Practitioners can use this knowledge in the determination of effective strategies for intervention, along with the timing of those strategies.

D

Dayton Accords

Peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The accords were named for the Ohio location of the talks between Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak delegations in November 1995.

Dubrovnik

A walled city on the Dalmatian coast, founded in the seventh century AD, situated in Croatia. The city was shelled by Yugoslav forces in 1991, which provoked considerable international outrage. Dubrovnik is also called Ragusa.

Democratic League of Kosovo

Founded by Ibrahim Rugova to challenge Serbian control of Kosovo. Known as the LDK by its Albanian initials.

Durable Peace

From Lund: "Durable (or Warm) Peace involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defense measures among parties, although it may include their military alliance against a common threat. A 'positive peace' prevails based on shared values, goals, and institutions (e.g. democratic political systems and rule of law), economic interdependence, and a sense of international community."

E

East Timor

A country in the Timor Sea that recently gained independence from Indonesia.

EC

European Community, a term used after the European Economic Community (EEC) took on a more political character, and before it became the European Union (EU).

Ethiopia

A country in East Africa plagued by internal uprisings in the 1990s, as well as a border war with neighboring Eritrea.

EU

European Union, the term used for this organization since the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Formerly the EEC and the EC.

F

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This term was applied to the six republics of the former SFRY, and then, following successful secessions by other republics, to just Serbia and Montenegro. The FRY officially ceased to exist in 2003.

G

Genocidaire

French term often used to describe those who committed genocide in Rwanda.

Genocide

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as "any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

Georgia

A country in the Caucasus that was part of the Soviet Union until its break-up in 1991. Since then separatist movements have grown in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Guatemala

A mountainous country in Central America plagued by guerrilla war throughout much of the latter half of the 20th century.

H

Hutu

One of three principal groups that inhabit Rwanda. The others are the Tutsi and the Twa. In pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" had, after centuries of intermarriage, come more closely to represent distinctions of economic class rather than ethnic origin. A Hutu who gained in wealth could become a "Tutsi," and conversely, a Tutsi could fall in economic stature and become a "Hutu." In 1926, however, the Belgians established policies to sharpen and institutionalize distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi.

Hutu Power

A radical Hutu movement in Rwanda that rejected power-sharing with Tutsi and whose leadership has been implicated in the Rwandan genocide.

I

IGO(s)

Inter-governmental organization(s), such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Internally Displaced Persons

Violent conflicts often drive people from their homes. International convention distinguishes those forced to cross an international frontier, "refugees," from those who remain in their own country but cannot return to their usual place of residence, "Internally Displaced Persons" (IDPs). In the former Yugoslavia, some categories blur, especially between Kosovo and Serbia, and between the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also unclear is the will of many people to return

to live alongside people whom they might see as bitter enemies. Across the region in the last ten years, at least three million people have found themselves in one status or the other. If "economic refugees" are included, the number is much higher.

Interahamwe

In Kinyarwanda, "those who attack together." Militia formed by Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Hutu Power leadership.

International Monetary Fund

International Monetary Fund (IMF).

J

K

Kampala

Capital of Uganda.

Kashmir

A region that has been a subject of conflict between India and Pakistan since the two states became independent in 1947.

Khojand

Tajikistan's second largest city.

Kigali

Capital of Rwanda.

Kinyarwanda

The language of Rwanda. Shared by both Tutsi and Hutu.

KLA

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which came to prominence after the Dayton Accords of 1995. Levels of violence in Kosovo increased, with the KLA emerging as a uniformed paramilitary organization, funded in part by the Albanian diaspora, that targeted Serbian security forces. After the Kosovo War, the KLA was officially disarmed and disbanded. However, not all violence has ceased in Kosovo. Moreover, some of its personnel, leaders and equipment, though, contributed to the foundation of the NLA, a parallel organization that began an armed insurgency in Macedonia in February 2001. In Albanian, KLA and NLA have the same name, the UCK.

Kosovo

Former province with an Albanian majority population within the Republic of Serbia. Its efforts to gain independence led to a war which did not end until June, 1999. Its final status has yet to be determined.

Kosovo Polje

Scene of a battle that has great symbolic significance in Serbian history. Now a town in Kosovo. Literally means "field of blackbirds."

L

LDK

Albanian initials of the Democratic League of Kosovo, founded by Ibrahim Rugova to challenge Serbian control of Kosovo.

Liberia

A country in West Africa that was plagued by civil war and factional fighting through much of the 1990s.

M

Macedonia

A former republic of Yugoslavia. Though it declared independence in 1991, its recognition was delayed by Greece, which objected to its use of the name "Macedonia" for an independent state. In 1995, it gained international recognition as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.).

Mediation

In mediation a third party actively helps parties find a solution they cannot find by themselves. Pure mediation involves helping parties to find their solutions, and the possible injection of ideas. To this process, power mediation adds leverage to persuade the parties, positive and negative incentives to achieve an agreement, and authority to advise, suggest or influence.

Montenegro

Former republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Now with Serbia a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

N

Narod and Narodnost

The terms Narod and Narodnost were used in the Yugoslav constitutions between 1945 and 1991, and still are used in the successor states. Narod referred to the "constituent people" of a Yugoslav republic. Narodnost referred to a group which had a nation-state outside Yugoslavia and which therefore had no claim to a republic of its own. Serbs were the largest narod, while Albanians were

the largest narodnost. Within Yugoslavia, Albanian activists in Kosovo sought status as narod and hoped that Kosovo would become a republic. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, who had been members of the largest narod, now found themselves in the potential role of minorities, a status that was formalized by the new Croatian constitution of 1990.

Tension over usage of the term narod also exists in Macedonia, where the 1991 constitution makes primary reference to the Macedonian narod and no other. Albanian political parties seek the status of narod for Macedonia's Albanians.

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Negotiation

In cases where two or more parties are in conflict, or have differences that may result in conflict, the parties may negotiate. Negotiation is a process to achieve goals through communication and bargaining, with the presumed outcome an agreement.

NGO(s)

Non-Governmental Organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or Amnesty International.

NLA

See KLA.

O

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a 30-member organization of market democracies from North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim.

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an inter-governmental organization whose members include the US, Canada, all European nations, and five Central Asian states.

OTPOR

A student-led organization in Serbia that was partly responsible for the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic.

P

Peace Enforcement

On Lund's curve of conflict, peace enforcement is an equivalent term for conflict mitigation and is associated with late stages of war. Describes efforts to enforce agreements.

Peacekeeping

On Lund's curve of conflict, peacekeeping is an equivalent term for conflict termination and is associated with a post-war state of crisis. Describes efforts to keep conflicts from re-escalating and to move them in the direction of resolution.

Peace Making

On Lund's curve of conflict, peace making is an equivalent term for conflict management and is associated with early stages of war. Describes efforts at ending hostilities.

Peacetime Diplomacy or Politics

On Lund's curve of conflict, peacetime diplomacy or politics is associated with durable and stable peace. In Preventing Violent Conflicts, Lund further defines peacetime diplomacy or politics as "the stuff of ordinary, peacetime international relations and national foreign and defense policies."

Post-conflict Peace Building

On Lund's curve of conflict, post-conflict peace building is an equivalent term for conflict resolution and is associated with de-escalation from crisis to unstable and stable peace. Involves assisting in the termination of conflicts by finding solutions to them.

Preventive Diplomacy

On Lund's curve of conflict, preventive diplomacy is an equivalent term for conflict prevention and refers to third-party efforts taken at the early stages of unstable peace. In Preventing Violent Conflicts, Lund further defines preventive diplomacy as an activity that comes into play when "policies, institutions, and procedures between states and groups at the local, national or regional levels that could handle disagreements and maintain a process of orderly resolution either do not exist, are breaking down, or fail to regulate political disputes and conflicts of interests."

Primary Actors

In conflict analysis, those directly involved in a conflict.

Pristina

Capital of Kosovo.

Pyramid Scheme

A form of "wild capitalism" which requires ever-increasing inputs from new speculators to repay earlier ones, since it does not entail any actual productive investment. Such schemes occurred in various former communist countries, including Romania, Serbia, Macedonia and Albania. A bank is set up offering very high rates of return on short-term investment. Those who invest early are repaid with the deposits of those who invest later; however, as the schemes

expand (which they must, to meet repayment schedules) it becomes impossible to repay the numerous later depositors. Those who set up such schemes generally profit at the expense of small investors seduced by the promise of riches. In Albania, the collapse of many such schemes brought down the government in 1997.

Q

R

Racak

A village in Kosovo which was the site of an engagement between KLA and Serbian security forces in January 1999. Foreign observers reported that the engagement was followed by a massacre of Albanian civilians, prompting renewed international pressure on Serbia. This led first to negotiations at Rambouillet and then to the use of force by NATO.

Rambouillet

Location of an international attempt to broker a peaceful solution to the growing violence between Serbian security forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army in February 1999. The Rambouillet Accords called for an international force to enter Kosovo and a phased introduction of self-determination. They were signed by Albanian representatives but not by Serbs, who denounced them as an assault on Serbian national sovereignty. The failure of Rambouillet led to the Kosovo War, which began in March 1999 with NATO air strikes.

Refugees

Violent conflicts often drive people from their homes. International convention distinguishes those forced to cross an international frontier, "refugees," from those who remain in their own country but cannot return to their usual place of residence, "Internally Displaced Persons" (IDPs). In the former Yugoslavia, some categories blur, especially between Kosovo and Serbia, and between the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also unclear is the will of many people to return to live alongside people whom they might see as bitter enemies. Across the region in the last ten years, at least three million people have found themselves in one status or the other. If "economic refugees" are included, the number is much higher.

Root Causes

In conflict analysis, that which is driving the conflict; the needs and fears of each group.

Rwanda

A country in East Central Africa, bordered by Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed in 1987 as an exile organization dedicated to the democratization of Rwandan society and the return of Rwandan refugees. Unable to attain these objectives through peaceful means, the RPF formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which invaded Rwanda in 1990.

S

Sarajevo

Capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The city was held by the Bosnian government, and besieged by Serbian forces on the surrounding hills for almost the entire period 1992-1995. It was the site of several highly public attacks against civilians, including a mortar shell in the marketplace which killed 68 people in February 1994.

Secondary Actors

In conflict analysis, not actual parties to the conflict but those who nevertheless have a high degree of interest in and influence over it, often due to their proximity

Serbia

Former republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Now part of Serbia and Montenegro.

"Shadow State"

An unofficial, parallel government for Kosovo organized by Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Formed and governed by Tito, it followed an idiosyncratic form of communism and a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War.

Slovenia

A former republic in Yugoslavia that declared and gained its independence in 1991.

Somalia

A country in East Africa plagued by factional fighting since the early 1990s.

South Africa

A country in Southern Africa that ended its apartheid system of race-based separation and minority rule and held its first national, multiracial election in 1994.

Srebrenica

Town in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina and site of mass killings of Bosnian Muslims by Serbian armed forces under the direct command of General Ratko

Mladic in July 1995. UN peacekeepers on the spot failed to prevent the murder of over 8,000 Bosnian men in an area that had been declared a United Nations "safe haven."

Stable Peace

From Lund: "Stable (or Cold) Peace is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g. trade) within an overall context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in nonviolent, more or less predictable ways. The prospect for war is low."

START I

The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Signed by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev and American President George H.W. Bush on July 31, 1991. It reduced the nuclear arsenals of both countries according to a specific timetable and had important verification provisions.

T

Tutsi

One of three principal groups that inhabit Rwanda. The others are Hutu and Twa. In precolonial Rwanda, the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" had, after centuries of intermarriage, come more closely to represent distinctions of economic class rather than ethnic origin. A Hutu who gained in wealth could become a "Tutsi," and conversely, a Tutsi could fall in economic stature and become a "Hutu." In 1926, however, the Belgians established policies to sharpen and institutionalize distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi.

Twa

One of three principal groups that inhabit Rwanda. The others are Tutsi and Hutu.

U

UCK

See KLA.

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Unstable Peace

From Lund: "Unstable Peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A 'negative peace' prevails because although armed force is not deployed [or employed], the parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities.. A

balance of power may discourage aggression, but crisis and war are still possible."

V

Vojvodina

A province of the Republic of Serbia.

W

War

From Lund: "War is sustained fighting between organized armed forces. It may vary from low-intensity but continuing conflict or civil anarchy...to all-out 'hot' war. Once significant use of violence or armed force occurs, conflicts are very susceptible to entering a spiral of escalating violence. Each side feels increasingly justified to use violence because the other side is. So the threshold to armed conflict or war is especially important."

X

Y

Yugoslav

A category of individual identity that was used by some people while Yugoslavia was still a country, especially in urban settings such as Novi Sad or Sarajevo, where affiliations to particular national identities sometimes carried less meaning. Members of mixed marriages and their descendants were especially likely to use this category.

Yugoslavia

Former Southeastern European country. At that time, its constituent republics included Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Literally, Yugoslavia meant "southern Slavs."

Z

Zagreb

Capital of Croatia.