


Touro Institute  מכון טרו

In conjunction with the



Introduction to Philosophy 2



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Professor William Ramsey

Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame

Course Description

This course is designed as a "topics-based" introduction to philosophy. What this means is that instead of working through the history of philosophy focusing on great historical figures and their views on different topics, we will focus on great philosophical topics and look at what historical and contemporary writers have said about them. Topics to be addressed will include

the existence of God, the relation between the mind and the body, human freedom, and the foundations of morality.

About the Professor



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Professor William Ramsey, Ph.D.

Associate Professor

Philosophy Department
University of Notre Dame

Areas of Interest: Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science

William Ramsey is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is the co-editor of four volumes: *Philosophy and Connectionist Theory* (with David Rumelhart and Stephen Stich, Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991) and *Rethinking Intuition* (with Michael DePaul, Roman Littlefield, 1998), and the two-volume series, the *Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science* and the *Cambridge Handbook to Artificial Intelligence* (with Keith Frankish, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press). He has written numerous articles in the philosophy of cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of mental representation, the philosophical implications of artificial intelligence, the character of common sense psychology, and the reliability of intuition-based analysis. He has also won several teaching awards at the University of Notre Dame including the Thomas P. Madden Award for Outstanding Teacher of First-Year Students (1999), the Kaneb Award for Excellence in Arts and Letters Teaching (2002), and the Charles Sheedy Award for Excellence in Teaching (2005). He was raised on a cattle ranch in Central

Oregon, and when not doing philosophy, can often be found dangling off of a cliff in some remote location.

Syllabus

PHIL 10100--Introduction to Philosophy

Course Description

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Course Objectives

- To introduce students to the central themes of philosophy
- To introduce students to important classical and contemporary philosophers
- To introduce students to the methods for doing philosophy
- To help students appreciate our own ignorance of even our most fundamental beliefs

Prerequisites

None

Textbooks

Required:

Davis, Thomas, *Philosophy: An Introduction Through Original Fiction, Discussion, and a Multi-Media CD-ROM*. 4th ed. New York, NY: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2004. ISBN: 0072831766.

Feinberg, Joel, and Russ Shafer-Landau, eds., *Reason and Responsibility*. 12th ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 0534543510. See [Calendar](#) for links to many of the readings from this text.

Recommended:

Martinich, A.P., *Philosophical Writing*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997. ISBN: 0631202811.

Other Reading

- Berkeley, George, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. Kessinger Publisher, 2005. ISBN: 1417972165. Text Available at [Berkeley: Three Dialogues I](#) and [Berkeley: Three Dialogues II](#).
- Cahn, Steven M., "Introduction: The Elements of Argument" in *Reason at Work*. 2nd ed. Steven M. Cahn, Patricia Kitcher, and George Sher, eds. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1990 (pp. 1-19). ISBN: 0155759914.
- Rachels, James, "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism" in *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 5th ed. McGraw Hill, 2005 (pp. 20-36). ISBN: 0073125474.

Grading

There is midterm exam (covering weeks 1-6) and a cumulative final exam.

Calendar

Week	Topic	Readings
1	Introduction to Philosophy Logic	Cahn, "The Elements of Argument"
Philosophy of Religion		
2	Ontological Argument	<p>Davis, "Surprise! It's Judgment Day" (Philosophy: An Introduction [PI] 66-74)</p> <p>Davis, "God and Suffering: Discussion" (Selections) (PI 74-75)</p> <p>Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, "Reason and Religious Belief: Introduction" (Reason and Responsibility [RR] 2-6)</p> <p>Anselm, "The Ontological Argument" from <i>Proslogion</i> (RR 6-7 or Anselm: Proslogion (Selections))</p> <p>Gaunilo, "On Behalf of the Fool" (RR 8-11 or Gaunilo: In Behalf of the Fool (Selections))</p> <p>Rowe, "The Ontological Argument" (RR 11-21)</p>
3	Cosmological Argument Teleological Argument	<p>Davis, "God and Suffering: Discussion" (Selections) (PI 75-79)</p> <p>Clarke, "A Modern Formulation of the Cosmological Argument" (RR 22-23)</p> <p>Rowe, "The Cosmological Argument" (RR 23-32)</p> <p>Paley, "The Argument from Design" (RR 32-37 or Paley: Natural Theology (Selections))</p>
4	Problem of Evil	<p>Davis, "God and Suffering: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 82-89)</p> <p>Johnson, "God and the Problem of Evil" (RR 85-89)</p> <p>Swinburne, "Why God Allows Evil" (RR 89-97)</p>
Mind and Freedom		
5	Philosophy of Mind	Davis, "Strange Behavior" (IP 151-157)

Davis, "The Nature of Mind: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 157-160)

Swinburne, "A Defense of Substance Dualism" (RR 263-267)

Carruthers, "The Mind Is the Brain" (RR 276-284)

Churchland, "Behaviorism, Materialism and Functionalism" (Selections) (RR 286-288)

6	Philosophy of Mind	Davis, "The Nature of Mind: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 160-171) Jackson, "The Qualia Problem" (RR 267-270) Davis, "Please Don't Tell Me How the Story Ends" (IP 1-11)
7	Freedom	Davis, "Freedom and Responsibility: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 18-28) Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, "Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility: Introduction" (RR 386-392) Holbach, "The Illusion of Free Will" (RR 392-397) Honderich, "A Defense of Hard Determinism" (Selections) (RR 397-401)
8	Freedom	Davis, "Freedom and Responsibility: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 29-32) Stace, "The Problem of Free Will" (RR 413-418)

Ethics

9	Relativism Divine Command Theory	Davis, "The Land of Certus" (IP 91-96) Davis, "Moral Principles: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 108-117) Rachels, "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism" Quinn, "God and Morality" (RR 564-578) Davis, "The Sheriff's Wife" (IP 100-106)
10	Utilitarianism	Davis, "Moral Principles: Discussion" (Selections) (IP 117-123) Mill, "Utilitarianism" (RR 594-607 or Mill: Utilitarianism (Selections))
11	The Ethics of Assistance	Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (RR 631-639) Rachels, "Ethical Egoism" (RR 488-495)

Epistemology

12	Descartes	Davis, "The Fantasy Machine" (IP 178-183)
		Davis, "Why Don't You Just Wake Up?" (IP 184-187)
13	Descartes Locke	Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" (Selections) (RR 145-153 or Descartes: Meditations I and II)
		Locke, "The Causal Theory of Perception" (RR 177-185 or Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Selections))
14	Berkeley	Berkeley, <i>Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous</i> (First Dialogue) See Berkeley: Three Dialogues I
15	Berkeley	Berkeley, <i>Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous</i> (Second Dialogue) See Berkeley: Three Dialogues II

Readings

Textbooks

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- Rachels, James, "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism" in *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. 5th ed. McGraw Hill, 2005 (pp. 20-36). ISBN: 0073125474.

• Lectures

Session	Title	Files
1	Course Introduction	Lecture 01 Note Lecture 01 Slide
2	Logic	Lecture 02 Note Lecture 02 Slide
3	Introduction to Philosophy of Religion; Ontological Argument	Lecture 03 Note Lecture 03 Slide
4	Ontological Argument--Objections and Replies	Lecture 04 Note Lecture 04 Slide
5	Cosmological Argument	Lecture 05 Note Lecture 05 Slide
6	Teleological Argument	Lecture 06 Note Lecture 06 Slide
7	The Problem of Evil	Lecture 07 Note Lecture 07 Slide
8	The Problem of Evil--Responses and Rebuttals	Lecture 08 Note Lecture 08 Slide
9	Introduction to Philosophy of Mind; Dualism	Lecture 09 Note Lecture 09 Slide
10	Problems with Dualism	Lecture 10 Note Lecture 10 Slide
11	Identity Theory	Lecture 11 Note Lecture 11 Slide
12	Jackson's Knowledge Argument	Lecture 12 Note Lecture 12 Slide
13	Introduction to Freedom; Hard Determinism	Lecture 13 Note Lecture 13 Slide
14	Replies to Hard Determinism	Lecture 14 Note Lecture 14 Slide
15	Compatibilism	Lecture 15 Note Lecture 15 Slide
16	Problems with Compatibilism	Lecture 16 Note Lecture 16 Slide
17	Introduction to Ethics; Relativism	Lecture 17 Note

		Lecture 17 Slide
18	Divine Command Theory	Lecture 18 Note Lecture 18 Slide
19	Utilitarianism	Lecture 19 Note Lecture 19 Slide
20	Problems with Utilitarianism	Lecture 20 Note Lecture 20 Slide
21	The Ethics of Assistance--Singer's Argument	Lecture 21 Note Lecture 21 Slide
22	The Ethics of Assistance--Evaluating Singer's Argument	Lecture 22 Note Lecture 22 Slide
23	Introduction to Epistemology; Descartes' Project	Lecture 23 Note Lecture 23 Slide
24	Descartes' Project Continued	Lecture 24 Note Lecture 24 Slide
25	The Enduring Problem of Perception	Lecture 25 Note Lecture 25 Slide
26	Locke's Project	Lecture 25 Note Lecture 26 Slide
27	Locke's Project Continued	Lecture 27 Note Lecture 27 Slide
28	Berkeley's Project	Lecture 25 Note Lecture 28 Slide
29	Berkeley's Project Continued	Lecture 29 Note Lecture 29 Slide

Lecture 01 Notes

Philosophy 101: Introduction To Philosophy
Spring 2005
Professor Ramsey

Course Objectives:

1. Introduction to Central Themes of Philosophy
 - a. Repository For Unanswered Questions
 - Is There A God?
 - What Makes An Action Right?
 - Do We Have Free Will?
 - How Do We Know What Is Real?

- b. Focus On Topics in Metaphysics, Ethics and Epistemology
 - c.
 - Metaphysics: The Study of the Nature of Reality
 - Ethics: The Study of Morality
 - Epistemology: The Study of Knowledge
- 2. Introduction to Important Philosophers
 - a. People vs. Issues
 - In this course, we will focus primarily on important issues in philosophy.
 - We will study important philosophers as their writings pertain to the issues we are studying.
 - Why? We Study Certain People Because Of What They Said About Important Issues; We Don't Study Certain Issues Because Important People Wrote About Them.
 - b. Classical vs. Contemporary Thinkers
 - In this course, we will study both classical and contemporary thinkers because both have made important contributions to the philosophical topics that we will address.
 - c. Analytic vs. Continental Philosophy
 - Analytic Philosophy--Breaks down a big problem into smaller, more manageable problems.
 - Continental Philosophy--Asks big questions, gives big answers.
 - In this course, the emphasis will be on philosophy in the Western Analytic Tradition rather than Continental or Eastern Philosophy.
- 3. Introduction to Doing Philosophy
 - a. Ideals of Good Reasoning
 - Clarity and Precision
 - Valid Arguments with Defensible Premises
 - Intellectual Integrity: Striving for truth rather than just winning the debate.
 - Note--None of these ideals come naturally. Oddly, students are rarely taught how to think and argue in an intellectually responsible manner. Much of what presented as "honest intellectual discussion" on TV is neither honest nor intellectual nor discussion.
 - b. Asking Hard and Dangerous Questions
 - Hard Because They Are About Things Taken For Granted
 - Dangerous Because We May Not Like The Answers
- 4. Appreciation of Our Own Ignorance
 - a. The Wisdom Of Socrates: "Wisdom Is Knowing What You Don't Know"
 - b. Will Learn to Critically Examine Many Things Taken for Granted

Lecture 02 Notes

Logic

Philosophical Method

1. Logic: A Calculus for Good Reason
2. Clarification, Not Obfuscation--In order to accomplish this goal, philosophers make distinctions and attempt to disambiguate concepts.
3. Examples and Counterexamples
 - a. Examples and Counterexamples are ways of engaging in hypothetical reasoning.
 - b. Examples and Counterexamples reveal our deepest convictions.
 - c. Examples and Counterexamples help us test our principles and definitions.

Logic: Primary Philosophical Tool

1. Logic Gives us Rules for Reasoning
2. Arguments and Their Parts

<p style="text-align: center;">Sample Argument</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ All humans are mortals. ○ Socrates is a human. ○ Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 	<p>d. Premises</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Premises are the assumptions of the argument; they are not established by the argument. ▪ In the Sample Argument, the first two lines are premises. <p>e. Sub and Main Conclusions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conclusions are supposedly established by the argument. ▪ Sub conclusions are conclusions that will later be used as premises to establish the main conclusion. ▪ In the Sample Argument, the third line is the main conclusion.
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Note--Relation Between Premises and Conclusion Is What Matters

- a. Logic is the study of this relation; it tells us which relations guarantee the truth of the conclusion if the premises are true.
- b. Logic is a calculus for generating new beliefs on the basis of old ones.

Types of Argument: Two Main Forms of Inference

1. Deductive Inference
 - a. Validity: If the Premises are True, the Conclusion Must Be True
 - b. Distinguishing Validity From Truth
 - Validity describes the relationship between premises; truth describes the relationship between a premise and the world.

- Arguments: Valid or Invalid; Not True or False
 - Premises: True or False; Not Valid or Invalid
 - Logicians care more about truth preservation than truth. That is, logicians are concerned with the validity of an argument not necessarily with the truth of the premises.
 - c. Soundness: Valid AND True Premises
 - d. Logical Schema
 - One can determine the validity of an argument even if one cannot determine whether or not the premises are true.
 - Symbolic Variables--Because the truth of the premises is irrelevant to validity, one can use variables to express the premises when one is examining argument forms for validity.
 - e. Some Common Deductive Forms:
 - Categorical Syllogism: (1) All As are Bs (2) x is an A (3) Therefore, x is a B
 - Modus Ponens: (1) If P, then Q (2) P (3) Therefore, Q
 - Modus Tollens: (1) If P, then Q (2) Not Q (4) Therefore, not P.
2. Non-Deductive Reasoning
- a. Inductive Inference
 - Probability: If the Premises are True, the Conclusion is Probably True
 - Inference to the Next Case (Ex. All of the Big Macs I have ever eaten have been good. Therefore, the next Big Mac I eat will be good.)
 - Universal Generalization (Ex. Every instance of copper encountered is a good conductor of electricity. Therefore, all copper conducts electricity well.)
 - b. Inference to the Best Explanation
 - Appealing to the best hypothesis.
 - Sherlock Holmes mysteries employ this type of reasoning.
- Fallacies
- Begging the Question--Presupposing the conclusion (often covertly) in your premises. (Ex. All forms of murder are wrong. Abortion is always murder; Therefore, abortion is always wrong!?? The second premise begs the question by just assuming the very thing that is debated in abortion controversies.)
 - a. Equivocation--Using the same word in two premises but using it in different ways. (Ex. All men are dogs. All dogs have four legs. Therefore, all men have four legs?!? Equivocates on "dog".)
 - b. Composition--Assuming that the whole has all of the features that the parts have. (Ex. A brick weighs 5 lbs. Therefore, the wall must weigh 5 lbs.?!? The wall does not necessarily have all of the features that its parts have.)

Lecture 03 Notes

Introduction to Philosophy of Religion and Ontological Argument

Philosophy of Religion: Preliminary Issues

1. Agreement vs. Tolerance
 - a. Agreement is not required for tolerance; people who have different beliefs can disagree while still tolerating one another.
 - b. Different religions ARE incompatible. There is genuine disagreement between religions.
 - c. Religious claims aren't true FOR individuals. There are objective truths about religious claims.
2. Reason and Faith
 - a. Unusual standards for belief. In most areas, we expect people to have objective reasons for their beliefs. But in the case of religion, we seem to think it is okay to hold religious beliefs without reasons (or objective reasons). For example, people sometimes say they are religious just because it gives their life meaning (and not because they have any evidence of God's existence).
 - b. Recent trends go against western tradition. For example, Aquinas offered arguments for Christian faith.
 - c. Classic Trinity of Arguments For Belief In God:
 - Ontological Argument
 - Cosmological Argument
 - Teleological Argument
- 3.
- 4.

The Ontological Argument: Background Concepts, Ideas, and Distinctions (Rowe's Analysis)

1. *A Priori* and *A Posteriori* Arguments
 - a. *A Priori* Arguments--Arguments with premises that are not based on what is observed. Mathematical proofs are a priori.
 - b. *A Posteriori* Arguments--Arguments with premises that are based on what is observed. Most scientific claims are a posteriori
2. Existing vs. Non-Existing Things
 - a. Example of An Existing Thing--Mount Everest
 - b. Example of A Non-Existing Thing--The Fountain of Youth
3. Possible vs. Impossible vs. Necessary Things
 - a. Possible Things--Things that either exist or could exist but do not (ex. unicorns)
 - b. Impossible Things--Things that could not exist (ex. round squares)
 - c. Necessary Things--Things that must exist (ex. God?, the universe?)

4. Existence in Reality vs. Existence in Understanding
 - a. Examples of Things with Existence in Reality--An undiscovered planet, George Bush
 - b. Examples of Things with Existence in the Understanding (the Mind)-- Sherlock Holmes, George Bush
 - c. Note--Some things exist only in reality and not in the understanding (e.g., the undiscovered planet). Some things exist only in the understanding and not in reality (e.g., Sherlock Holmes). Some things exist in both (e.g., Mt. Everest).
5. Perfections
 - a. Perfections--"Great-Making" Qualities; properties that make something better.
 - b. Key Idea for the Ontological Argument: Existence in Reality is a Perfection
6. "Reductio ad Absurdum" Argument
 - a. In a reductio ad absurdum argument, you assume the negation of the conclusion for the sake of argument.
 - b. Then you show that the negation of the conclusion leads to a contradiction, suggesting the negation of the conclusion is false.
7. Anselm's Definition of God
 - a. God: The Being Than Which No Greater is Possible
 - b. This definition of God has historical roots and is in keeping with Western theism.

The Ontological Argument

1. God Exists In The Understanding
 - a. This is the first premise.
 - b. Even atheists allow for this premise.
2. God Is A Possible Being
 - a. This is the second premise.
 - b. Even atheists allow for this premise.
3. If Something Exists Only In The Understanding And Could Have Existed In Reality, Then It Could Have Been Greater Than It Is
 - a. This is the third premise.
 - b. This is a natural assumption.
 - c. Date Example--Suppose that your roommate wants to set you up on a blind date. She describes the blind date as a handsome, intelligent, wealthy guy who spends his free time helping underprivileged children. On top of all of this, he is funny and friendly and has a great personality. The one catch is that he only exists in the understanding; he doesn't exist in reality. It is natural to assume that while this guy sounds pretty great, he would have been greater if he would have existed in reality as well as the understanding.
4. Suppose God Exists Only In The Understanding
 - a. Reductio Premise

- b. The reductio premise assumes the opposite of what Anselm is trying to show, namely, that God exists in reality as well as the understanding.
 - c. He will then show that given premises 1, 2, and 3, this reductio premise leads to a contradiction and therefore must be false.
- 5. Then God Might Have Been Greater Than He Actually Is (follows from 1, 2, 3, & 4)
- 6. God Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible (follows from 5)
- 7. The Being Than Which No Greater Is Possible Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible (follows from 6)
 - a. Restates 6 substituting Anselm's definition of God for 'God'
 - b. Key Point: This is a Contradiction
- 8. It Must Be False That God Exists Only In The Understanding
 - a. Rejection of 4 (The claim that God exists only in the understanding.)
 - b. If 1, 2, & 3 are obvious and 5, 6, 7 follow directly from prior premises, 4 must be wrong!!!
- 9. Therefore, God Exists In Reality As Well As Understanding (1 & 8)
 - a. Follows directly from 1 & 8
 - b. Establishes that God Really Exists!!!

Lecture 04 Notes

Ontological Argument - Objections and Replies

Review: The Ontological Argument

1. God Exists In The Understanding
2. God Is A Possible Being
3. If Something Exists Only In The Understanding And Could Have Existed In Reality, Then It Could Have Been Greater Than It Is
4. Suppose God Exists Only In The Understanding
5. Then God Might Have Been Greater Than He Actually Is
6. God Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible
7. The Being Than Which No Greater Is Possible Is A Being Than Which A Greater Is Possible
8. It Must Be False That God Exists Only In The Understanding
9. Therefore, God Exists In Reality As Well As Understanding

Objections to The Ontological Argument

1. Gaunilo's Objection
 - a. The Objection: The Argument is Too Strong
 - The same sort of argument could prove that "the x than which no greater is possible" exists for any x.
 - Ex. The Perfect Island = the island than which no greater is possible. If you substitute "The Perfect Island" for "God" and "the island than

which no greater is possible" for "the being than which no greater is possible" in the argument, you will have an argument for the existence of the perfect island. But, of course, no such island exists.

- b. First Reply: The Argument Concerns Only Things in General, Not Specific Things Like Islands
 - Response on Behalf of Gaunilo--This seems ad hoc. Why can't specific things have the argument applied to them?
 - c. Second Reply: Fully Perfect Island not Possible
 - This is an extension of the first reply. The reason the argument does not apply to specific things (like islands) is that, in being specific things they must lack perfections (e.g., omnipotence).
 - Response on Behalf of Gaunilo--But what about a semi-perfect island?!? Could the argument be used to prove that an island that has all of the perfections that specific things could have must exist?
 - Gaunilo's Response--Of course no island can be omnipotent. But the concept of a perfect island only includes the perfections that are appropriate to an island. Moreover, existence in reality is a perfection an island could have. Thus, Anselm's argument could still be used to prove that there must exist an island that has all of the perfections that are appropriate to an island.
2. Kant's Objection
 - a. The Objection: Existence is Not a Predicate
 - Attacks premise (3)--Premise (3) claims that having the property (predicate) of existence makes a being greater. But if existence isn't a property (predicate), then having it would not make a being greater.
 - Kant argues that existence is not a predicate because just by making a statement about something, we presuppose the thing to exist.
 - b. Reply: Many Statements Clearly Don't Presuppose Existence
 - Ex. A statement about a mythical being does not presuppose that the mythical being exists.
 3. Possibility Objection
 - a. The Objection: Anselm's God is Not Possible
 - Attacks premise (2).
 - Maybe beings are like integers--there is no greatest one.
 - b. Reply: Perhaps God is Like Angles, Not Integers
 - We can't say one way or the other.
 - Since we can't say one way or the other, we should be charitable to Anselm.
 4. Rowe's Objection
 - a. The Objection: We Must Distinguish Between Talking About Properties Which Make Up a Concept and Talking About Whether a Concept is Instantiated
 - b. Example: Magico vs. Magican
 - Magico = a non-existing magician
 - Magican = an existing magician

- Rowe notes that no non-existing thing will qualify as a magican. But that does not show that there are any magicans.
 - c. Crux Point: Anselm Shows That No Non-Existent Being Would Qualify as God; Not That God Actually Exists
 - In this way, the concept of God is like the concept of the magican; it includes existence.
 - But the fact that these concepts include existence does not prove that these concepts are instantiated.
- 5. Further Consideration--Is it really OK to view existence and non-existence as properties?
 - a. Metaphysical Worries About Rowe's Analysis
 - Rowe's Objection does allow for existence as a property; this seems questionable.
 - b. Use-Mention Errors
 - A use-mention error occurs when you confuse the representation (mention) with the thing represented (use).
 - Ex. (1) Boston has busy streets. (2) Boston has 6 letters. In (1), we use the word Boston; the word is intended to represent the city. In (2), we mention the word Boston; the subject of the sentence is the representation not what is represented.
 - Anselm's argument seems to use something like a use-mention error. When Anselm talks about God existing in the understanding, and God existing in reality, it looks like he is talking about God in both cases. But when talking about God in the understanding, we are really talking about our idea or concept of God -- our mental representation of God. So we wind up comparing two very different things.
 - c. Constructing a New Analysis With Proper Terminology (replacing "God in the understanding" with "a concept of God")
 - i. We have a concept of God.
 - ii. That concept could correspond to something real.
 - iii. If we have a concept of something that doesn't correspond to something real and could have, then that concept could have been greater than it is. (???)
 - iv. Suppose our concept of God doesn't correspond to something real. (reductio premise)
 - v. Then our concept of God might have been greater than it actually is. (i, ii, iii, & iv)
 - vi. Our concept of God is a concept than which a greater is possible. (v)
 - vii. Our concept of the being than which no greater is possible is a concept than which a greater is possible. (vi, def. of God--contradiction???)
 - viii. Our concept of God doesn't correspond to something real is false. (deny reductio premise???)
 - ix. Therefore, our concept of God corresponds with something real. (i & viii)

The New Analysis seems to have a false premise (iii) and the contradiction isn't clear in (vii).

Lecture 05 Notes

The Cosmological Argument: Background

1. Aquinas: 1225-1274; Clarke: 1675-1729
2. Sources of Explanations: Three Options
 - a. Explained by Other
 - b. Explained by Nothing
 - c. Explained by Self
3. Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR):
 - a. Individual things and events need an explanation.
 - b. Positive facts need an explanation.

The Cosmological Argument: First Version (Aquinas)

1. Things are moved/changed/caused by something else.
 - a. The causal series that Aquinas has in mind is not a temporal series. He is concerned with sustaining causes. For example, consider a chain with several links that is hanging from a hook. For any link in the chain, the immediate sustaining cause of its being suspended from the ground is the link immediately above it.
 - b. This premise assumes PSRa. Things require an explanation (i.e., a mover, a changer, or a cause).
 - c. Note--This premise rules out "nothing" as a source of explanation.
2. This cannot go on forever.
 - a. Problems with an infinite regress--it violates PSRb.
 - b. There would be no explanation for the positive fact that there is this infinite series of moving/changing/causing.
3. Therefore, there must be a first mover/changer/cause.
4. This is God.

The Cosmological Argument: Second Version (Clarke)

1. Every being is either dependent or self-existent.
 - a. Dependent Being = Explained by other
 - b. Self-existent Being = Explained by self
 - c. Note--This premise rules out "nothing" as a source of explanation.
 - d. This premise assumes PSRa. Things require an explanation (either self or other).
2. Not every being can be dependent.

- a. Problem with an infinite series of dependent beings--it violates PSRb.
- b. There would be no explanation for the positive fact that there is this infinite series of dependent beings.
3. Therefore, there must be a self-existent being.
4. This is God.

The Cosmological Argument: Objections and Replies

1. Attacks on First Version
 - a. Why must uncaused event be God?
 - Reply: Misunderstanding Point of Argument
 - The proponent of the argument does not think that he has given an argument for the full picture of God given by a particular religion.
 - However, he has given an argument for the existence of a being with one of the key features of the western conception of God, namely, first cause. Agreeing that there is such a being would be a major concession on the part of the atheist.
 - b. What's wrong with infinite regress, where individual events are explained by another, *ad infinitum*?
 - Reply: But What Explains the Series of Events? Appealing to the second part of PSR (PSRb), the proponent of the argument would note that the positive fact of the existence of an infinite series of events would be left unexplained if the series were in fact infinite.
2. Attacks on Second Version
 - a. Fallacy of Composition--Just because the members of set need explanation, the set itself does not.
 - This attack assumes the following reasoning behind premise 2--(1) Every being of the series of dependent beings needs an explanation. (2) The series itself must have every feature that its members have. (3) Therefore, the series itself must have an explanation. But this is to commit the fallacy of thinking that a set must have the same features as its parts.
 - Reply: Again, Second Part of PSR. This attack misunderstands the reasoning behind premise 2. The proponent of the argument thinks that the series itself needs an explanation because he holds to PSRb.
 - b. But why accept PSR???
 - Against PSR--It seems that there are brute facts; facts for which there is no explanation (e.g., the speed of light). But if there are brute facts, then PSR is false.
 - Defense of PSR--(1) Intuitive; (2) Presupposition of Reason--the very act of reasoning is the search for an explanation.
- c. Why doesn't PSR apply to God?
 - Reply: Appeal to Self-Existence. PSR does apply to God. God explains himself (appeal here to the Ontological argument?).

- Rebuttal: But What Explains the Positive Fact That God is Self-Explaining?!?

Lecture 06 Notes

The Teleological Argument: Background

1. Aquinas, Paley (1743-1805)
2. Teleology = Purpose; this is the argument for God's existence from the apparent purposefulness found in the universe.
3. Arguments by Analogy
 - a. Ex. Aspects of dogs are like cats. Dogs make good pets. Therefore cats make good pets.
 - b. What aspects of dogs are like cats? Dogs: 4 legs, tail, housebroken. Cats: 4 legs, tail, housebroken.
 - c. Note--Not all analogous features are relevant to the conclusion. In the above example, only the analogous feature *housebroken* is relevant to the *good pet* conclusion. Many four-legged creatures with tails wouldn't make good pets (e.g., tigers).

The Teleological Argument: Argument By Analogy

1. Aspects of natural world are like machines.
2. Machines are produced by intelligent design.
3. Therefore, aspects of natural world are produced by intelligent design (God).

Key Questions Regarding First Premise of Argument By Analogy

1. Which aspects of the natural world are like machines? Solar Systems? Organisms? Let's consider two analogies--One between the solar system and a machine, the other between an organism and a machine.
2. In what ways are these aspects of the natural world like machines? Machine: moving parts, regularity, teleology. Solar Systems: moving parts that behave with regularity. Organisms: moving parts, regularity and teleology.
3. Are all of these analogous features relevant to the conclusion? No.
 - a. Moving Parts? Some things that have moving parts are not necessarily produced by intelligent design (e.g., an avalanche).
 - b. Regularity? Some things that have regularity are not necessarily produced by intelligent design (e.g., a geyser).
 - c. Teleology! Things with parts that have a clear function do seem to be produced by intelligent design. It is this feature that machines and organisms seem to share that is relevant to the argument that all are produced by intelligent design.

4. The Focus on Functionality (Teleology)
 - a. Biological systems and organisms display regularity plus *teleology*. Organisms have internal parts and sub-systems with clear purposes (e.g., the eye, the circulatory system).
 - b. The Link Between Functionality and Design: Purposefulness Implies Intention

The Teleological Argument: Inference to Best Explanation

1. World contains many well-crafted machines with functional parts.
2. Best explanation for this is an intelligent craftsman/designer.
3. Therefore, there exists an intelligent craftsman/designer.
 - a. Garden Analogy--If we came across flowers planted in a row as opposed to randomly scattered across a field, we would infer that the best explanation for this is that the flowers were planted by a gardener.
 - b. Likewise, the best explanation for the functionality found in organisms is a designer.

The Teleological Argument: Objections and Replies

1. Hume's Criticism (Argument By Analogy)
 - a. Hume's criticism is found in [*Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*](#) (1779)
 - b. Hume notes that if we take the analogy seriously, it suggests an imperfect God. Machines break down and have certain flaws which suggest that they have an imperfect creator. Likewise, solar systems and organisms display certain flaws, and so this suggests that they have an imperfect creator.
2. Darwinian Criticism (Inference to Best Explanation)
 - a. Evolution provides an alternative explanation. There is apparent design, but this apparent design really emerges from random mutations and natural selection processes: Dawkins described nature as the "Blind Watchmaker".
 - b. Garden Analogy Revised--While at first it might seem that the best explanation for flowers in a row is to assume a gardener, we could discover that plants require a specific mineral to grow, and that for geological reasons this mineral shows up only in straight lines in the soil. We would then have a natural explanation for what once seemed to require intelligent design. Darwin provided a similar account of the teleology of organisms.
3. Teleology Resurrected: "Fine Tuning" Arguments About the Universe
 - a. The basic parameters of physics, like the gravitational constant, appear to require "fine-tuning" in order for the universe to be life-sustaining.
 - b. This suggests that the universe has teleology; certain basic parameters are deliberately tuned for the purpose of allowing intelligent life.

Lecture 07 Notes

The Argument Against Western Theism: Reason to Doubt that a Christian God Exists

1. Christianity assumes God is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and loves us.
2. Massive evil exists.
 - a. Moral Evil=Suffering caused by us (e.g., murder)
 - b. Natural Evil=Suffering caused by nature (e.g., hurricanes)
 - c. Both of these kinds of evil clearly exist.
3. God and evil are inconsistent.
 - a. Unpacking the Premise:
 - God would know about suffering (omniscient).
 - God could have prevented suffering (omnipotent).
 - God would want to prevent suffering (loving, perfectly good).
 - Therefore, it seems that the existence of God is inconsistent with the existence of suffering.
 - b. What sort of inconsistency?
 - Strong: Logical Inconsistency--It is not possible that God and evil coexist. (Problematic--It is difficult to support this strong of a claim.)
 - Weak: Evidential Inconsistency--It is not likely that God and evil coexist.
4. Therefore, either God or evil doesn't exist.
5. The existence of evil is indisputable.
 - a. Suffering of both forms clearly exists.
 - b. If we know anything, we know that evil exists.
6. Therefore, the God of Christianity does not exist.
 - a. Like the teleological argument *for* God, this argument is based on the nature of the world.
 - b. This is in contrast with the ontological argument which is based on a priori knowledge.

Lecture 08 Notes

Review: The Problem of Evil

1. Christianity assumes God is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and loves us.
2. Massive evil exists.
3. God and evil are inconsistent.
4. Therefore, either God or evil doesn't exist.
5. The existence of evil is indisputable.
6. Therefore, the God of Christianity does not exist.

First Response: Challenge Premises 2 & 5

1. Response--One can deny that suffering is real.
2. Rebuttal
 - a. Makes God a Deceiver--It sure seems like suffering is real so if it turns out that it isn't real, then God is deceiving us into thinking that it is real.
 - b. Hard to Take Seriously

Second Response: Challenge Premise 3 (Note: Except for the Parent Analogy, all of these are called "Theodicies" -- i.e., making sense of suffering in a world created by a Christian God)

1. Parent Analogy
 - a. Response--Suffering is for reasons we don't understand.
 - Just as a child might not understand the suffering a parent allows when she gets immunizations, we do not understand why God allows us to suffer.
 - Note: Doesn't Explain Suffering; Just Suggests How Suffering May Be Consistent With God's Existence
 - b. Rebuttals
 - Bad Analogy; Parents Aren't Omnipotent. They are limited in what means they can use to bring about certain ends. God is not so limited. It seems that he could bring about the ends that he desires through painless means.
 - Double Standards--If good events reflect God's nature, then why don't bad events?
2. Counterpart Theory
 - a. Response--Just as tallness can't exist without shortness, happiness can't exist without suffering.
 - Note--The issue is metaphysical, not epistemological. The claim is not that we cannot *know* happiness without suffering; the claim is that there cannot *be* happiness without suffering.
 - b. Rebuttals
 - This response suggests that suffering and happiness are related in a way that makes the status of one dependent upon the status of the other. But this doesn't seem right. Instead, the two seem to be mutually independent psychological states the status of which is determined by other facts. For example, to be generally happy, one needn't also experience chronic depression at some point. It seems perfectly intelligible to conceive of a world in which everyone is generally happy -- as is suggested by certain depictions of heaven. People might be less inclined to appreciate their happiness, but that would still be a better world than one with massive suffering.
 - Even if suffering is context dependent, only a small amount of suffering would be needed. If suffering is required for there to be happiness, it seems a small amount of suffering would do the trick. Surely much of the suffering we see and experience is gratuitous. If

suffering is only required so that we will appreciate not suffering, then, again, it seems a small amount of suffering would suffice.

3. Virtue Defense

a. The Response--Virtues like sympathy, compassion, and forgiveness all require suffering. God wanted virtues. So suffering must be permitted.

b. Rebuttals

- Virtues are not good in themselves; they are only good because they allow us to *cope* with suffering. It is wrong to allow suffering so people can exhibit compassion. Virtues are like chemotherapy; chemotherapy is good in that it alleviates suffering by curing some cancers but it would be better to not have cancer and thus not have chemotherapy.
- Virtues are counter-balanced by vices. Suppose this response suffices to explain why God allows first order evil (suffering), namely, so that we might develop second order virtues. This does not explain why he allows second order evils (vices) such as malevolence, cruelty, and cowardice.

4. Free Will Defense

a. The Response

- (1) Not possible for humans to be free and incapable of doing moral evil.
- (2) A world in which we are free is better than one in which we are restricted.
- (3) God creates the best possible world.
- (4) Therefore, God created a world in which people sometimes do moral evil.

b. Rebuttals

- What about natural evil? The free will defense only accounts for evils that stem from free human choices.
- Challenge (1): We Already Live With Restrictions But Still Consider Ourselves Free. For example, we cannot fly but this fact does not incline us to think that we are not free. So it seems that God could have restricted us by making us incapable of doing moral evil and we could still consider ourselves free.
- Challenge (2): Why Not Sacrifice Some Freedom For Less Suffering? Look at our normal views of justice--We often imprison someone (restrict his freedom) in order to minimize suffering if we think he might cause more suffering.
- Challenge Validity of the Argument: The Capacity To Do Moral Evil Needn't Lead to Actual Moral Evil. Why not a world with better characters who freely choose not to harm others?

c. Rebuttals to Rebuttals

- Rebuttal to Natural Evil--We suffer from natural evil because we freely choose not to avoid dangers. For example, we choose to live in places that hurricanes commonly strike.

- Rebuttal to Challenge to (1)--What sort of freedom matters? It seems like the freedom to choose between good and evil, right and wrong is one of the most important freedoms. This is in contrast with the freedom to fly.
- Rebuttal to Challenge to (2)--Many reject morality of preventative restriction. Consider the movie *Minority Report*. In this movie, people are put into jail for crimes that they would have committed. This sort of restriction strikes many people as wrong, even if it prevents suffering.
- Rebuttal to Challenge to Validity of the Argument--Creating a world with better characters may not be the best world. Some have suggested that evil plays a role in "making our souls"; making us into the sort of people that God wants us to be. So a world in which everyone freely choose good would lack the evil required for soul-making. The process of us making ourselves into better creatures is more important than the end result of a world with no suffering.

Freedom Problems in Christianity

1. Foreknowledge and the Problem of Freedom--On the surface, God's foreknowledge appears to preclude human freedom.
 - a. God knew eons ago about all of our actions.
 - b. We cannot change the past.
 - c. We cannot make God wrong.
 - d. So, we can't do other than what God has always known that we will do.
2. Reply: Taking God Outside of Time

Lecture 09 Notes

The Mind-Body Problem

1. An Inconsistent Tetrad
 - a. Mind is non-material (spiritual).
 - b. Body is material (physical).
 - c. Mind and body interact.
 - d. Material and non-material do not interact.
2. Possible Solutions: Dualism and the Varieties of Materialism

Two Types of Dualism

1. First Type: Substance Dualism: 2 Kinds
 - a. Interactionism (Descartes, Popular View)
 - Mind and body are made up of different kinds of stuff.

- The mind is made up of thinking stuff (immaterial) and the body is made up of extended stuff (material).
 - Mind and body interact. Big Problem: How???
 - b. Parallelism (Leibniz)
 - Mind and body are made up of different kinds of stuff.
 - The mind is made up of thinking stuff (immaterial) and the body is made up of extended stuff (material).
 - Mind and body do not interact but are on a parallel course. The appearance of interaction is just a pre-established harmony that God orchestrates.
- 2. Second Type: Property Dualism
 - a. Certain mental states have "irreducible properties"; as a result, certain mental states cannot be reduced to physical states.
 - Reducibility vs. Irreducibility--Reduction does not mean making something smaller. A is reducible to B means either A is identical to B or A can be entirely explained in terms of B.
 - Reducibility--Something materialists (physicalists) claim about the nature of mental states. It says mental states are in some sense identical to brain states. It provides support for materialism.
 - Irreducibility--Something dualists claim about the nature of mental states. It says mental states do not equal brain states because of one or more of the special features. It provides support for dualism.
 - b. What sorts of properties are thought to be irreducible?
 - Qualitative Properties: Raw Feels. Qualia states such as pains, tickles, etc. have qualitative properties and thus are thought to be irreducible to physical states.
 - Intentional: Aboutness, Truth and Falsehood. Propositional attitude states such as beliefs, desires, etc. have intentionality and truth and falsity and thus are thought to be irreducible to physical states.
 - c. Deep Worry: Epiphenomenalism
 - Epiphenomenalism--A radical view about the causal role of mental states. It says they do absolutely nothing. It is a consequence of property dualism.
 - This is a deep worry because it seems obvious that our qualia states and our propositional attitude states do have influence on our physical states. Ex. The pain in my leg causes me to shout "Ouch!"

Lecture 10 Notes

Review: Dualism

1. Dualism--The mind is made up of thinking stuff (immaterial) and the body is made up of extended stuff (material).
2. Two Types:
 - a. Substance Dualism--Mind and body interact.
 - b. Property Dualism--Mind and body do not interact. Mental states are epiphenomenal.

Problems with Dualism

1. Neurological Dependency of the Mental Undermines Substance Dualism
 - a. If substance dualism is true, then drugs and brain disorders should not undermine mental capacities. But they do!
 - b. This is a reason for being a property dualist as opposed to a substance dualist.
2. No Sign of Non-Physical Causation
 - a. If substance dualism is true, then the immaterial mind is causing events in the physical world, presumably in the brain. Thus, one should expect to find causal gaps in the causal series in the brain.
 - b. There are no known causal gaps in the causal series in the brain.
 - c. This is another reason for being a property dualist as opposed to a substance dualist.
3. Crazyness of Epiphenomenalism
 - a. It seems obvious that our mental states do have influence on our physical states.
 - b. Ex. The pain in my leg causes me to shout "Ouch!"
4. New Respect for Matter in Age of Computers
5. Explanatory Weakness of Dualism--Dualism is in no better position than materialism with respect to explaining aspects of the mind like intentionality and consciousness.
6. Problem of Other Minds--If the mind is immaterial, it is impossible to know if there are any other minds besides your own.

Lecture 11 Notes

Type-Identity Theory (Basic Materialism)

1. Background
 - a. Key Question: What Makes Something a Mental State?
 - b. Reductionism in Science
 - Example: Water Is H₂O
 - c. Core Assumption: To Discover the Essence of Something, We Focus Upon Its Physical Composition

2. Central Claim: Mental States are Defined By Virtue of Their Underlying Neurological Make-Up. In Short, Types of Mental States are Simply Types of Brain States.
3. Virtues
 - a. No interaction problem.
 - b. No deep worries about other minds.
 - c. Makes psychology part of the natural sciences. This has evolutionary and developmental plausibility.

Problems with Identity Theory

1. Appeals to Leibniz's Law
 - a. Minds and brains seem to have different properties. Ex. Mind is non-spatial. Brain is spatial.
 - b. Replies
 - Question-begging; assumes the mind is non-spatial which is just what the argument is trying to prove.
 - Look at Historical Analogues--Other reductions have occurred when at first it appeared that they had different properties. Ex. Light can be reduced to electromagnetic waves.
2. Material Chauvinism
 - a. Martian Thought Experiment--If identity theory is true, pain is identical to a type of brain state in a carbon based organism. Suppose that there are martians made of silicon. According to identity theory, it would be impossible for them to be in pain because they are not carbon based. But it seems reasonable to think that there is nothing special about being carbon based that makes humans capable of experiencing pain.
 - b. Brain Transplant Thought Experiment--If identity theory is true, pain is identical to a type of brain state in a carbon based organism. Suppose that we develop a synthetic brain material to replace the brain material that is in the human brain. According to identity theory, it would be impossible for this synthetic brain material to be in the brain state pain because it is not carbon based. But it seems reasonable to think that we could still be in pain even with the synthetic brain material.
 - c. These thought experiments show that the stuff your brain is made of is not what is required to have a mental life so identity must be false.
 - d. Reply: Functionalist Materialism. According to functionalist materialism, mental states are identical to functional roles. For example, pain is whatever causes me to shout "Ouch!" when I touch a hot stove. Now pain is not identified with the stuff that your brain is made of.

Lecture 12 Notes

The Knowledge Argument

1. Mary knows all physical facts about color vision.
 - a. Suppose that Mary is a brilliant neuro-scientist who has learned everything that goes on in the brain when color vision occurs. She knows all of the physical facts about color vision.
 - b. Moreover, Mary has been colorblind since birth. But, of course, she could still learn what happens in the brain when color vision occurs even if she doesn't see color.
2. Mary does not know all facts about color vision.
 - a. Demonstrated by Mary's learning when seeing red.
 - b. It seems that if Mary's colorblindness were corrected, she would learn something new about the color red when she saw it for the first time, namely, what it is like to see red.
3. Therefore, some facts about color vision are left out of the physical account
4. Therefore, some aspects of color vision (and other qualia) are non-physical.

The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism

1. Jackson thinks that his argument is good support for epiphenomenalism.
2. Why epiphenomenalism?
 - a. Jackson's argument concludes that there are non-physical aspects of color vision.
 - b. But there is causal closure in the physical world. There is no evidence of gaps in neurological processing. It seems like some gaps should occur if there are non-physical causal agents.
 - c. Therefore, the non-physical aspects of color vision are causally powerless. This is epiphenomenalism.
3. Apparent Problem with Epiphenomenalism can be Handled
 - a. The Apparent Problem--Given evolution, only features that are conducive to survival are selected. If epiphenomenalism is true, the non-physical aspects of color vision and other qualia do nothing. So how is it that these non-physical aspects survive natural selection?
 - b. Reply:
 - The apparent causal role of qualia is simply that: apparent. Qualia come about as a consequence of something else that is necessary for survival.
 - Evolution need only select for brain states. The non-physical mental states that are given off are extra.

Problems with the Knowledge Argument

1. Argument Also Works Against Dualism
 - a. Mary knows all non-physical facts about color vision.
 - Suppose that Mary is a brilliant student of all things "soulish." She has learned everything that goes on in the soul (immaterial part)

- when color vision occurs. She knows all of the non-physical facts about color vision.
- Moreover, Mary has been colorblind since birth. But, of course, she could still learn what happens in the soul when color vision occurs even if she doesn't see color.
- b. Mary does not know all facts about color vision.
 - Demonstrated by Mary's learning when seeing red.
 - It seems that if Mary's colorblindness were corrected, she would learn something new about the color red when she saw it for the first time, namely, what it is like to see red.
 - c. Therefore, some facts about color vision are left out of non-physical account
 - d. Therefore, some aspects of color vision (and other qualia) are physical.
2. Fallacy of Equivocation: Two Senses of "Know"
 - a. Knowledge by Description (Discursive)
 - We gain knowledge by description of x by learning the features of x.
 - This is the sort of knowledge referred to in the first premise.
 - b. Knowledge by Acquaintance (Non-Discursive)
 - We gain knowledge by acquaintance of x by experiencing x.
 - This is the sort of knowledge referred to in the second premise.
 - c. Since "know" is used differently in premises one and two, the argument is invalid.

Lecture 13 Notes

Introduction: Freedom and Determinism

1. There seems to be a clash between a modern account of thought on the one hand, and free will, human agency and moral responsibility on the other.
2. We will set out the problem and some proposed solutions by considering the argument for hard determinism.

The Argument for Hard Determinism

1. Premise 1: Universe Governed by Deterministic Laws
 - a. Matter obeys causal regularity and laws.
 - b. There are no uncaused events.
 - c. There is the potential for exact predictability. Imagine a demon (Laplace's Demon) or a super-computer that knows the complete state of the matter in the universe and all of the laws that govern matter. On the basis of this information, it could predict every future event.

- d. Note: We Should Be Thankful That the Universe is Deterministic In This Way. We could not function in a world that did not allow for some degree of predictability.
 2. Premise 2: We are *Part* of this Deterministic Universe
 - a. Plausibility of Physicalism
 - According to Physicalism, Mental Processes = Brain Processes. Recall the arguments against dualism.
 - There is no evidence of neurological anomalies; the brain is governed by the laws of physics. (In other words, there are no neurological gaps as would be expected on dualism.)
 - b. Note: Even Property Dualisms Admit That Behavior is Governed Solely By the Brain!
3. Conclusion 1: Therefore, Human Actions are Determined.
 - a. If the universe is governed by deterministic laws and we are part of the universe, then we are governed by deterministic laws.
 - b. Importantly, our brain is governed by deterministic laws and human action is determined by brain activity.
 - c. Brain activity is governed by interaction of genetic endowment, environmental stimuli (prior and current), and the laws of physics and chemistry. All of these process are deterministic.
 - d. The Brain is an Organic Computer
 - The brain is governed by complex but determined programs.
 - The programs have potential for manipulation. Consider the [SpheX Wasp](#). The SpheX Wasp exhibits behavior that looks complicated but isn't. It kills its prey (a grasshopper), takes the grasshopper to the edge of its hole, checks the hole, then enters with the grasshopper. This appears to be sophisticated behavior but the SpheX Wasp is really just following a program. If you move the grasshopper away while the SpheX Wasp is checking the hole, it will drag the grasshopper back and check again. It just follows a program. In the same way, we are SpheXish though we follow more complex programs.
 - e. Note: Determinism is Not the Same As Fatalism
 - Determinism=There is one path from x to n: x causes y which causes z which causes n.
 - Fatalism=There are many paths from x to the fated event n: x could go via y and z to n, or via a and b to n, or via c and d to n, etc.
4. Conclusion 2: Therefore, We Aren't Really Free.
 - a. According to Hard Determinism, freedom requires the ability to do otherwise (given certain background conditions).
 - b. We lack the ability to do otherwise (because we are determined--see conclusion 1).
 - c. Therefore, we aren't free. Freedom is an illusion (like a train that thinks it "chooses" to go down a certain path.)
5. Conclusion 3: Therefore, We Don't Have Moral Responsibility
 - a. Ought Implies Can

- To say that you ought to do otherwise, we must assume that you can do otherwise.
 - Determinism denies that you can do otherwise. (See Conclusion 2)
 - Therefore, it is wrong to say that you ought to do otherwise.
- b. Responsibility Requires Freedom
- Comparing Different Cases: Psychopath vs. Stroke Victim
 - Suppose that a car swerves to hit children waiting for a bus. If it swerves because the driver is a psychopath and wants to harm children, then we hold him morally responsible because he was free to do otherwise. If it swerves because the driver has a stroke, then we do not hold him morally responsible because he was not free to do otherwise.

Lecture 14 Notes

Review: The Argument for Hard Determinism

1. The universe is governed by deterministic laws.
2. We are part of this deterministic universe.
3. Conclusion 1: Human actions are determined.
4. Conclusion 2: We aren't really free.
5. Conclusion 3: We don't have moral responsibility.

Replies to Hard Determinism: Two Main Strategies

1. Deny Determinism by Appealing to Quantum Indeterminacy (Deny Premise 1)
 - a. Quantum Indeterminism
 - According to quantum indeterminism, there are spontaneous events at the quantum level.
 - These events are governed by probabilistic laws, not deterministic laws.
 - b. Responses
 - Appeal to Hidden Variables--While these events appear indeterministic, there may be variables that we do not yet know about that determine the events.
 - Quantum Indeterminism is Irrelevant For Us--Indeterminism on the micro level does not appear on the macro level. Human actions are on the macro level.
 - Is Randomness What We Want for Freedom??? How will being spastic help? If our actions are indeterministic, then they are random. But the sort of freedom that we are interested in is one in which the agent has control over her actions.

2. Deny Determinism and Freedom are Really Incompatible (Deny that Conclusion 2 follows from Conclusion 1)
 - a. This view is called Compatibilism (Soft Determinism).
 - b. The compatibilist rethinks freedom. Freedom is not the ability to do otherwise; freedom is the ability to do what one wants.
 - c. See next lecture for more on compatibilism.

Re-conceptualizing the Problem

1. Initially, the problem seemed to stem from materialism assumption.
 - a. The Problem: We are not free and, hence, not morally responsible.
 - b. The argument for this employs a materialist premise: We are part of this deterministic universe.
2. But now, whether you are a materialist or a dualist, it seems we only have two choices:
 - a. Thought processes are causally determined.
 - b. Thought processes are random.
3. Apparently, neither gives us freedom!!! (In other words, neither gives us control over our actions.)
4. A Libertarian Solution? The challenge for the libertarian is to provide an account of indeterminism without randomness.

Lecture 15 Notes

Introduction to Compatibilism

1. Competing Accounts of Freedom
 - a. Metaphysical Freedom (Hard Determinist's View): Freedom At Least Requires the Ability To Do Otherwise
 - b. Moral Freedom (Compatibilist's View): Freedom Only Requires the Ability To Do What You Want
2. Key Point: Debate Between HD and Compatibilism is NOT Over Whether or Not We are Determined (Both Theories are Deterministic). It is Over the Correct Analysis of Freedom!

Arguments for Compatibilism

1. How can we act differently from what we want?
2. The ability to do otherwise would never be utilized.
 - a. The hard determinist's analysis of freedom suggests it would be irrelevant to our lives. If we had the ability to do what we want, we would never use the ability to do otherwise.

- b. The Twin-Earth Scenario--Suppose that there are two earths. On one earth, we have the ability to do what we want. On the other earth, we have the ability to do otherwise. There will be no difference in the course of events between the two earths because we will always do what we want to do even if we could have done something else.
- 3. Hume: Freedom Requires Determinism. The alternative appears to be loss of control.

Lecture 16 Notes

Review: Compatibilism

- 1. Freedom and determinism are compatible. We are both free and determined.
- 2. Freedom = Moral Freedom (the ability to do what you want).

Problems with Compatibilism

- 1. Strategy for Challenging Compatibilism--Attack the idea that doing what you want is sufficient for freedom by giving cases where a person is doing what she wants but intuitively isn't free. In other words, give counterexamples to the compatibilist's account of freedom.
- 2. Type 1 Counterexamples: Manipulative Neuroscientist/Hypnotist/Brainwasher
 - a. Suppose that there is a manipulative neuroscientist that gives you the desire to cheat on an exam. If you were to then cheat on the exam, you might be acting according to your desire but you would not be free since you had no control over what you desire.
 - b. [Patty Hearst Case](#)--Patty Hearst was abducted and brainwashed. She was later found in the act of robbery; an action that she would not have done prior to being brainwashed. But, presumably, at the time she desired to commit this act of robbery. So, again, we have an example of an action that is in accord with an agent's desires but we would not consider it free.
- 3. Type 2 Counterexamples (Locke's Room Example)
 - a. Being Free vs. Being Lucky--The compatibilist account of freedom seems to mistake being lucky for being free in cases where you are compelled to do something that you luckily want to do.
 - b. Ex. Imagine that a Notre Dame sports fan and a Michigan sports fan are going out one night. They find themselves in a bar filled with Notre Dame fans watching classic Notre Dame victories over Michigan. The Notre Dame fan desires to stay; what could be better than watching the Irish beat the Wolverines?!? The Michigan fan desires to leave but finds that he is locked in the bar. So according to the compatibilist's account of freedom, the Notre Dame fan is free (he has the ability to do what he wants), but the Michigan fan is not (he lacks the ability to do what he wants). But this is

absurd--wouldn't we want to say that neither of them is free, the Notre Dame fan is just luckier than the Michigan fan?

4. Key Point: We Can Do What We Want and Not Be Free!

The Hard Determinism vs. Compatibilism Debate

1. Hard Determinist: Free acts require the ability to do otherwise; we don't have that, so we aren't free.
2. Compatibilist: No, your analysis of freedom is mistaken; freedom only requires that we do what we want. We often do this, so we are free.
3. Hard Determinist: No, YOUR analysis of freedom is mistaken since there are cases where people do what they want, but clearly are not free (i.e., brainwashing, etc.)
4. Compatibilist: Wait, those cases don't count as counterexamples to our analysis of freedom since in those cases, the person isn't really acting on her own wants; instead, the wants have been installed by outside forces.
5. Hard Determinist: Oh yea? Well, if determinism is true, everyone's wants and beliefs are installed by outside forces--what's the relevant difference between brain-washing and ordinary childhood?
6. Compatibilist: Oh yea? Well, your mother...

Lecture 17 Notes

Introduction to Ethics

1. The Importance of Careful Reasoning with Respect to Ethics--The consequences of bad ethical thought can be severe because of what is at stake in many ethical questions (e.g., abortion, euthanasia).
2. Two Critical Questions:
 - a. What is the scope of ethical principles? Is some form of relativism correct, or do ethical principles apply universally?
 - b. What is the justification for ethical principles? What ultimately makes an act right or wrong?
3. Important Distinctions To Bear in Mind:
 - a. Morally Permissible vs. Morally Forbidden vs. Morally Obligatory--A morally permissible act is an act that it is permissible to perform or not to perform. A morally forbidden act is an act that it is not permissible to perform. A morally obligatory act is an act that it is not permissible not to perform.
 - b. Legal vs. Moral--Some actions are legal but not moral (e.g., lying to your spouse); some actions are moral but not legal (e.g., the underground railroad).
 - c. Particular Moral Judgments vs. General Moral Principles--Some particular moral judgments are difficult to generalize into moral principles. For

example, suppose that you break your roommate's computer. You might think that it is immoral to lie to her about it. But you probably wouldn't want to affirm the general moral principle that all lying is immoral. Suppose your roommate has a stalker who comes to the door and asks for her whereabouts. Though you know she is hiding in the closet, lying might be the moral course of action in this case.

Moral Objectivism vs. Moral Subjectivism

1. Definitions
 - a. Objectivism=The moral status of an action is completely objective; conflicting views cannot all be right.
 - Morality is not dependent upon attitudes, preferences, or culture.
 - Moral claims are true or false in the same sense as scientific claims.
 - b. Subjectivism=The moral status of an action is not completely objective; conflicting views can all be right.
 - Morality depends on attitudes, preferences, or culture.
 - Moral claims are true or false in the same sense in which fashion claims are true or false.
2. A Popular Form of Subjectivism: Cultural Relativism--the morality of an action depends on the culture in which you live.
3. The Cultural Differences Argument
 - a. Different cultures have different moral codes.
 - Appeal to famous cases (Ex. Certain Eskimo cultures practice [infanticide](#).)
 - b. Therefore, there are no objective, universal, culturally independent facts or considerations which determine the truth or falsehood of different moral claims.
4. Problems with the Cultural Differences Argument
 - a. Extreme Consequences of Relativism
 - Can't justify criticizing other societies
 - Can't justify criticizing aspects of our own society
 - No such thing as cultural progress
 - Sometimes used in a self-refuting manner--It is immoral to believe that there are objective moral truths. But is that an objective moral truth?!?
 - b. Argument is Invalid--The premise does not guarantee the conclusion. It is consistent with the premise to conclude that there are objective moral truths and some cultures are just wrong.
 - c. Rethinking the First Premise
 - All cultures share in common certain moral rules that are necessary conditions for societies (e.g., indiscriminate killing is wrong, some forms of dishonesty are wrong). Moreover, some cultural differences are merely biases as opposed to moral rules (e.g.,

manners, dress codes). The question is: Are there objective truths about issues that are clearly moral (as opposed to biases) but are not necessary conditions for society (e.g., slavery is wrong, racism is wrong, etc.)?

- Even Eskimo infanticide wasn't indiscriminate killing. The Eskimos let female babies die because there was a food shortage and the female babies would not contribute to hunting and gathering food.

Lecture 18 Notes

Divine Command Theory

1. Divine Command Theory is an attempt to ground morality through theological considerations.
2. Definitions:
 - a. An act is right if and only if God permits it.
 - b. An act is wrong if and only if God forbids it.

Problems with Divine Command Theory

1. Practical Problem
 - a. The Problem--Whose interpretation of God?
 - b. Reply--The defining feature of morality need not be easy to discern. Just because it is hard to figure out whose interpretation of God is correct, it doesn't mean that God's commands aren't in fact what define morality.
2. Plato's Dilemma
 - a. Is an act right (wrong) because God allows (forbids) it, or does God allow (forbid) it because it is right (wrong)?
 - b. Note--The divine command theorist would agree with the former.
 - c. If the former, then...
 - Arbitrariness--God could have commanded anything and it would have been good (e.g., God could have commanded us to torture innocent children, in which case it would have been good to torture innocent children.)
 - God's own Goodness is Uninteresting--(1) God is good = God commands what is morally good. (2) Morally good = what God commands. (3) Therefore, God is good = God commands what God commands. This is an uninteresting analysis of God's goodness. Consider a tyrant analogy: Suppose that we define legal as doing what the tyrant says. It would be a weak defense of the tyrant's actions to say that he always does what is legal. Likewise, it is not too impressive to say that God is good if goodness is doing what God says.

- d. If the latter, then...
 - Morality is not based upon God's commands (i.e., Divine Command Theory is false).
 - Note: Other Properties of God Also Admit Independent Analyses (e.g., omnipotence is not being able to do what God can do).
- 3. Quinn's Rebuttal
 - a. God's commands are not fully arbitrary. He is contrained by *divine goodness* which is a part of his nature.
 - Reply: Does This Fully Remove Arbitrariness? It looks like God's nature is now arbitrary.
 - b. Divine command theorists *should* allow counter-intuitive cases. (Historical Examples--God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son. God commands Hosea to take a harlot for his wife.)

Lecture 19 Notes

Background

1. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
2. From Philosophy Prodigy to Burnout--Mill was an excellent philosopher and student at a very young age, but he also tired of his studies at a young age.

Formulation of the Doctrine

1. Mill's Formulation--"Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness."
2. Key Point: Emphasis Upon *Consequences* of Actions
3. Questions about Mill's Definition
 - a. "Tend to Produce Happiness"
 - "Tend to Produce" or Produce"? If an action tends to produce happiness but in a particular case does not in fact produce happiness, is the action moral in that case?
 - Which things produced really count? For example, how far into the future do we count things that are produced by our actions?
 - What is meant by "happiness"?
 - Whose happiness?
 - Can we measure happiness?
 - b. Introducing a Notion of Utility
 - This is an attempt to make Mill's doctrine more sophisticated.
 - Hedons are units of happiness.
 - Dolars are units of unhappiness.
 - Utility = Hedons - Dolars
 - c. Note: Total Utility is What Matters. So...

- Moral acts can sometimes produce pain (but overall they produce less pain than other options).
- Immoral acts can sometimes produce pleasure (but overall they produce less pleasure than other options).

Revised Formulation

1. An act is right if and only if there is no other act the agent could have performed that has higher utility.
2. Virtues
 - a. Captures common sense views of morality. For the most part, the actions that we consider right will be right on this formulation and the actions that we consider wrong will be wrong on this formulation.
 - b. Grounds morality in something objective. It tries to derive an "ought" from an "is" (i.e., we ought to do that which performs the highest utility).

Lecture 20 Notes

Review: Utilitarianism

1. The Doctrine--An act is right if and only if there is no other act the agent could have performed that has higher utility.
2. Utility = Units of happiness caused by an action minus units of unhappiness caused by an action.

The "Doctrine of Swine" Objection

1. The Objection
 - a. If utilitarianism is correct, then the only relevant moral consideration is the amount of pleasure.
 - b. It is false that the only relevant moral consideration is the amount of pleasure.
 - Ex. Suppose that one inherits \$100,000. One could go spend it on great food, a new car, and an expensive wardrobe. Or one could spend it on great works of philosophy and literature and take a year off of work to study. The former would certainly bring one more pleasure but it isn't obvious that extravagant spending is the moral choice.
 - c. Therefore, utilitarianism is false.
2. Mill's Response
 - a. Introduce a quality variable to pleasure.
 - b. Pleasure has three dimensions: duration, intensity, and quality. So when we are measuring the pleasure produced by an action, we not only look at

the duration of the pleasure or the intensity of the pleasure but also the quality of the pleasure. It may be that studying brings us less intense pleasures than spending but they are longer in duration and higher in quality.

- c. Adding the quality dimension to pleasure differentiates the pleasures that are relevant to the morality of our actions from the pleasures of the swine.

The "Too High of Standard" Objection

1. The Objection

- a. If utilitarianism is correct, then an act is right only if stems from a motive to promote the best interests of society.
- b. It is false that right acts must all stem from such a motive.
- c. Therefore, utilitarianism is false.

2. Mill's Response

- a. Premise a is false; according to utilitarianism, motives are irrelevant to the morality of an action. The only thing that is relevant is maximizing utility.
- b. If we take consequentialism (the view that the morality of an action depends on the consequences of that action) seriously, then the morality of an action has to do with fulfilling our duty to maximize utility as opposed to having good motives to maximize utility. For example, suppose that a doctor goes to a third world country because he wants to help fight disease A. However, while he is there he unintentionally spreads a much worse disease, disease B. According to utilitarianism, his good motive (wanting to help fight disease A) does not make his action moral as he failed to accomplish his duty (maximizing utility).

Further Difficulties

1. The Objections

- a. Harming the Innocent--If utilitarianism is true, then it is sometimes moral to harm the innocent just in case doing so maximizes overall utility.
 - Possible Reply--The "Rawlsian" Alternative and the Moral Point of View--This incorporates a notion of justice in addition to utilitarianism.
- b. Trivial Acts--If utilitarianism is true, then there are no trivial acts (acts which have no moral value). Every action is either moral or immoral.
 - Ex. Should you eat bacon or sausage for breakfast? According to utilitarianism, you have a moral obligation to eat whichever one maximizes utility.
- c. Supererogatory Acts--If utilitarianism is true, there are no supererogatory acts (acts which exceed our moral obligations). If an act is moral, it is a moral obligation.

- Ex. You might have thought that giving money to famine relief is supererogatory. But if it maximizes utility, you have a moral obligation to do so.
- 2. Common Response
 - a. The problems rest not with utilitarianism, but with our common moral attitudes.
 - b. "Outsmarting" the Critics--A strategy for handling a problematic consequence for your theory in which you bite the bullet and accept the consequence.

Lecture 21 Notes

Preliminary Comments

1. Making Philosophy Relevant for our Lives--Many people complain that philosophy is irrelevant to how we live our lives. In this section of the course, we will look at a philosophical argument that calls us to a radical change in our behavior.
2. The Controversial Nature of Peter Singer--Peter Singer famously argues for the morality of infanticide in certain cases. He is known for his radical views in ethics. But we ought not to dismiss the following argument just because he wrote it and has radical views in other areas.
3. Stepping Back and Thinking about our own Moral Integrity--Do we have what it would take to do the right thing in a culture that is morally misguided?

Singer's Argument

1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical attention are very bad things.
2. If we can prevent very bad things from happening, without sacrificing something of comparable (any) moral value, then we are morally required to do so.
 - a. "Comparable"--a stronger thesis; it requires us to sacrifice anything with lesser moral value than that which is being prevented. This is Singer's view.
 - b. "Any"--a weaker thesis; it requires us only to sacrifice things with no moral value.
3. Therefore, we are morally required to prevent suffering and death from lack of food shelter, and medical attention without sacrificing something of moral value.

Motivating the Second Premise

1. Three Cases:

- a. The "Shallow Pond" Case--Suppose you are dressed up for a night on the town. You are walking past a shallow pond on your way to your car and you notice that a child is drowning. It would be easy enough for you to walk out into the pond to rescue the drowning child, but you do not want to ruin your expensive suit, so you choose not to. This choice is obviously immoral; something like the principle expressed in premise 2 captures why it is immoral.
 - b. Unger's "Vintage Sedan" Case--Suppose you are driving down a fairly deserted road in your newly restored sedan. A man on the side of the road flags you down. He was trespassing on someone else's property and was shot in the leg and he is bleeding very badly. If he doesn't get to the hospital very soon, he will lose his leg. He asks if you can take him to the hospital. It would be easy enough for you to drive him to the hospital (it is on the way) but you don't want his bleeding leg to ruin the new leather in your restored sedan so you choose not to. This choice is obviously immoral; something like the principle expressed in premise 2 captures why it is immoral.
 - c. The "Envelope" Case--Suppose that you receive a letter requesting a modest donation (\$100) to save the lives of 3 children who are dying of malnutrition. The organization requesting the money is reputable and you are confident that the money would be used as specified. However, you choose not to donate the money because you are saving up for a later purchase; you throw the envelope in the trash. Why is it that this choice doesn't seem as obviously immoral as in the previous two cases?!? It seems that premise 2 would suggest that it is immoral.
2. The Vintage Sedan vs. The Envelope: Five Reasons To Think the Behavior In the Envelope Case is Morally Worse
 - a. Cost is less
 - b. Number affected by inaction is greater
 - c. What is lost is greater
 - d. Victims are not responsible for situation
 - e. Victims' behavior is not morally dubious

Hard and Disturbing Facts

1. Number of Humans Dying Preventable Deaths Daily: 25,000 (1,000/hour)
2. Age Group of Most Deaths: Under 6
3. Cause of Most Deaths: Depleted Immune Systems from Chronic Malnourishment
4. UN Target Request for Assistance from Developed Nations: 0.7% of GNP
5. Nations that Meet Target: Denmark, Sweden, The Netherlands, Norway
6. Typical Nation: Japan at 0.27%
7. Worst Contributor: America at 0.1%; 0.14% with Private Contributions
8. Americans Spend: 14 Billion on Foreign Assistance, 50 Billion on Entertainment Industry, 379 Billion on Military Budget

Lecture 22 Notes

Review: Singer's Argument

1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical attention are very bad things.
2. If we can prevent very bad things from happening, without sacrificing something of comparable (any) moral value, then we are morally required to do so.
3. Therefore, we are morally required to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical attention without sacrificing something of moral value.

Responding to the Cases

1. To respond to the cases, one needs to explain the conflicting intuitions that we have between the Pond/Sedan case, on the one hand, and the Envelope case on the other.
2. Three Possibilities
 - a. The Envelope scenario is significantly different from the Pond/Sedan scenario.
 - Reply: Modify Cases To Show That Adding or Subtracting Alleged Relevant Feature Makes No Difference
 - For example, consider a candidate relevant difference: the availability of others to help. Others are available in the envelope case but not in the pond case. However, one can modify the pond case as follows...suppose that there are hundreds of people standing around the pond watching the child drown. Does this make you any less obligated to go in after the child in your suit? Of course not. So we are still morally obligated to help even though others are available.
 - b. Our normal intuitions about the pond/sedan case are mistaken: it is morally okay not to help.
 - Reply: If We Know Anything About Morality, We Know That Not Helping is Seriously Wrong
 - c. Our normal intuitions about the envelope case are mistaken: it is morally wrong not to give.
 - Note: Many Plausible Explanations For This Mistaken Attitude. For example, we might have lacked awareness about our ability to help.

Key Features of the Second Premise

1. Irrelevance of Proximity

- a. Distance may make us feel less obligated, but it doesn't remove actual obligation.
- b. Appeals to ignorance and inability are no longer plausible. There are reliable organizations with the "pipelines" in place to help people who are suffering in other parts of the world.
- 2. Irrelevance of Others' Involvement
 - a. The inactivity of others may make us feel less obligated, but it doesn't remove actual obligation.
- 3. Only Need to Prevent Bad, Not Promote Good

Radical Consequences of the Singer/Unger Argument

- 1. Traditional Demarcation Between Duty and Charity is Mistaken
 - a. We might have thought that helping the needy is an act of charity, not a duty.
 - b. This argument points out that helping the needy is morally obligated.
 - c. It is immoral not to help the needy!
- 2. Rethinking Types of Giving
 - a. Helping Those in Need vs. Helping Those *Really* in Need
 - Giving toys to children who cannot afford them at Christmas time is helping those in need.
 - Giving nourishment to starving children is helping those really in need.
 - b. Note: Given Our Actual Situation, Rarely Need To Sacrifice One Form of Giving for Another

Objections to Singer's Argument

- 1. Too Drastic
 - a. Reply 1--Progress sometimes requires drastic revisions.
 - Slavery Analogy--Surely abolishing slavery was a drastic revision of our culture. But just because it was drastic does not mean that it should not have been done.
 - b. Reply 2--Congruance with the Catholic Tradition. It is in keeping with the Catholic tradition to believe that we have a moral obligation to help the poor, even if it involves sacrificing some of our comforts.
- 2. Extreme Socialism
 - a. Reply 1--Even if Singer's view is socialism, it is a dubious assumption that all socialism is bad.
 - b. Reply 2--Singer's view is not socialism. The argument requires only preventing very bad things from happening (not making everyone equal).
- 3. Practical Objections
 - a. Always Will Be Starvation
 - Reply 1--False Assumption

- Reply 2--One way to eliminate starvation is to work for population control. So one could contribute to organizations that work toward this goal.
- Reply 3--Return to the drowning child case: Even if there always will be a child drowning, does that make you less obligated to help as much as you can?!?
- b. Responsibility of Government
 - Reply--If you think that directly helping needy people is the responsibility of government, then you have a moral obligation to work to change government.
- c. Giving Will Undermine Our Economy
 - Reply--Confusing two scenarios: (1) All Give--Only a small amount is required of each so there will be little impact on the economy. (2) Few Give--There will be little impact on the economy.

Lecture 23 Notes

Introduction to Epistemology

1. In epistemology, we explore our access to the truth; examine human reason, perception, and knowledge.
2. We will study three greater philosophers and their different epistemologies: Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley.


Descartes' Project: Background

1. Descartes (1596-1650)
 - a. "Father" of Modern Philosophy; Multi-talented Genius
 - b. A Deeply Committed Catholic
2. The Goal: An Edifice of Knowledge
 - a. Descartes builds an inverted pyramid.
 - b. The foundation of the pyramid is what he believes he knows with certainty. Upon this certain belief, he will try to build the rest of his knowledge.
3. The Ground Rules: Avoid Error
 - a. Descartes attempts to avoid error by basing his beliefs ultimately on things that he knows with certainty.
 - b. Certainty and Justification
 - Chains of Justification--Descartes will try to build chains of justification between his beliefs.
 - Need for Certainty in First Link--In order to avoid error, the first link in the chain of justification must be known with certainty.

Seeking The Foundation

1. Method
 - a. Goal: Seeking a Solid Foundation For the Inverted Pyramid of Knowledge
 - b. Requirement: Absolute Certainty
 - c. Primary Tool: The Wrecking Ball of Cartesian Doubt
 - Cartesian vs. Ordinary Doubt--In Cartesian Doubt, we are to doubt anything that could possibly be false. In Ordinary Doubt, we doubt anything that is probably false.
 - Descartes uses this high standard for doubt as a wrecking ball on his previous edifice of knowledge. Any belief that he once held that could possibly be false will be doubted.
 - d. Labor Saving Device: Grouping Beliefs By Virtue of Their Type of Support.
 - Instead of considering each belief individually, Descartes will question sources of beliefs.
 - For example, he will group together beliefs that are formed on the basis of the senses.
2. Three Assaults on Previous Knowledge
 - a. First Assault on the Senses: The Argument from Illusion
 - The Argument--Some of our sensory beliefs turn out to be illusions. For example, at a distance a dry road may appear wet. Therefore, we should doubt all of our beliefs that are based on the senses.
 - Reply--Senses seem to work okay much of the time.
 - b. Second Assault on the Senses: The Dreaming Argument
 - The Argument--We can't be certain that we aren't now dreaming. So the beliefs we form on the basis of the senses could possibly be false. Therefore, we should doubt all of our beliefs that are based on the senses.
 - c. Third Assault on the Senses; Primary Assault on A Priori (Mathematical) Beliefs and (Almost) Everything Else: The Deceiving Demon Argument
 - The Argument--It is possible that whenever I form a belief from any source (a priori, the senses, etc) I am really being deceived by a demon.
 - This argument clears the decks with doubt. No source is immune from the deception of the demon.
 - Note: Don't Need To Believe Demon is Real; Only Possible
3. The Foundation: The "Cogito"
 - a. "Cogito" = "I exist"
 - b. The Cogito is necessarily true every time I think it.
 - c. Even to be deceived we must exist and have mental states.
 - d. In other works, Descartes identifies this foundational belief as "Cogito Ergo Sum" or "I think therefore I am".

- e. Descartes suggests that we can have certainty about the contents of the mind. We may not know if thoughts and experiences are accurate, but we can know that we are *having* such thoughts and experiences.
- f. The "Cogito" is Descartes' Archimedian Point; he will try to rebuild his entire edifice of knowledge on the basis of it.



Engraving from *Mechanics Magazine*, London, 1824 (320px x 214px)

Lecture 24 Notes

Review: Descartes' Project

1. Descartes is seeking a certain foundation for his edifice of knowledge.
2. His assaults on the senses and the apriori show that knowledge from these sources cannot be known with certainty.
3. Ultimately, the only thing we can know with certainty is the cogito ("I think").

Time Out: Reflection on Descartes' Legacy

1. Defining our True Essence: A Thinking Thing
 - a. Descartes' account of the human person as a thinking thing is the most influential account of dualism.
 - b. Dualism is the view that a human person has two components: an immaterial mind and a material body.
2. The "Ego-Centric" Predicament
 - a. The "Ego-Centric" Predicament is the difficulty with trying to penetrate the screen of perception. That is, it is difficult to see how we can get beyond our perceptions of the world to what the world is actually like.
 - b. The difficulty for Descartes is avoiding solipsism (i.e., the view that nothing is real except my mind and the thoughts taking place in my mind).

Rebuilding the Pyramid

1. Goal: Establish We Can Trust Clear and Distinct Thoughts and Perceptions
2. Available Resources: Contents of the Mind
 - a. Concept of God
 - b. Ancient Principles
 - Reality comes in degrees.
 - Cause must have as much reality as effect.
 - An idea's source must have as much formal reality as the idea's own objective reality. For example, consider an apple. My idea of an apple has as its content redness, roundness, sweetness, etc. This is the objective reality of my idea. According to this principle, the source of my idea must be red, round, and sweet. That is, the formal reality of the source of my idea must be red, round, and sweet.
3. Next Step: Establishing God's Existence
 - a. My idea of God must come from God!
 - b. This is based on the third of the ancient principles. My idea of God has as its objective reality things such as omnipotence, omniscience, all goodness, etc. According to the principle, the source of this idea must have as its formal reality omnipotence, omniscience, and all goodness.
4. Next Step: Clear and Distinct Ideas Must be Accurate
 - a. God exists and is not a deceiver.
 - b. Therefore, I am not deceived about my clear and distinct ideas.
5. Next Step: Establishing Truth of Beliefs about the World
 - a. If clear and distinct perceptions of the world are accurate, then the world must really exist as we (generally) believe it does.
 - b. Descartes has rebuilt his pyramid of beliefs on the basis of his one certain belief, the cogito.

The Problem with Descartes' Project: The Cartesian Circle

1. The Cartesian Circle--Start with the idea of God and the ancient principles. Reason that the idea of God cannot come from Descartes but must come from God. Therefore, God exists. Therefore, our clear and distinct ideas are true. However, it seems that we must already believe that our clear and distinct ideas are true in order to believe that the ancient principles are true. So Descartes reasons in a circle.
2. Why suppose that the ancient principles are correct?
 - a. The justification appears to be that they are believed clearly and distinctly. Descartes appeals to the "light of nature".
 - b. But the reliability of things understood clearly and distinctly is the very thing we must establish!!!

Lecture 25 Notes

The Enduring Problem of Perception

1. The Representational Theory of Perception
 - a. According to the representational theory of perception, we have no direct perception of anything except inner representations.
 - b. Naive View: Inner Representations Fully "Resemble" That Which They Represent. For example, my inner representation of an apple is of a round, red object. According to the naive view, the object represented is also round and red.
2. Key Problem: What Justifies Resemblance Assumption??? Note: Direct Comparison Between Representation and Represented is NOT Possible!

From Rationalism to Empiricism

1. The Rationalists: Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Chomsky
2. The Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Skinner
3. Rationalists vs. Empiricists
 - a. Innate Knowledge vs. Knowledge Through Experience--The Rationalists believe that we have innate knowledge; the Empiricists believe that we are born with a blank slate and we gain knowledge through experience of the world.
 - b. Competing Paradigms of Knowledge--Euclid vs. Newton
 - Euclidean Paradigm--First principles and axioms are used to prove other principles. The goal is certainty. This is the Rationalist paradigm.
 - Newtonian Paradigm--Observation is the source of knowledge. The goal is not certainty but predictive power or explanatory power. This is the Empiricist paradigm.

Lecture 26 Notes

Background

1. John Locke (1632-1704)
 - a. Major thinker in metaphysics, epistemology, and political philosophy.
 - b. Our Lockean Roots--One can see Locke's influence in the US Constitution.
2. Rejecting Descartes' Rationalism for an Empiricist Picture
 - a. All knowledge is based upon observation.
 - b. Non-deductive reasoning is favored instead of proofs.

Locke's Arguments Against Solipsism

1. Instead of offering a proof for the existence of an external, mind-independent, material world, Locke argues for the existence of such a world via inferences to the best explanation.
2. Puzzles for the Solipsist:
 - a. Why can't we have visual experience in the dark?
 - b. Why can't we control sensory experience?
 - c. Why is there always coherence and consistency in experience?
3. Answer: Best Explanation For the Above is the Reality of External, Mind-Independent, Material World

Locke's Account of Perception

1. Limited (Sophisticated) Representationalism
 - a. Primary Qualities (e.g., motion, number, shape, size)--These are features of things that cause similar sensations in our minds--we can experience them as they really are.
 - b. Secondary Qualities (e.g., color, taste, smell, hot & cold)--These are the power of things to cause dissimilar sensations (ideas) in our minds. In other words, these are qualities of our inner representations but not of the objects that are represented; the objects that are represented just have the power to cause these sensations.
2. Limited Representationalism is in contrast with Naive Representationalism (the view that our inner representations fully resemble that which they represent).

Lecture 27 Notes

Review: Locke's Project

1. Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities.
2. Primary Qualities (e.g., motion, number, shape, size)--These are features of things that cause similar sensations in our minds--we can experience them as they really are.
3. Secondary Qualities (e.g., color, taste, smell, hot & cold)--These are the power of things to cause dissimilar sensations (ideas) in our minds. In other words, these are qualities of our inner representations but not of the objects that are represented; the objects that are represented just have the power to cause these sensations.

Defending the Distinction Between Two Types of Qualities (Primary and Secondary)

1. Atomism and Newtonian Matter
 - a. Physical things are made out of smaller bits with only shape, size, configuration, and number.
 - b. Scientific Perspective: Geometrical properties are what matter for matter. In other words, primary qualities are what matter, not secondary.
2. Continuum from Warmth to Pain
 - a. Extreme Warmth = Pain
 - b. If pain is a mental state (not a feature of the object), then so is extreme warmth.

Variance Arguments

1. Basic Strategy: Show That Certain Features Of Our Experience Of Objects Cannot Be Actual Features Of the Object
2. First Version (Color, Taste):
 - a. It is impossible for features of material objects to change without a corresponding change in the object.
 - b. Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that change when there is no corresponding change in the object are not qualities inherent in the object.
 - Example #1--The same paint can appear one color in natural light and another color in a red light. So color can change without a corresponding change in the object.
 - Example #2--The same glass of orange juice can taste one way before you brush your teeth and another way after you brush your teeth. So taste can change without a corresponding change in the object.
 - c. Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that change when there is no corresponding change in the object are ideas.
3. Second Version (Warm and Cold):
 - a. It is impossible for features of material objects to be incompatible.
 - b. Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that are incompatible are not qualities inherent in the object.
 - Example--Suppose that you put one hand near a fire and the other hand in an ice bucket. Then you put both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water. The water will feel warm to the cold hand and cold to the warm hand. But the water in the bucket cannot be both warm and cold; these qualities are incompatible. So warmth and coldness must not be inherent in the object.
 - c. Thus, aspects of our sensory experience of an object that are incompatible are ideas.

Lecture 28 Notes

Background

1. Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753)
 - a. Eccentric Genius
 - b. Early "American" Scholar
2. Berkeley's Philosophy
 - a. Concern Over Ego-Centric Predicament
 - b. Defender of Common Sense
 - c. Rethinking Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction
 - d. Critical Question: Why suppose any resemblance between ideas and matter???

Berkeley's Idealism

1. The only things that exist are minds and their ideas!!!
2. Paradox in Berkeley's Philosophy: Berkeley Viewed Himself As the True Anti-Skeptic; As the Defender of Common Sense Views. But He Denies the Reality Of Matter!
3. Crucial distinction between ordinary objects on the one hand, and mind-independent matter, on the other hand--Ordinary objects exist; mind-independent matter does not.
 - a. Berkeley is not a solipsist. According to solipsism, objects are not real.
 - b. Berkeley does think that objects are real. However, to be real is not to be material. To be real is just to be a collection of ideas. Therefore, objects exist, but they are just collections of ideas.

Berkeley's Attack on Matter

1. Hylas and Philonous: Goal is to Avoid Skepticism
 - a. Berkeley thinks that one avoids skepticism by attacking mind-independent matter.
 - b. If objects are just collections of ideas, then our ideas cannot misrepresent objects.
2. Strategy for the Attack on Matter
 - a. First Stage: Attacking Naive Representationalism
 - Notes the continuum to pain and pleasure (see [Locke's discussion of the continuum from warmth to pain](#))
 - Variance arguments again (see [Locke's variance arguments](#))
 - b. Second Stage: Attacking Locke's Limited Representationalism
 - Berkeley uses Locke's own arguments to show that primary qualities are also mind-dependent.

Variance Arguments for Primary Qualities

- . Size depends on the perceiver. For example, a shoe might seem large to an ant but relatively small to a person.

- a. Different shapes for the same object. For example, a stool seat might appear round when one is looking at it from directly above, but it will appear oval-shaped when one is looking at it from an angle.
- b. Degree of motion depends on psychological factors. For example, a person on earth in a room judges that she is not in motion. But someone in a spaceship looking down on that person would see that they are moving as the earth rotates on its axis and orbits the sun.
- c. The Failure of Abstraction--There is no such thing as size or motion "in general".

Highlighting the Mysterious Nature of Matter: The Uselessness of "Substratum"

- . The idea of a "substratum"--Even if all of the primary qualities and secondary qualities are ideas, there must be something that causes these ideas in the mind. This something is the material substratum.
- a. Berkeley thinks the notion of a "substratum" is useless. Matter is neither perceivable nor conceivable!
 - All experienced qualities are ideas; ideas cannot exist in a non-mental substance.
 - We cannot conceive of something with no color or shape, etc. So we cannot conceive of a material substratum.
 - We cannot conceive of something unconceived.
 - No basis for inference to mind-independent matter.
 - Interaction problems--There are notorious problems with positing that matter and immaterial minds interact.

Lecture 29 Notes

Review: Berkeley's Project

1. Berkeley's Thesis--The only things that exist are minds and their ideas!!!
2. Berkeley argues for this thesis by applying Locke's variance arguments to primary qualities. The same sort of argument that Locke used to show that secondary qualities are just ideas in the mind can also be used to show that primary qualities are just ideas in the mind.

Berkeley's Defense of Common Sense

1. All qualities we perceive really ARE in the object. (Objects are just collections of ideas; the qualities are the ideas.)
2. We CAN trust our senses. (Our senses contact these collections of ideas and hence tell us what objects are really like.)
3. We CAN know things as they truly are. (What we know are the collections of ideas, and this is what objects truly are.)
4. Objects ARE real. (They are just collections of ideas as opposed to bits of mind-independent matter.)

Berkeley's Challenge: Unperceived Objects

1. The Challenge--If objects must be perceived to exist, then do things pop out of existence when no one is around???
2. Berkeley's Reply:
 - a. To avoid this absurdity, there must be a constant perceiver of everything!
 - b. There is only one candidate for this role: GOD.
 - c. Berkeley converts a potential criticism into an argument for God's existence.